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ABSTRACT 
This study explored the structural sources behind variability in the sentences 
applied to felons convicted in state courts located across the U.S.  Multilevel regression 
models were used to explore whether various state and county-level attributes help to 
account for why defendants experience a significantly higher probability of incarceration 
versus probation in certain jurisdictions. 
Drawing upon a broad theoretical landscape, the analyses test several hypotheses 
derived from macro level theories of social control which predict that that the legal and 
organizational culture of courts, and the socioeconomic and political attributes of the 
communities they serve, influence sentencing outcomes.  This study sought to fill two 
important gaps in the existing research.  First, it broadened the theoretical framework 
used to interpret community variation in punishment to include the impacts of state 
sentencing policies that have been linked to the increase in mass incarceration among 
U.S. states.  The second major goal of this study was to bring new data to bear on the 
issue of whether social and cultural attributes of communities are associated with the 
severity of the sentences their courts impose.  The analysis examines this issue by linking 
individual sentencing outcomes to aggregate-level General Social Survey (GSS) 
responses that capture community variation in public sentiment.  
The sentencing data used to test these hypotheses are derived from the State Court 
Processing Statistics (SCPS) for the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004.  Information on a 
sample of 26,000 felony cases in the SCPS were appended to a unique county and state-
level database containing measures that capture variation in sentencing policy, criminal 
statutes, correctional resources, crime rates, court case load pressures, GSS survey 
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responses, and census-derived demographic attributes.  The findings indicate that the 
average probability of being sentenced to incarceration varies significantly across court 
jurisdictions, and that differences in the types of cases courts process do not account for 
this variation.  Consistent with previous studies, the analyses reveal that commonly 
considered attributes such as county racial composition, levels of crime, and adverse 
economic conditions, exert weak or null effects on the outcomes of criminal cases.  
Analyses of the effects of legal policy reveal that defendants processed in jurisdictions 
with certain punitive sentencing policies do not face significantly higher odds of being 
incarcerated.  This finding contradicts much of the theoretical and policy literature, which 
highlights the role of more punitive sentencing policies as a key factor responsible for the 
growth in mass incarceration.   
Certain aspects of the organizational context in which courts operate, including 
the amount of state correctional spending and higher monthly probation supervision fees, 
are associated with a significantly lower likelihood of going to prison.  Models examining 
the effects of community social climate indicate that defendants convicted in 
communities with higher levels of anti-Black resentment among whites are significantly 
more likely to receive a prison versus a jail sentence, and that the odds of being sentenced 
to prison are significantly lower in jurisdictions where religious fundamentalism is more 
widespread.  A series of supplementary models separating out drug versus non-drug 
felony cases suggests that the relationship between community context and sentencing 
outcomes is complex, and that certain aspects of the broader social and legal climate only 
impact the odds of incarceration for drug offenders.  The implications of these findings 
for advancing contextual explanations of sentencing are discussed.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This research uses the State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS) to explore the 
sources behind the significant jurisdictional variation in the likelihood of incarceration 
across state felony courts.  The central premise of this study is that amidst a broader 
national trend towards more punitive crime control and the expanded use of 
incarceration, the probability of being sentenced to a period of incarceration varies 
significantly across court jurisdictions.  This study tests propositions derived from classic 
and contemporary theories of punishment, which argue that jurisdictional variation in the 
severity of sentencing can be attributed to differences in the legal cultures of states, and 
the social, political, and organizational climate in which county trial courts operate.  I 
examine these questions using State Court Processing Statistics data on felony cases filed 
between 1998 and 2004 in county trial court jurisdictions that span 19 states.   
 
Background and Significance  
“Justice by Geography” 
Sentencing scholars have long acknowledged that judges are not isolated actors, 
and that environmental conditions impact the priorities of courts and help to establish 
shared norms about what constitutes appropriate “going rates” of punishment (Eisenstein 
et al., 1988; Feld, 1991; Gibson, 1980; Kramer, 2009; Myers and Talarcio, 1987; Ulmer, 
1997).  These observations have important implications for sentencing.  Despite a US 
legal culture emphasizing formal rationality and equal protection under the law, the 
potential for “justice by geography” undermines the core legal principles of most modern 
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democratic societies (Feld, 1991; Savelsberg, 1994; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004).  Though 
there are legitimate reasons why jurisdictions may vary in the leniency of sentencing, 
local variations to state or federal law can signal troubling evidence of local courts’ 
hostility to sentencing policy out of bias or prejudice (Bibas, 2005). Moreover, 
geographic variations in the sentencing of otherwise similar defendants that is “too great 
or too blatant comes at the steep price of inequality, unfairness, and reduced deterrence.” 
(Bibas, 2005: 138).  
Yet criminal courts in the U.S. are, by design, uniquely susceptible to geographic 
disparities for a number of reasons.  Sentencing is the most visible stage of the criminal 
justice process in the U.S., and the only point at which citizens may openly observe and 
participate.  Although most citizens have little direct contact with the courts, legal 
scholars maintain that court processing in the U.S. is unusually sensitive to political 
pressure since in most jurisdictions judges and prosecutors are locally elected, and 
because criminal justice authority in the U.S. is concentrated in state and local 
governments that can (and often do) quickly adjust crime control strategies to fit with 
changing structural pressures (Zimring & Johnson, 2006: 277; Helms, 2009; Helms and 
Jacobs, 2002).  These features make courts in the U.S. a fertile context in which to study 
how sentencing decisions may be sensitive to the broader social climate in which courts 
are embedded. 
 
The Current Context of Criminal Sentencing 
Several recent developments in U.S. corrections have brought the social, political, 
and economic backdrop of sentencing into sharp focus.  Two recent Supreme Court 
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decisions struck down provisions of the federal and state presumptive guideline schemes, 
leaving these jurisdictions struggling to find ways to maintain judicial discretion while 
also minimizing the potential for unwarranted sentencing disparities (e.g., Bushway and 
Piehl, 2007).   In addition, spending on corrections is now the fastest growing general 
fund expenditure for states (Scott-Hayward, 2009).  And for the first time in over two 
decades the annual rate of growth in state correctional populations has slowed, leading to 
speculation that budget deficits are prompting states to accelerate the rate of prison 
releases and to rethink the severity of criminal sanctions for nonviolent offenses 
(Lawrence, 2008; Sabol, West, and Cooper, 2009; Scott-Hayward, 2009; Wilhelm and 
Turner, 2002).  Fiscal constraints have so far motivated at least six state legislatures to 
expand community corrections in order to control prison costs, and to help stem the flood 
of state revenue away from other important state functions (Lawrence, 2008; Warren, 
2009). 
This is a remarkable turnaround after decades of steady growth in state 
incarceration rates and it illustrates just a few of the ways in which broader structural 
changes impact the work of courts.  However, signs of a slowdown in incarceration come 
with two caveats.  The recent decline in the overall rate of incarceration among states 
between 2008 and 2009 was driven primarily by decreases in jail inmates, not prison 
inmates (Glaze, 2010). The second caveat is that while the annual rate of growth in state 
prison populations is leveling off, prison population declines appear to be driven by 
reductions in parole revocations more so than decreases in the rate of new court 
commitments to prison (Glaze, 2009).   Moreover, while the magnitude of prison growth 
is slowing, the raw size of prison populations continued to increase between 2008 and 
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 11 
2009, at which point the U.S. reached a critical threshold- now more than 1 in 100 U.S. 
adults is incarcerated in prison or jail (Glaze, 2010; Warren, 2009).1  Currently, the rate 
of incarceration in the U.S. remains the highest in the world at 750 inmates per 100,000 
residents, an increase of 76% since 1987 (Langan, 1991; West, 2010).  Remarkably, the 
period of steady growth in prison populations during the 1990s occurred amidst a 
sustained crime drop, and data show that the growing use of prison reflects changes in 
sentencing behavior more so than changes in reported crime or arrests (Blumstein and 
Beck, 1999; Langan, 1991; Raphael, 2009).   
Though there are signs that local jurisdictions are easing their reliance on 
incarceration, there is little evidence to suggest that the propensity to incarcerate felony 
offenders has declined significantly.  Since the 1990s, a number of studies have examined 
the factors behind the unprecedented levels of incarceration in the U.S. (Austin and Irwin, 
2000; Beckett and Sasson, 2000; Garland, 2001; Langan, 1991; Tonry, 1995, 1996).  A 
persuasive claim emerging from this work is that courts began to increasingly impose 
incarceration terms not because the composition of individual judges or prosecutors 
shifted, or because courtroom actors independently adopted a more punitive orientation to 
punishment (Tonry, 1996).  Rather, the theme emerging from recent legal research is one 
of adaptation.  Punishment philosophies began to change in the 1980s, and courts were 
forced in many jurisdictions to adopt sentencing practices triggered by legislative 
pressure to apply more “just,” determinate, and uniform sanctions, (Beckett and Sasson, 
2000; Feeley & Simon, 1992; Garland, 2001; Lynch, 2005; Tonry, 1996).  
                                                
1 In 2009, Pennsylvania and Florida experienced the largest increases in the size of state prison populations 
(Glaze, 2010). 
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What are the sources of these pressures to mete out more uniform and punitive 
sanctions?  The theoretical literature points to the increasing saliency of crime in 
everyday life, that political rhetoric on crime tacitly stoked anti-black racial prejudice, 
that public sentiment gained greater influence in forming sentencing policy, and that 
discourse regarding the appropriate response to crime has become more ideologically 
charged in recent decades (Beckett and Sasson, 2000; Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz, 2004; 
Garland, 2001; Steiger, 1998; Tonry, 1996).   Some explain this newfound reliance on 
incarceration as the result of the war on drugs, which resulted in significant growth in the 
proportion of drug arrestees sentenced to imprisonment (Austin and Irwin, 2000; Beckett 
and Sasson, 2000; Blumstein and Beck, 1999).  Others argue that a politicizing of crime 
paved the way for state lawmakers to experiment with parole abolishment, mandatory 
minimums, and ‘three-strikes’ laws that favor incapacitation and deterrence over 
rehabilitation (Garland, 2001; Raphael, 2009; Tonry, 1999; Zimring and Johnson, 2006).  
This policy explanation for the growing use of incarceration has gained considerable 
traction, and it is now “conventional wisdom” among criminologists that sentencing 
reforms are the primary factor responsible for changes in the severity of sentencing 
(Engen, 2009: 329).  For example, in a highly publicized report documenting that 1 in 
100 U.S. adults are now behind bars, researchers at the PEW Center concluded: 
“…lawmakers are learning that current prison growth is not driven primarily by an 
increase in crime, or a corresponding surge in the population at large.  Rather, it flows 
principally from a wave of policy choices that are sending more lawbreakers to prison 
and, through popular ‘three-strikes’ measures and other sentencing enhancements, 
keeping them there longer” (Warren, 2008: 3).  The underlying assumption of this 
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 13 
argument is that policies have significantly increased the severity sentencing above and 
beyond the effects of legally relevant factors such as offense severity and prior criminal 
history.  While this seems reasonable, there is little evidence to support such conclusions 
(Engen, 2009).  In fact, several macro level studies show that the adoption of sentencing 
guidelines and determinate sentencing either fail to significantly impact incarceration 
rates at all, or in some cases, are associated with reductions in incarceration rates (Engen, 
2009; Greenberg and West, 2001; Marvell and Moody, 1996; Stucky, Heimer and Lang, 
2005).  Similarly, the passage of mandatory minimums in many states in the 1970s did 
not correspond with a swelling prison population of repeat offenders and those who 
committed offenses targeted by the mandatory provisions (Langan, 1991).  Yet the 
popular explanations for why certain jurisdictions are more or less punitive favor the 
explanation that “policy choices drive growth” (Warren, 2008: 3).  In sum, though 
scholars disagree on which factors shape the tendency of courts to mete out more punitive 
sanctions, the consistent theme of recent scholarship on incarceration and sentencing is 
that judges enjoy considerably less autonomy than in previous decades, and that the 
broader social and legal context in which sentencing occurs matters more than ever. 
 
The Variability of Sentencing across State Court Jurisdictions 
While reorienting theorizing on punishment back to the importance of social and 
political context, the tone of these explanations (most notably present in Garland’s 
‘Culture of Control,’ 2001) is suggestive of a monolithic “get tough” approach to crime 
control within the US.  This broad description is misleading. Though every state 
experienced some increase in the prison admissions over the last thirty years, the severity 
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of sanctions applied to felony defendants, and presumably the rationale for this severity, 
varies widely within the United States.  For instance, during the 1980s the degree of 
variability in state incarceration rates was greater than the variability in incarceration 
observed across all of the countries in Western Europe (Zimring and Hawkins, 1991 cited 
in Frost, 2008: 277).  New court-imposed prison sentences in Southern states typically 
double the number of new prison sentences imposed by trial courts located in the West 
and Northeast (Sabol, West, and Cooper, 2008).  At the local level, data from the State 
Court Processing Statistics indicate that the proportion of convicted felons sentenced to 
incarceration in large urban courts rose for the fifth straight year to a new high of 75% in 
2002 (Cohen & Reaves, 2006).  However, this ranged from as low as 40% of convicted 
felons in Birmingham, Alabama to as high as 96% in Houston, Texas.  These same data 
show that the overall mean prison sentence length for felony offenses in 2002 was 58 
months; but this ranged from a low of 28 months in Fulton County, Georgia to a mean 
sentence of 253 months in Salt Lake County, Utah.   
What explains this variation?  A number of studies have examined jurisdictional 
variation in prosecutorial decision-making (Baumer and Martin, 2011; Cooney and Burt, 
2008; Wooldredge and Thistlewaite, 2004), guideline departures (Johnson, 2005; Johnson 
et al., 2008), the odds of incarceration (Fearn, 2005; King et al., 2010; Myers and 
Talarico, 1987; Pardoe and Weidner, 2006; Wang and Mears, 2010; Weidner et al., 2004, 
2005), and sentence lengths (Baumer and Martin, 2011; Britt, 2000; Cooney and Burt, 
2008; Helms and Jacobs, 2002; Huang et al., 1996; Johnson, 2006; Myers and Talarico, 
1987; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).  These studies consistently show modest but significant 
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inter-jurisdictional variation in sentencing severity, even within states that operate under 
structured sentencing schemes.   
These studies have had less success, however, in identifying which community 
attributes consistently impact sentencing outcomes. Most of this research has focused on 
investigating the effects of variables emphasized in functionalist, conflict, Durkheimian, 
and Weberian theories of law and punishment.  These theories typically emphasize that 
crime rates, the size of poor and minority populations, geographic region, political and 
religious conservatism, and variation in the size and caseload pressures of courts impact 
sentencing outcomes. Though there are some exceptions, the findings from this research 
reveal that most contextual variables exert no influence on the outcomes of individual 
cases.  When studies do report significant relationships between county-level attributes 
and sentencing outcomes, the effects generally tend to be weak and at times inconsistent 
with theoretical expectations. Consequently, despite a sizeable body of theoretical work 
suggesting local context should shape the nature of punishment courts mete out, no 
consistent set of findings has emerged to answer the basic question of why some 
communities, on average, impose significantly more punitive sanctions in felony cases. 
Though many studies report null findings, this area of research has still yielded 
some important insights that suggest a need for further research.  For instance studies of 
sentencing outcomes in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Federal District courts highlight 
the importance of organizational constraints such as jail crowding, caseload pressure, and 
jurisdiction size (e.g. Dixon, 1995; Johnson, 2005; Ulmer and Bradley, 2006; Ulmer, 
Bader, and Gault, 2008).  A handful of studies that analyze sentencing decisions from the 
State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS) also suggest that the racial and ethnic makeup of 
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communities may help to explain why defendants in some jurisdictions experience 
significantly higher odds of imprisonment upon conviction (Helms, 2009; King, Johnson, 
and McGeever, 2010; Pardoe and Weidner, 2006; Wang and Mears, 2010; Weidner, 
Frase, and Schultz, 2005).  Last, recent studies have theoretically expanded their focus 
and find that more conservative religious climates, the characteristics of judges, and the 
racial makeup of the local legal workforce help to account for cross-jurisdictional 
variability in the severity of sentencing (Fearn, 2005; Johnson, 2006; King et al., 2010; 
Ulmer, Bader, and Gault, 2008). 
 
Limitations of Prior Research 
Despite these advances, contextual sentencing research remains limited in some 
important respects.  Most prior research consists of studies conducted in a handful of 
states, the majority of which operate under presumptive guidelines. We know a good deal 
now about sentencing in Washington, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and in the Federal 
system (Miller, 2005).  However, the results from these studies may have limited 
generalizeability.  Most states do not operate under sentencing guidelines, and analyses of 
sentencing using samples from presumptive guideline states likely provide a conservative 
test of the extent and sources behind geographic disparities in punishment because 
guidelines are designed in part to mitigate the potential for such disparities.   
Multi-state studies that analyze case outcomes from the State Court Processing 
Statistics (SCPS) have helped broaden the geographic scope of contextual sentencing 
research, but suffer from crucial methodological and conceptual problems.  First, these 
studies have employed two-level research designs that pool defendants and counties from 
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across the U.S. as if they were sentenced within the same state (Fearn, 2005; Helms and 
Jacobs, 2002; Pardoe and Weidner, 2006; Weidner, Frase, and Pardoe, 2004; Weidner et 
al., 2005).  Yet, the states that participate in the SCPS exhibit diverse legal contexts.  
Some of the states have no structured sentencing scheme in place to minimize the 
potential for local variations in sentencing.  Others have formal guideline grids that allow 
(and in some cases require) judges to consider more than the seriousness of the current 
offense, which may disadvantage defendants with more extensive criminal histories 
(Engen and Gainey, 2000; Frase, 1997).  Likewise, there is considerable variation in the 
purposes and discretion (voluntary vs. presumptive) afforded by various guideline 
schemes.  This is not to mention the variability across states in the adoption of mandatory 
sentencing policies and habitual offender laws.  Yet the analyses from recent multi-state 
contextual sentencing studies treat these cases as if they operate under a single legal 
structure that performs in the same fashion for every defendant in every jurisdiction 
(Bushway and Piehl, 2007).  As a result these studies have likely overstated the degree to 
which jurisdictional variation is due to local political and social dynamics, and 
underestimated the extent to which jurisdictional differences stem from state legal rules 
and guidelines that regulate judicial decision making.  If so, these multistate studies may 
have confounded the estimated effects of conservative political climate, levels of crime, 
or county racial composition with variations across jurisdictions in the severity of 
sentencing options state penal codes provide judges.  In other words, it may be that 
community levels of crime and a more politically conservative voter base help to foster 
punitive legislation rather than punitive judges.  Thus, it remains unclear whether studies 
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of jurisdictional variation in punishment severity are modeling judicial or legislative 
behavior.   
Ignoring state sources of variation also neglects one of the more critical policy 
issues that case-level data are uniquely situated to examine.  The emergence of state 
sentencing reforms is among the most significant legal developments in the U.S. courts 
during the past century, yet there are few studies that compare the severity of sentencing 
across these various sentencing systems.  For instance, prior studies have not addressed 
claims that controversial reforms such as mandatory enhancements, punitive drug 
penalties, and three-strikes laws truly increase the severity of sentencing above and 
beyond the effects of legally relevant case factors (Engen, 2009).  This omission from the 
multilevel literature is surprising since a number of macro level studies reveal that state 
spending, revenue, and policy reforms play an important role in explaining growth in 
incarceration (Raphael, 2009; Spelman, 2009; Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson, 2005).  
Though the findings from research on prison admission and incarceration rates are 
intriguing, incarceration rates confound arrest, conviction, incarceration, sentence length, 
and parole decisions.  Thus, unlike case-level sentencing data, these aggregate level 
studies cannot isolate the stage at which sentencing reforms impact punishment, nor can 
they disentangle the effects of policy from those of legally relevant factors such as the 
severity of the offense.  Accordingly, a major goal of this study is to broaden existing 
contextual research by incorporating measures of various state legal policies and 
organizational attributes that are predicted to directly impact the way courts sentence.  
Another key shortcoming of the research is the lack of data that directly tap public 
sentiment and cohesion.  For instance, classic Neo-Durkheimian perspectives on social 
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control argue that the severity of punishment in reflects the cultural sensibilities and 
attitudes of community members.  A few of the community norms emphasized by this 
perspective are religious and political values, social cohesion and trust, and norms and 
attitudes that shape residents’ tolerance for more or less repressive punishment styles.  
Numerous researchers have voiced a need to incorporate these types of direct measures 
into studies of social control (Liska, 1993; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).  However, data 
restrictions have forced researchers to rely primarily on Census and official crime data to 
capture community social context.  This limitation is important for a number of reasons.  
First, census-derived measures of racial composition, poverty and unemployment, region, 
age structure, and political representation provide only indirect tests of the theoretical 
processes believed to shape variation in formal social control.  For instance, community 
racial composition and unemployment have each been the subject of a good deal of 
research on spatial variation in various social control outcomes (e.g., police force size, 
sentencing, prison admissions).  Most of this research is informed by conflict theory, 
which interprets the relationship between threatening populations and the severity of 
social control as evidence of social “threat” (Liska, 1992).  An equally plausible 
possibility though, and one that is supported by survey research, is that larger populations 
of the poor and non-whites impact social control primarily in an indirect way by shaping 
levels of fear among local residents (e.g., Liska, Lawrence, and Sanchirico, 1981; 
Quillian and Pager, 2001; see also Baumer and Martin, 2011).  Ulmer and Johnson 
(2004) recently concluded that for reason like these, future studies should consider more 
refined and specific survey measures of local public attitudes on a range of criminal 
justice concerns.  Another reason why more direct measures of public sentiment can 
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advance contextual sentencing research is that a good deal of the theoretical literature 
highlighting the role of policy in shaping sentencing behavior has been careful to point 
out that punitive statutes such as three-strikes laws and mandatory minimums are 
successful only insofar as the public provides political support for them (Garland, 2001; 
Tonry, 1999).  This insight suggests that depending on the local social climate, state legal 
policies may be met with varying degrees of tolerance in local communities and that local 
public sentiments play an important role in forming the broader social environment from 
which prosecutors and judges formulate “going rates” of punishment for most offenses 
(Kramer, 2009).   
 
The Current Study 
This research attempts to overcome some of these limitations by taking a more 
comprehensive theoretical approach that considers the relevance of a broad array of 
community and state attributes. This project builds upon recent work by Baumer and 
Martin (2011) which expanded the consideration of the social and organizational believed 
to shape punishment, while paying significant attention to the role of legal statutes and 
policies that shape the boundaries of judicial decision making and may serve to limit the 
influence of cultural and political features of communities on the sentencing process.  
The study develops and tests hypotheses derived from the macro structural theories of 
punishment which highlight the importance of social norms and values, organizational 
constraints and resources, and neo-Weberian perspectives which view sentencing in 
urban courts as highly “rationalized” and consistent with the rule of law.  While previous 
studies have examined the effects of a few of these characteristics, no prior research has 
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systematically tested the propositions from much of the theoretical literature that focuses 
explicitly on the effects that more punitive legal statutes, financial resources, and public 
sentiments are believed to have on decisions to incarcerate felons.  
The current study examines the effects of social, organizational, and legal climate 
on the likelihood that convicted felons are sentenced to incarceration versus probation.  
The data for this study come from the State Court Processing Statistics, which contains 
information on felony criminal cases processed in 60 large urban courts between 1998 
and 2004. The SCPS is a biennial collection of felony cases that are followed from the 
original filing decision up until the final sentencing disposition. The SCPS includes 
information on the characteristics of defendants, their prior criminal history, the severity 
of the offense for which they were arrested and convicted, the mode of adjudication, and 
information on key decisions prior to sentencing such as bail and charging decisions. 
These data also contain geographic identifiers that were used to construct a multilevel 
database describing the social and legal contexts in which these cases were processed.   
To test these hypotheses a unique three-level multilevel database was constructed 
that contains data describing the communities and states in which felony cases were 
processed.  I incorporate more direct indicators of social and cultural context from a 
version of the General Social Survey (GSS) that contains census FIPS codes identifying 
the metropolitan areas in which respondents live.  Using these codes, responses were 
aggregated to construct measures that have been identified in survey research as 
important indicators of more punitive orientations.   These include GSS items tapping 
religious and political conservatism, support for harsh sanctions, levels of fear, social 
trust, and racial resentment among whites.  In addition, another unique aspect of this 
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study is the inclusion of policy variables that tap jurisdictional variation in sentencing 
structure and the presence of substantive sentencing policies that aimed at increasing the 
overall severity of sentencing.  These measures are derived from a sentencing policy 
database originally designed and made available by researchers at the Vera Institute 
(Stemen et al., 2005).  This data base provided information on the presence of sentencing 
guidelines, determinate sentencing structures, truth in sentencing provisions, the breadth 
of mandatory minimum enhancements in each state’s penal code, whether the 
jurisdictions in the SCPS have three-strikes policies for habitual offenders, as well as the 
minimum statutory sentences each state imposes for the possession and sale of cocaine.  
Finally, this research goes beyond prior studies by examining the effects of a broader 
array of organizational factors that constrain the sentencing options available to judges, 
and that may provide incentives for more lenient sanctions.  Specifically, data were 
gathered that capture state variation in correctional spending, the ability of local and state 
authorities to collect fees that offset the costs of probation supervision, the availability of 
jail and prison space, and the workload of local prosecutors.  Finally, this research 
replicates previous studies by examining the effects of crime rates, region, racial and 
ethnic composition, and economic conditions on sentencing.   
 Using a sample of over 26,000 felony cases that resulted in conviction, the 
analyses explore the outcomes of criminal cases using a dependent variable for sentence 
type that consists of prison, jail, and non-custodial sentences (i.e., probation and fines). 
A series of hierarchical multinomial regression models were estimated to addresses two 
general research questions.  First, does the likelihood of incarceration vary significantly 
across county and state jurisdictions net of any differences across courts in the severity of 
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their caseloads?  Second, do aspects of the jurisdictional legal, social, and organizational 
climate explain this variation?  The models examining the effects of legal policies on 
sentencing address an additional set of research questions.  First, what are the effects, if 
any, of sentencing policy on the severity of sentencing?  Second, do sentencing policies 
such as presumptive guidelines and three-strikes laws that give special weight to prior 
offending indirectly increase the severity of sentencing by strengthening the weight 
courts place on having a prior felony record?  Third, given the emphasis in the sentencing 
literature on the increase in the severity of sanctions for drug offenders over the past two 
decades, this study also conducts a separate analysis of variation in sentences meted out 
to drug offenders.  Specifically, this study examines whether sentencing policies impact 
drug offenders in unique ways, and second, whether variation in state drug laws explain 
the higher probability of incarceration observed for drug offenders in certain 
jurisdictions.  Prior research examining the social contexts of incarceration decisions has 
not explicitly considered the possibility that legal and social contexts may impact the 
sentencing of drug offenders in unique ways.  This distinction may be important as 
certain social contexts may only increase punitive responses toward serious violent 
offenders, while prompting more therapeutic forms of sanctioning for drug offenders (e.g. 
Simmons, 1999).  
Models assessing organizational perspectives address whether sentences are on 
average less punitive in jurisdictions experiencing prison and jail overcrowding, where 
there are higher correctional expenditures, greater caseload pressure on prosecutors, and 
greater fiscal offsets that promote the use of probation in lieu of jail and prison. 
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A series of models designed to test social conflict explanations of social control 
assess whether incarceration terms are more likely in jurisdictions that contain larger 
populations of non-whites and the poor, higher levels of economic inequality and 
unemployment.  The analyses then explore whether levels of fear within the community 
mediate the relationships between social threat and sentence type. 
Finally, data from the GSS are used to explore whether defendants face a 
significantly higher probability of being sentenced to incarceration in jurisdictions where 
residents are more socially conservative, where support for harsh sanctions is more 
widespread, and where mutual trust and interdependence are weaker. 
The study is organized in the following manner.  Chapter 2 briefly summarizes 
the state of the literature devoted to jurisdictional variations in sentencing severity and 
summarizes the hypotheses examined in the current research.  Chapter 3 describes the 
methods and data used for assessing the effects of jurisdictional legal, organizational, and 
social climate on the outcomes of criminal cases.  Chapter 4 presents the findings from a 
series of hierarchical multinomial regression models that test the hypothesized effects of 
various aspects of legal, organizational and social climate emphasized in the theoretical 
literature on sentencing and social control.  Chapter 5 concludes the study by discussing 
the implications and limitations of the research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PRIOR RESEARCH, THEORY, AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This research examines whether, net of jurisdictional differences in caseloads, 
state courts’ social, political, legal and organizational climate significantly impact the 
odds that a defendant will be confined to prison or jail versus probation or fines.  In this 
chapter I review previous studies that have examined the effects of courtroom social 
climate on incarceration and guideline departure decisions.  The latter half of this chapter 
describes the theories that have been used to interpret community variation in the severity 
of punishment.  There are five distinct explanations that inform the literature:  structural 
functionalist models, legal rationality models emphasizing procedural rules and a 
punitive legal culture, organizational efficiency models, conflict models which link harsh 
sanctions to the presence of “problem populations,” and neo-Durkheimian models which 
emphasize community cohesion and the moralistic aspects of punishment.  I conclude the 
chapter by summarizing the specific hypotheses that are tested in the current study.   
 
BACKGROUND 
Micro and Macro Approaches to Studying Punishment 
Traditionally, sentencing research has been conducted at the individual level, with 
an emphasis on estimating the degree of variation in sentencing that can be attributed to 
defendant social status characteristics such as age, race, and gender (Bushway and Piehl, 
2007; Sampson and Laub, 1993).  The findings from this extensive body of research 
confirms that legal characteristics associated with the severity of the offense and prior 
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criminal history are the most powerful and consistent predictors of sentencing outcomes 
(see Engen and Gainey, 2000; Ulmer, 2000; Spohn, 2000 for reviews).  This research also 
suggests that when racial and sex –based disparities arise, they are most pronounced in 
the decision of whether to incarcerate more so than the length of imprisonment (Hagan 
and Bumiller, 1983; Spohn, 2000; Spohn and Cederblom, 1991; Welch, Spohn, and 
Gruhl, 1985; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998; Ulmer, 2000).  Yet, the growing 
consensus among sentencing scholars is that the symbolic importance attached to 
defendant attributes as well as the ways in which the courts respond to felony crime in 
general are geographically contingent (Myers and Talarico, 1987; Peterson and Hagan, 
1984; Spohn, 2000).  
In this regard, macro level research on incarceration rates using states and 
counties as units of analysis have filled a void in our understanding of how and why the 
severity of sanctioning varies across U.S. jurisdictions.  These studies demonstrate that 
the frequency with which states incarcerate and invoke the death penalty are determined 
in part by crime rates, the presence of populations perceived as threatening, residents’ 
tolerance of certain types of crime, and the capacity to mobilize resources to respond to it 
(e.g., Crawford, Chiricos, and Kleck, 1998).   Until recently these two streams of research 
(individual and macro level studies) remained relatively separate from each other. This 
resulted in an expansive but fragmented body of work that separated the micro level 
correlates of sentencing from the broader trends in the size and growth of prison 
populations across the states.  Both micro and macro approaches to understanding the use 
of imprisonment provide critical insights on the nature of punishment in the U.S., but 
both are limited in important respects.  
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Individual-level sentencing studies leave out of account the widespread patterns 
of punishment in the U.S. that are suggestive of important state and county differences in 
their approach to crime control.  For instance, the goals of sentencing are not uniform 
across jurisdictions (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Ulmer, 1997).  The purposes of 
sentencing may be incapacitation in some communities, retribution in others, while a 
greater emphasis may be placed on the rehabilitative ideal in other court contexts.  
Consider for example that the adoption of determinate sentencing schemes in California, 
Ohio, Kansas and Arizona coincided with legislative action to alter their respective penal 
codes to proclaim that “punishment” would become the primary purpose of sentencing.2  
This stands in contrast with the move by Wisconsin, Illinois, and New York to legislate 
that sentencing be carried out for the purposes of community safety (i.e., deterrence) and 
rehabilitation of the offender, rather than retribution.  Claiming a retributive punishment 
philosophy may merely represent symbolic gestures on the part of politicians, but they 
underscore the need for a comparative assessment of individual felony case processing 
across multiple states and their local courts.  
State level studies that draw from conflict, economic, and political models of 
punishment to explain prison populations and their growth provide an important point of 
departure from the individual level sentencing literature by recognizing that structural 
conditions other than crime provoke prison use, but these studies also suffer from some 
crucial limitations. First, although states dictate the legal parameters of sentencing, 
criminal court processing and sentencing is organized at the county level (Bridges, 
                                                
2 This information was gleaned from a variable contained in the Vera Institute Sentencing Policy Database 
collected by Stemen, Rengifo, and Wilson (2005). The variable provides a description of the purposes of 
punishment according to state penal codes.  This stated purpose is usually provided at the very beginning of 
each state’s penal code. 
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Crutchfield, and Simpson, 1987; Eisenstein, Flemming, and Nardulli, 1988).  Scholars 
familiar with legal decision making in guideline states seem to agree that while 
guidelines and other state-imposed laws provide meaningful boundaries that judges 
generally follow, they are nonetheless mediated by informal local community processes 
and organizational constraints that govern informal norms about appropriate penal 
sanctions (Engen and Steen, 2000; Gainey, Steen, and Engen, 2005; Johnson, 2003, 2005; 
Ulmer and Kramer, 1996; Ulmer, 1997).  Second, aggregate level research using states 
and counties as units of analysis measure legal sanctioning using incarceration and prison 
commitment rates, but in doing so, may confound jurisdictional differences in 
punishment severity with differences in the regularity with which states and counties 
punish.  For instance, a growing number of studies reveal that the certainty of prosecution 
and conviction is contingent upon the county and states in which defendants are arrested 
(Baumer and Martin, 2011; Cooney and Burt, 2008; Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; 
Wooldredge and Thistlewhaite, 2002).  These studies provide important clues to 
uncovering the sources of geographic differences in the severity of felony sentencing; 
namely, that some jurisdictions and states will have a higher volume of incarceration (i.e., 
they appear to be more punitive) because they prosecute, deny bail, and convict more 
suspects that come to the attention of police and prosecutors.  Using the same logic, 
studies of incarceration conducted exclusively at the state and county level may confound 
the affects of structural conditions such as the economy and political conservatism with 
differences across courts in the types of cases and defendants processed, as well as parole 
board decision making.  
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Contextual Studies of Criminal Case Dispositions 
Recognition that legal processes vary across jurisdictions spurred several 
groundbreaking studies aimed at uncovering the organizational and social sources of 
variability in the application of law.  In particular, case studies of nine court jurisdictions 
located in Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania by Eisenstein and colleagues (1988) 
provided an important step towards merging these previously separate frameworks for 
understanding punishment. One of the key insights to emerge from this research is that 
the “going rates” of punishment differed across court jurisdictions as a function of three 
things:  differences in the severity of state legal codes and varying prison capacities, 
differences in how courts informally negotiate pleas and charging, and the county’s 
political culture. Reiterating the importance of legal context, the authors concluded that 
minimum and maximum penalties dictated in state penal codes not only explains why 
punishment is more severe in certain jurisdictions (in this instance, Michigan), but that 
more severe penalties generally signal that “state political culture supports strict 
punishment, encouraging higher incarceration rates and longer terms,” and that higher 
prison capacities “provide the opportunity to translate that desire to punish into reality.” 
(Eisenstein et al., 1988: 225).  However, this research also uncovered that legislative 
sentencing reforms “from above” had widely varying results across jurisdictions because 
local norms about punishment and organizational priorities differed greatly from county 
to county. On the latter point, the authors explain that more “moralistic” political cultures 
view government as a means of making judgments and improving society, and is defined 
to a good degree by the ideological and religious leanings of local residents. These 
conclusions point to the importance that the cultural sensibilities of communities, state 
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legal context, and the organizational barriers or opportunities to realize any influences 
that social and legal culture provide are key to explaining why punishment is on average 
more severe in some jurisdictions.  This study encouraged a new theoretical interest in 
understanding the nuanced ways that local courts differ in their goals, strategies, political 
climate, and ideological values in ways that might contradict the goals of sentencing set 
forth by state legislatures (Eisenstein et al., 1988; Engen and Steen, 2000; Ulmer, 1997).   
Other advancements include work by Spohn and colleagues on rape case 
processing in the 1980s, which highlighted the various success and failures among six 
counties as they adapted to state rape law reforms (Spohn and Horney, 1992).  They 
found that prosecutors in certain jurisdictions were significantly more committed to 
pursuing convictions and stiff penalties in sexual assault cases, while statutory changes to 
rape law in other jurisdictions produced little change on the part of prosecutors (Spohn 
and Horney, 1992; Welch, Spohn, and Gruhl, 1985).  Another significant study to lay the 
foundation for contemporary contextual research was conducted by Myers and Talarico 
(1987).  The authors examined sentencing decisions handed down in Georgia courts 
during the 1970s and found that that the likelihood of incarceration is greater in urban 
courts and where there is a greater presence of blacks and the unemployed.   More 
importantly, Myers and Talarico began the first systematic effort to replicate research 
emerging at the time that suggested that judicial decisions are sensitive to public opinion 
(Cook, 1977; Kuklinski and Stanga, 1979).  In their conversations with mayors, judges 
and law enforcement, the authors noted a keen awareness among court personnel that 
judges face pressure by a public that perceives sentences as too lenient (Myers and 
Talarico, 1987: 31-32).  In sum, each of the studies just discussed were among the first to 
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 31 
establish that sentencing decisions reflect a delicate balance between the role 
expectations of judges as fair and consistent arbiters and the pressures placed on them by 
public perceptions and organizational constraints.   
Recognizing the merits of both approaches, contemporary multilevel sentencing 
literature merges considerations of individual, organizational, and community level 
factors in the study of criminal case disposition.  In doing so, the empirical evidence from 
multilevel studies have helped clarify three points of contention in the study of 
sentencing: 1) they demonstrate that state and county variability in the rate at which they 
imprison offenders is tied primarily to the characteristics of the case and the way courts 
process them; 2) That despite the clear import of individual-level criteria for predicting 
sentencing outcomes, a significant amount of variability in sentencing severity remains 
unexplained by case and defendant characteristics, even within states with presumptive 
guideline structures in place; and 3) that a modest but significant portion of this 
variability can be explained by several aspects of the broader social and organizational 
context, including racial and ethnic composition, court case load pressure, religious 
conservatism, and levels of crime .  In sum, individual studies of the legal process 
underscore that community differences in the severity of punishment reflects differences 
in the nature and severity of crime, but that this variability is also symbolic of local 
norms and interests; the very factors emphasized in classic macro level theories of social 
control and implied in the decision making processes described in current theories of 
sentencing (e.g., focal concerns and causal attribution theories). 
 The findings from contemporary contextual studies (most of which use more 
sophisticated hierarchical modeling procedures) are summarized in Table 2.1.  This table 
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has several purposes.  The body of research examining the social contexts of 
incarceration decisions is complex, owing largely to the diversity of the samples used and 
the multitude of ways in which researchers have operationalized various theoretical 
concepts.  For example, a glimpse at the column headings of Table 2.1 demonstrates that 
there is little consensus on how to best measure levels of crime and adverse economic 
conditions (e.g., unemployment, economic inequality, poverty, overall disadvantage).  
Thus, this table is designed to succinctly summarize both the geographic and theoretical 
scope of prior research, while providing a snapshot of the empirical support for each of 
these perspectives in a way that gives attention to potentially important measurement 
differences across these studies.  
Looking at the far-left column of the Table, the studies are grouped according to 
whether they analyze a sample of cases within a single system (i.e., one state or the 
Federal system) versus a sample of cases across courts located in multiple state 
jurisdictions.  The first group of studies listed includes those that analyze sentencing 
within Georgia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and the Federal system.  These studies represent the 
bulk of contextual sentencing research. Underneath this grouping, studies that examine 
jurisdictional variability in sentencing using samples of cases pooled from across 
multiple states are listed.  All but one of these multistate studies analyzes data from the 
State Court Processing Statistics (Helms, 2009 is an exception).  Within each of these 
groupings, the studies are listed down the left-hand column in order of the year they were 
published.  
The first theoretical “block” of predictors shown along the top left-hand side of 
the chart provides a summary of the empirical findings on whether levels of crime 
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explain geographic disparities in the probability of incarceration and/or guideline 
departures.  As described in more detail in the coming sections of this chapter, these 
measures tap instrumentalist or functionalist theories of punishment, which argue that the 
severity of punishment will correspond closely with levels of crime in the community.   
The second grouping of variables display results pertaining to the effects of 
punitive social climate.  These indicators, which include conservatism and religious 
fundamentalism, are derived from classic Durkheimian arguments that view punishment 
styles as a reflection of cultural values and public sentiments rather than merely an 
instrumental response to crime (Garland, 2009).  Traditionally, researchers have 
attempted to capture geographic variation in punitive attitudes using a dummy indicator 
of southern region as a proxy for communities with more collective support for 
retributive punishment styles.  While this is a popular control variable in macro level 
studies of incarceration, these findings summarized here indicate that southern courts do 
not mete out significantly more punitive sentences compared to courts in other regions of 
the U.S.  As the table shows, several recent studies have expanded beyond this focus to 
examine the influences of political and religious conservatism (Fearn, 2005; Johnson, 
2006; Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer, 2008; Ulmer et al., 2008).  Though only two studies 
have examined the effects of religious fundamentalism, the finding that incarceration is 
more likely in communities containing with a greater concentration of adherents to 
evangelical and/or fundamentalist Christian faiths is consistent with a good number of 
survey-based studies that report significant associations between fundamentalist beliefs 
and more punitive attitudes.  Borrowing on insights from the macro literature on social 
control, a greater number of contextual sentencing studies have examined whether 
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 34 
incarceration is more likely in conservative political climates (Fearn, 2005; Helms, 2009; 
Johnson et al., 2008; King et al., 2010; Weidner et al., 2005).  Though there is some 
evidence to suggest that Federal sentencing is more lenient in liberal states (Johnson et 
al., 2008), and that incarceration is more likely in jurisdictions with a larger number of 
Republic voters, political explanations of sentencing do not receive much empirical 
support.  Nevertheless, political explanations of punishment remain a popular focus of 
contextual research on sentencing and a handful of studies that examine only sentence 
length decisions suggest that conservatism may be more relevant for explaining variation 
in the average duration of sentences more so than incarceration decisions (Helms and 
Jacobs, 2002; Huang, Finn, Ruback, and Friedmann, 1996). 
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The table then presents the findings of studies that have tested hypotheses derived 
from the social conflict perspective.  The conflict perspective, which argues that 
incarceration is more likely in communities where social conditions threaten the interests 
of elites and the middle class, has become a mainstay of the social control literature. 
Every study included in Table 2.1 tests the hypothesis that larger populations of the poor, 
non-whites, and higher levels of economic inequality are associated with more repressive 
punishment.  Researchers have measured community social conflict a variety of ways, 
but on the whole, the findings summarized in this table confirm that there is little 
empirical evidence to suggest that communities mete out more punitive sanctions as a 
response to threats posed by the poor.  However, the findings summarized in Table 2.1 
suggest that racial and ethnic composition tend to exert more consistent and significant 
influences on the severity of sentencing.  Specifically, a number of studies analyzing 
cases from the SCPS, Pennsylvania, and Georgia find that the odds of incarceration are 
significantly higher in jurisdictions where the relative size of the black and/or Hispanic 
population is higher (Britt, 2000; Johnson, 2005; King et al., 2010; Myers and Talarico, 
1987; although see Johnson et al., 2008 and Wang and Mears, 2010).  As a whole though, 
the findings from research testing threat-based hypotheses do not provide particularly 
strong or consistent support for conflict models of sentencing.  
The remaining columns of the table display the findings from research that has 
examined the organizational and legal contexts that may promote variability in the use of 
incarceration across jurisdictions.  Early research on courtroom functioning by Eisenstein 
and colleagues in the 1970s and 1980s identified several key aspects of the organizational 
work environment that might promote more or less punitive sentencing outcomes.  These 
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include the size of the caseloads courts must process, the availability of adequate 
financial and physical resources to do so, and that the size of courts and the communities 
they serve help determine the ways courts “do business” and whether courts can be 
expected to rely on more harsh sanctions (Eisenstein and Fleming, 1977; Eisenstein et al., 
1988; Feld, 1991; Ulmer, 1997).  As Table 2.1 illustrates, multi-state contextual studies 
have generally neglected to consider the role that organizational context exerts on 
sentencing.  Thus, the bulk of what we know about how caseload pressures, jurisdiction 
size, and jail and prison crowding influence incarceration decisions comes from research 
conducted in Pennsylvania (Johnson, 2005; Johnson, 2006; Ulmer and Bradley, 2006; 
Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Ulmer, 1997).  With respect to caseload pressure, prior studies 
have yielded inconsistent findings.  The results from studies in Pennsylvania and the 
Federal court system suggest that higher caseloads tend to translate into a lower 
likelihood of being incarcerated and downward departures (Johnson, 2005; Johnson et al., 
2008; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).  Yet several other studies listed in Table 2.1 report that 
higher caseloads increase the odds of incarceration (Farrell, Ward, and Rousseau, 2009; 
Ulmer and Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2008), suggesting that the effect of caseload 
pressure is likely sensitive to the choice of court or county-level variables that are 
included in model. 
Finally, a handful of the contextual studies shown in Table 2.1 have examined 
aspects of legal context that include the presence of guidelines, the rate at which judges 
depart from guidelines, and whether states provide judges with alternative sanctions.   As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, previous studies have afforded little attention to the possibility 
that county-level variation in the probability of incarceration reflects state-level 
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differences legal context.  Instead, prior multilevel studies examining cases across 
multiple state jurisdictions have simply control for the presence of presumptive or 
voluntary guidelines.  However, the theoretical rationale for why this variable has been 
included in models predicting incarceration is unclear (i.e., researchers usually do not 
offer a prediction about how or why the presence of guidelines is expected to impact the 
severity of sentencing above and beyond the effects of legally relevant case controls for 
offense and criminal history that guidelines direct judges to base sentencing on).  
Typically, prior multistate studies analyzing the outcomes of SCPS felony cases include 
this as a control for “state differences in sentencing structure” (e.g., see Fearn, 2005; 
Wang and Mears, 2010).  The findings from studies that include a control for whether 
sentencing occurs within a guideline jurisdiction indicate null or inconsistent effects of 
guidelines on incarceration outcomes.  Similarly, in their analyses of outcomes in a 
sample of SCPS cases Weidner and colleagues report that the availability of alternative 
sanctions exert no significant impact on the likelihood of incarceration (Weidner et al., 
2005).  The six studies summarized in Table 2.1 that use data from the SCPS do not 
provide estimates of the degree to which residual variation in the probability of 
incarceration is due to county versus sate-level sources of variation.  Though doubtful, it 
may be the case that states that participate in the SCPS exhibit very little variation in the 
severity of their statutory penalties, which might explain why the presence of alternative 
sanctions exerts little influence on sentencing.  Based on studies documenting the 
variability of state sentencing policies and statutory penalties for felonies, this is doubtful 
(Stemen et al., 2005), and there is a good possibility that these studies not only confound 
county-level and state-level sources of variability in the severity of sentencing, but also 
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that the absence of controls for state sentencing policy leaves open the possibility that the 
findings reported in these studies are biased. 
 
Summary of Prior Research Examining Jurisdictional Variation in Incarceration 
The findings from previous studies examining the community variation in 
incarceration decisions are somewhat difficult to summarize because these studies rely on 
diverse samples and examine the effects of a wide range of contextual predictors. On the 
whole, this research shows that individual level factors are the most powerful indicators 
of sentencing dispositions, but that even after adjusting for differences in the composition 
of cases jurisdictions exhibit significant variability in the tendency to grant departures 
and/or to incarcerate offenders.  The multilevel sentencing literature has been 
predominantly concerned with how crime rates and the size of black, Hispanic, and poor 
populations may trigger more punitive formal control, as whether more conservative 
communities may be more supportive of law and order crime control campaigns 
traditionally used by Republicans (Fearn, 2005; Helms & Jacobs, 2002; Ulmer and 
Johnson, 2004; Johnson, 2006). The community conditions that appear to increase a 
defendant’s odds of receiving incarceration on a fairly consistent basis are county racial 
and ethnic composition (though it is not clear why) and levels of violent crime.  With the 
exception of research in Pennsylvania, organizational and legal contexts have garnered 
significantly less attention in contextual studies of sentencing despite early research 
documenting the salience of organizational factors and recent interest in assessing 
whether state sentencing policies increase the use of incarceration. 
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Three things are noteworthy about these findings.  First, there is very little 
evidence that the size of the conservative population (an increasingly popular theoretical 
explanation for understanding variability in police force size, criminal justice spending, 
and growth in incarceration rates) exerts any discernable influence on the odds of 
incarceration.  This appears to be the case across multiple time periods and across single 
and multi-state samples of felony case filings.  Second, the direction of the effects for 
racial composition and organizational context depends on the data and state in question, 
suggesting a need for a broad sample of cases across multiple states.  Equally puzzling is 
the inconsistent direction of the effect of guidelines in three studies that analyze the same 
sample of cases from the SCPS.  The presence of sentencing guidelines appears to 
increase the odds of incarceration in one study (Pardoe and Weidner, 2006), yet decrease 
the odds of incarceration in another (Weidner et al., 2005), and appears irrelevant to 
jurisdictional variation in incarceration in another study (Fearn, 2005).  Overall though, 
the dominant theme to emerge from a review of previous research is the relative inability 
for the majority of these contextual predictors to significantly account for jurisdictional 
variation in the odds of incarceration.  The research provides little consensus as to why 
some jurisdictions are, on average, more punitive than others. Thus, despite a substantial 
body of research that demonstrates that the severity of sanctions applied to defendants 
varies across communities, our understanding of the sources that account for geographic 
variation in sentencing remains limited. 
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The Current Study’s Contribution 
In one of the earliest ethnographic studies to examine how courtroom 
environments shape sentencing, Eisenstein and Flemming concluded that although 
organizational resources, working styles, and interpersonal relationships among court 
personnel are key factors impacting sentencing, two elements of a court’s environment 
are particularly powerful forces that shape the court’s authority to punish: “the legislature 
as the source and definer of sanctioning authority, and public opinion as the context in 
which workgroup members develop expectations about punishment “ (1977: 263). 
A review of the findings presented her demonstrates that these two aspects of courtroom 
environments are not typically examined in contemporary contextual sentencing studies.  
Perhaps the most significant shortcoming of existing studies is the lack of attention to the 
role that state sentencing policies may play in generating significant variability in the 
severity of sentencing outcomes.  A comparative analysis of sentencing across a variety 
of sentencing structures would fulfill a gap in our understanding of the effects of policies 
on the propensity of courts to impose incarceration.  As Stemen and Rengifo recently 
noted, the tradition of relying on socioeconomic variables to explain jurisdictional 
differences in incarceration and sentencing “dismisses the variation in state-level 
sentencing and corrections policies and confounds the impact of ideological and political 
covariates of imprisonment with state-centered interventions” (2011:175).  Perhaps one 
reason why it has been a challenge to successfully explain jurisdictional variation in 
sentencing severity in studies that analyze cases pooled from multiple states is that these 
studies have ignored the types of state-level choices that exert the most powerful 
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influences on both the discretion of judges and the severity of the sanctions they are 
permitted to impose. 
When multilevel studies have considered the effects of policy, they have restricted 
their focus to guidelines, and even then, have not offered a strong theoretical rationale for 
how guidelines should influence the severity of punishment. For those states that do 
operate under guidelines, including a binary variable indicating the presence of a 
guideline scheme acknowledges that there are constraints on judicial behavior in that 
state, which should help to reduce geographic variation in sentencing outcomes by 
promoting more uniform sentences.  But merely accounting for the presence of guidelines 
assumes that the content, intent and forms (voluntary vs. mandatory) of these guidelines 
systems do not vary.  Empirical research on the implementation and effectiveness of 
various guideline schemes shows that judicial adherence to the guidelines is shaped by 
whether the guidelines are legislatively mandated or merely advisory (Marvell, 1995; 
Tonry, 1999). In addition, prior research has focused exclusively on estimating the main 
effects of sentencing guidelines and has not yet considered the possibility that guidelines 
might indirectly increase the severity of punishment by giving greater weight to the 
effects of having a prior criminal history.  While an important first step in providing 
baseline evidence about the effects of guidelines on sentencing across multiple state 
jurisdictions, this approach still leaves unaddressed variation in penalties for crimes 
across states without guidelines.  For instance, prior work gives the impression that the 
only legal factor shaping jurisdictional variation in sentencing severity is the presence of 
structured sentencing.  This is not the case.  Every state has a penal code that dictates a 
minimum, maximum, or range of sentence lengths a judge may consider.  As an example, 
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 45 
one area of statutory law that exhibits a remarkable degree of state variability are 
minimum penalties for the sale and possession of the smallest amount of drugs that 
typically qualify as a felony (usually 1 oz) (Pillsbury, 1989; Stemen et al., 2005).  In 
addition, a recent survey of state sentencing policies documents considerable variability 
in the extent to which states have embraced mandatory enhancements, parole restrictions, 
and truth in sentencing provisions that require offenders to serve portions of their prison 
terms; these types laws were embraced by a larger number of states in an effort to crack 
down on crime (Pillsbury, 1989).  However, the effects of these policies have not been 
examined using individual case data that can assess whether policies explain more 
punitive sentencing while adjusting for legally relevant aspects of each case. 
The current study addresses these gaps by assessing both the main and interactive 
effects of a variety of sentencing structures and substantive laws that regulate the severity 
of punishment.   This study also contributes to existing research by considering the 
effects of court organization and aspects of the social climate that are highlighted in 
theories of punishment, but that have yet to be tested in prior research. These precise 
factors are discussed in greater detail in the discussion describing the theoretical 
framework used to develop this study’s hypotheses.  The remainder of this chapter 
summarizes the major theoretical models of punishment that are used to develop specific 
hypotheses that tested in the current study.
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES GUIDING CONTEXTUAL 
 SENTENCING RESEARCH 
 
Recent efforts to extend theorizing on punishment reflect a new interest towards 
integrating structural, organizational, and cultural theoretical perspectives using 
multilevel statistical techniques.  Drawing upon organizational efficiency models and 
macro-level theories of crime control, contemporary contextual research using explicitly 
multilevel regression-based techniques tie a fairly consistent set of community and state-
level predictors to the disposition of criminal cases.  These frequently include racial 
composition, economic conditions, crime rates, political conservatism, and local case 
processing strategies.  These variables reflect a diverse theoretical field devoted to 
punishment that includes social threat, structural functionalist, economic perspectives, 
and organizational theories.  These perspectives can be organized according to four 
theoretical traditions that center on a combination of societal and justice system forces 
that influence punishment:  the Durkheimian emphasis on law as a reflection of collective 
values and punishment as the protection of commonly-shared interests; Marxist/conflict 
perspectives that view the mobilization of law as a means of protecting the 
socioeconomic interests of more powerful segments of society; economic/deterrence 
perspectives which argue that sentencing decisions are sensitive to organizational costs 
and constraints; and Weberian explanations that characterize “ideal” types of punishment 
as a dispassionate, highly “rationalized,” and calculable. 
A key assumption that unites the first two perspectives is that the exercise of law 
reflects social norms, relations, and personal interests, rather they be rooted in consensus 
or conflict.  Scholars such as Liska (1992) and Garland (1990; 2001) stress that values 
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and interests undergird why structural arrangements are believed to shape the intensity of 
crime control.  This has prompted scholars to begin integrating more consistently 
indicators of political and religious ideology into models predicting legal outcomes (e.g., 
Fearn, 2005).  Garland (2001) in particular has reasserted the importance of considering 
public sentiment and the political mobilization of interest groups for understanding the 
symbolic aspects sentencing (see also, Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin, 2001; Zimring, 
2003).  For instance, he reasons that neo-Marxist theorists linking unemployment and 
inequality to penal power were “explicating penal culture and grounding it in the 
structures of social life,” but that ultimately, “in linking penal culture directly to social 
structure this way, these accounts tend to leave out of account large stretches of the 
mediating cultural framework in which penality exists – particularly those forms of 
cultural life such as religious sentiment and humane sensibility which do not fit with their 
theoretical approach” (1990: 210).   Efforts to sway public sentiment motivates political 
efforts to shift crime control authority away from criminal justice agencies, although 
there is some evidence to suggest that lawmakers are out of touch with a significant 
portion of Americans who express a desire for therapeutic justice measures, especially for 
drug users (Beckett and Sasson, 2000; Tonry, 1999).  These arguments suggest that 
without fear, public distrust in the ability of criminal justice agencies to control crime, 
and some willingness to support punitive sentencing laws, there are fewer incentives for 
political parties to bear the mantle of ‘moral entrepreneurship’ over the crime problem as 
a means to gain public favor.  For these reasons, the tone and strength of political 
partisanship, public attitudes about crime control, and fear of crime may significantly 
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contribute to geographic variation among states and local communities in sentencing 
behavior. 
One way to advance the contextual study of sentencing behavior then is to 
evaluate the affects of more direct and proximate social conditions through which 
political party strength, unemployment, inequality, or race relations may impact the 
decisions of judges and prosecutors.  As I elaborate on shortly, classic and contemporary 
explanations of community differences in legal sanctioning suggest several relevant 
indicators worth considering.  The Durkheimian tradition emphasizes that religious 
values and a normative climate supportive of harsh sanctions affect the severity of legal 
sanctions.  Contemporary interpretations of the Marxist/conflict perspective emphasize 
that “threatening” groups (e.g., the poor, racial and ethnic minority groups) can be 
expected to elicit more punitive social control insofar as they trigger fear of crime, 
insecurity about the judicial response to it, and foster a perception among the ruling class 
that their social position is in jeopardy (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Liska, 1992).  
These factors feature prominently in sociological theories of social control as well as 
current sentencing theories that predict that judges and prosecutors develop norms about 
appropriate reactions to crime based on their local surroundings (Eisenstein & Jacob, 
1977; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  Estimating the link between structural arrangements 
and the local normative climate makes survey-based research on public attitudes 
increasingly important to understanding community differences in punishment severity.   
Survey research has established that fear and ideology are important predictors of 
punitive orientations, and that levels of fear (Liska et al., 1981), support for retributive 
punishment (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld, 2003; Borg, 1997), and the racial 
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typification of crime (Quillian and Pager, 2001) all significantly vary across 
communities.  These studies are an important part of the theoretical framework I draw 
upon for the current study and I discuss the implications of it for predicting variability in 
legal decision making throughout this chapter. 
The normative and conflict-based perspectives detailed above clash with Weber’s 
description of the ideal legal process as a mechanistic adherence to legal rules and 
precedent (Garland, 1990).  The former characterizes punishment as vengeful reaction, 
the latter as a process of neutral uniformity.  Neo-Weberian perspectives on sentencing 
are exemplified by state efforts to regulate the use of substantive, extralegal criteria 
during sentencing (Dixon, 1995; Salvesberg, 1994; Ulmer and Kramer, 1996).  The most 
controversial of these reforms include efforts undertaken by some states to move away 
from the indeterminate sentencing model, to control judicial discretion through 
presumptive sentencing guidelines, and the adoption of habitual offender statutes such as 
the “three strikes” penalty.   Although these relatively new legal procedures and 
sentencing options may clash with organizational efficiency and public interest, the thrust 
of neo-Weberian explanations of legal processing is that legal rules are the most 
important factor judges consider when disposing of cases.  Consistent with this theme, 
Garland (2001) argues that public sentiment is important to understanding punishment, 
but perhaps primarily through its enduring effects on the adoption of more punitive 
sentencing laws and philosophies.3   Thus, a critical issue confronting sentencing research 
                                                
3 A recurrent theme in classic and contemporary legal perspectives (e.g., focal concerns) is that public 
sentiment is expected to shape judicial norms about danger and culpability, and guide perceptions of 
appropriate punishment based on community standards.  Garland makes a broader argument about criminal 
justice functioning though, summarizing the process as “the result of political choices and administrative 
decisions- but these choices and decisions are grounded in a new structure of social relations and coloured 
by a new pattern of cultural sensibilities” (2001:6).  He goes on to argue that this has resulted in a chief 
focus of crime prevention being one of “fear reduction” alongside traditional concerns of prosecution and 
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is the need to distinguish between the affects of public sentiment and political interests on 
sentencing from that of institutionalized public outcry embodied in sentencing policies 
designed to increase the certainty, and in some cases the severity, of felony sentences.  In 
doing so, we can begin to examine the tension between state policy and local context, but 
even more importantly, we can begin to systematically compare the consequences of 
implementing populist sentencing reforms by comparing variation in the disposition of 
individual defendants across these diverse systems.  This study goes beyond existing 
research on jurisdictional variation in sentencing severity by incorporating differences 
across jurisdictions in policies intended to increase the certainty or severity of 
punishment (e.g., sentencing guidelines; three-strikes laws; the abolishment of parole), 
organizational constraints on the use of imprisonment (prison capacities, correctional 
spending), and policies that provide fiscal incentives to not imprison offenders (e.g., 
charging offenders fees for their state supervision).  To date, this line of research has not 
systematically assessed the effects of each of these legal and organizational attributes on 
individual probabilities of imprisonment despite the widely held view that punitive 
sentencing reforms, not crime rates, are primarily responsible for growth in prison 
admissions over the last 30 years (Blumstein and Beck, 1999; Raphael, 2009).   
Below I review the theoretical foundations influencing the study of jurisdictional 
variation in sentencing severity. The study of community variation in punishment 
includes a broad set of explanations that are usually integrated to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the ways in which social contexts affects the outcome of 
                                                
punishment (2001: 17).  Thus, there are two related, but different arguments present in the literature- one 
argues that public sentiment impacts judicial decision making indirectly through judicial discretion to 
‘represent’ public sentiment, the other being that punitive public sentiment affects the implementation of 
punitive sentencing laws which judges then implement in the courtroom. 
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criminal cases.  I begin by first describing the theoretical foundation in the sociology of 
law for linking judicial behavior to the broader social environment.  In relating social 
structure to individual level behavior, the multilevel literature assumes a subtle, 
interlocking relationship between sociological theories of social control and theories of 
institutional functioning and judicial decision making.  Aggregate patterns of punishment 
are the result of decisions made by individual legal actors and the theoretical bridge 
between structural conditions and legal decision-making is important to establish.  
 
Sociological Jurisprudence  
Research examining the environmental aspects of legal decision making is guided 
by the theoretical principle that courts respond to deviance on behalf of collectives (e.g., 
the criminal justice system, the community, victim advocates, and influential groups), 
and that social structure, the political environment, and public interests impart subtle, but 
substantively important influences on judicial behavior.  Sociological jurisprudence, a 
sub-discipline of legal realism, bridges sociological theory with social-psychological 
perspectives on legal decision making to contend that the ‘law in action’ frequently 
contradicts the ‘law in the books,’ (Pound, 1910).  Arguing that the law achieves 
socioeconomic as well as legal purposes, legal realists argue that the law ‘in action’ can 
be understood in relation to other social institutions because “judges and courts are 
products of the broader social and political systems in which they exist” (Myers and 
Talarico, 1987: 9).   
The distinction between sociological jurisprudence and the broader sociological 
study of punishment is that the former provides an explicit account of why other social 
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institutions penetrate courts to influence the legal process, while sociological theories of 
punishment make specific predictions about which features of the social context impact 
sentencing and the nature of that impact on sentencing severity.  Much of the contextual 
research on sentencing owes a debt to the seminal work of Nonet and Selznick (2001), 
who provided a theoretical typology of the various forms and functions of the law.  These 
models helped provide an entry point from which to merge the study of sentencing and 
legal decision-making with an explicit consideration of the ways in which law must 
contend with other social institutions, and with local public and political interests.  Nonet 
and Selznick (2001) describe a three-part typology of repressive, autonomous and 
responsive legal forms that is designed to indicate the degree to which courts are sensitive 
to pressures placed on them by the economic conditions, the public, and various justice 
system stakeholders.  These pressures are predicted to frequently disrupt the routine 
application of objective legal policies in favor of a law that adjusts to social reality.  The 
first of these, repressive law, is characterized as a politically opportunistic style of legal 
behavior in which legal institutions may adapt legal reasoning to fit with current public 
mood and political interests.  Numerous studies conducted over the last two decades 
provide evidence consistent with the opportunistic model of legal behavior.   In one of the 
first systematic attempts to investigate environmental constraints on legal decision 
making in a criminal court setting, Gibson argues that trial judges actively “represent” 
community values and norms out of fear of electoral defeat, or out of a sense of moral 
obligation to the constituents that elected them (1980: 362).   More recent analyses of 
sentencing in Pennsylvania also lends some support to this politicized view of the law by 
showing that judges issue significantly harsher sanctions as they near the date of their 
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retention election (Huber and Gordon, 2004).   Thus, despite the fact that most judges 
face a low objective risk of electoral upset, these types of patterns have led some legal 
researchers to characterize courts as distinctly political institutions (Gibson, 1980). 
In contrast to the repressive legal model, autonomous systems are preoccupied 
with preserving the authority and legal integrity of the court by keeping the court system 
insulated from the needs and interests of political figures and the public through a rule-
centered system of “mechanical jurisprudence” (Nonet and Selznick, 2001: 61).  This 
system closely resembles Weber’s model of legal formalism, which predicts that the most 
powerful predictor of legal behavior is the law itself, and that legal outcomes will reflect 
the goals of procedural fairness and equality.  Ultimately, adopting either of these two 
systems (a strict repressive or autonomous system) poses a fundamental dilemma for 
courts.  As Nonet and Selznick explain, courts must uphold legal principles (or else risk 
intrusion by the government) while remaining responsive to their respective 
constituencies.  If courts remain closed and autonomous, they risk becoming socially 
irrelevant.  This leaves the courts unable to enforce the decisions they hand down, and in 
the case of trial judges, vulnerable to political competition for their seat on the bench.  In 
essence, courts cannot conflict too much with their social and political environment, even 
as they risk politicizing the legal process.  Following a decade of controversial rulings by 
the Warren Court during the civil rights era, a crisis of judicial authority in the 1960s 
prompted a shift toward a responsive style of law.  Providing a balance between 
repression and autonomy, responsive law represents an attempt to uphold legal doctrine 
and maintain institutional integrity, while also acknowledging social problems, remaining 
“responsive to social needs” and adjusting to changes in social context (Nonet and 
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Selznick, 2001; see also Hurst, 1971).  The contemporary research on the social contexts 
of sentencing reflects the tenets of the responsive legal model- that judicial behavior 
should closely approximate the law, but that in practice legal decision making can often 
be understood in relation to public desires, political interests, and fiscal constraints 
confronting local criminal justice systems. 
 
Contemporary Theories of Sentencing: Focal Concerns and Causal Attribution 
Nonet and Selznick’s framework advanced the view that legal behavior frequently 
achieves social, economic, or political purposes in addition to legal ones (Savelsberg, 
2002).  Although measuring the content of local norms and social needs is challenging, 
the notion that community standards influence the legal process is well established in the 
theoretical literature on law enforcement and sentencing.  The focal concerns perspective 
of sentencing behavior, which has become a popular framework from which to analyze 
sentencing practices, shares these assumptions that courts absorb as well as regulate 
community life.  According to focal concerns, public norms, the political environment, 
legislative pressures, and organizational values serve as environmental cues that impart 
subtle signals to judges that certain acts and defendants are perceived as more dangerous 
by the community, and that a deliberate message to offenders (i.e., retribution) and a need 
to deter future offending is desired by their constituency.  The focal concerns framework 
blends insights from deterrence perspectives, Black’s (1976) propositions tying 
stratification to the quantity of law, Albonetti’s (1991) uncertainty avoidance theory of 
case processing, and the sociological literature on organizational efficiency. According to 
this perspective, judges weigh three focal concerns when sentencing defendants:  the 
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offender’s blameworthiness, protection of the community, and the practical implications 
of the sentence for defendants, victims, and other justice system agencies (Steffensmeier 
et al., 1998).   First, the primary purpose of sentencing is to mete out sanctions that fit the 
severity of the crime.  Steffensmeier et al. (1998) argue that regardless of where 
defendants are sentenced, explicitly legal criteria will be the strongest predictors of 
sentencing severity.  Specifically, judges are expected to first take into account the nature 
of the defendant’s role in the incident, the injury to the victim, and any mitigating factors 
that reduce their culpability when determining sentences.  Consequently, defendants who 
play only a secondary role in the offense, the absence of a weapon or physical injury, 
very young offenders, or those who have experienced a history of victimization or mental 
illness may be viewed as less blameworthy by the court and are expected to receive more 
lenient sentences (Kautt and Spohn, 2007).   A second focal concern of judges is 
community protection.  Judges are expected to base sentencing in part on their 
perceptions of the defendant’s dangerousness and likelihood of reoffending.  Thus, 
defendants with more serious offending histories are expected to receive more punitive 
sentences in an attempt to incapacitate the defendant and deter future offending.  In 
particular, those with violent or multiple prior convictions are significantly less likely to 
escape a felony conviction with probation given that these defendants will be viewed as 
less reformable (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  Thus, the main way judges address concerns 
of community safety and recidivism is through sentences that incapacitate the most 
dangerous offenders and deter crime. 
Last, the focal concerns framework predicts that judges take into account the 
impact of their decisions on other agencies and the offender.  From an organizational 
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standpoint, judges must maintain healthy relationships with other court actors, efficiently 
manage their caseloads, and often consider the impacts of their decisions on the fiscal 
costs to probation departments and prisons (Steffensmeier et al., 1998: 767; see also 
Dixon, 1995; Flemming et al., 1992; and Ulmer and Kramer, 1996).  As a result, judges 
may mete out more lenient sentences offered through plea bargains in the interests of 
maintaining case processing efficiency for prosecutors and defense attorneys.  These 
focal concerns represent potentially important sources of jurisdictional variability in 
sentencing that stem from community differences in perceptions of dangerousness, 
blame, and rehabilitation potential for offenders. 
In recent applications of this perspective, Ulmer argues that judicial reliance on 
these focal concerns is universal but that importance, meaning, and interpretation of them 
is local (Ulmer, 1997; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).  Focal concerns proponents argue 
judges’ interests in protecting the community and concerns about the costs of punishment 
are intertwined with the local political climate, criminal stereotypes and the fears of 
residents, and the local legal culture in ways that foster community variation in legal 
decision making (Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).   The most 
potent public pressure judges may face is balancing the need to protect the community 
with the costs sustained from relying on incarceration or intensive supervision.  
Steffensmeier and colleagues point out that because judges are accountable to local 
politicians, victims, and their constituency, they are sensitive to the potential for 
community backlash to recidivism and to the perception that judges do not adequately 
protect the community (Eisenstein et al., 1988; Steffensmeier et al., 1998: 767; see also 
Myers and Talarico, 1987).   Judges may feel vulnerable to public perceptions of leniency 
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for several reasons.  Trials are rare, and the majority of residents will never be charged 
with a felony offense or given any firsthand insight into the sentencing process.  
Consequently, research shows that the media and political messages play a pivotal role in 
informing the public about sentencing (Roberts and Doob, 1990).  This is problematic for 
judges because politicians and the media often address only violent and ‘newsworthy’ 
cases that provide little detail about the sentencing process.  This in turn may encourage a 
desire among the public for more punitive sentences that would incapacitate offenders 
and alleviate public anxiety that stems from the media construction of the crime problem 
(Roberts and Doob, 1990).  Thus, conservative political climates and communities with 
more punitive public attitudes might signal to judges that one way to avoid uncertainty in 
determining the threat defendants may pose to the community is to err on the side of 
incapacitation.   
In sum, the focal concerns perspective argues that community context shapes 
sentencing in two key ways:  local community standards and tolerance for recidivism will 
shape the severity of sentencing, and second, that stereotypes that disadvantage certain 
defendants partly reflect the prevailing community sentiment about the causes of crime 
and the threats posed by certain groups (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).   In some key 
respects, the focal concerns perspective represents a deterrence-based model of 
sentencing by predicting that judges maximize the goals of community safety and 
retribution while minimizing the social and fiscal costs of their decisions.  These goals 
are often mediated by the reality of uncertainty in the legal process, and the compensation 
of that uncertainty through the reliance on community norms as well as racial and gender 
stereotypes.  However, the focal concerns model does not offer specific predictions about 
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which or in what direction community characteristics might yield more or less punitive 
sentences; only that judges are sensitive to public and political pressures, and that they 
may share the community’s stereotypical views about crime and certain defendants.  
Nevertheless, it provides a useful starting point for predicting a) How community 
conditions like crime, fear, and political composition may provoke less favorable 
treatment of offenders; b) That judges will consider prison crowding and organizational 
constraints when weighing the costs of incarcerating offenders relative to the uncertain 
risk of recidivism if given probation; and c) That judges may share in the community’s 
stereotypical views that certain defendants are more dangerous.  Below I describe the 
theoretical perspectives that identify the community factors and organizational 
constraints believed to be the most relevant macro level conditions for understanding 
jurisdictional variation in sentencing severity. 
 
MACRO LEVEL THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
 This study develops and tests hypotheses that are informed by four of the major 
sociological theories of punishment: neo-Weberian models that focus on procedural rules 
and the law, organizational efficiency models which emphasize the costs of punishment, 
social conflict models which view the purpose of punishment as a means to control 
threatening subordinate groups, and neo-Durkheimian perspectives which emphasize 
social solidarity and the emotional and ethical aspects of punishment.  I begin the 
discussion with an overview of the functionalist perspective, which provides the primary 
alternative hypothesis to Weberian, Durkheimian, conflict, and organizational models of 
the law.  In this regard, the factors emphasized by functionalist models are typically 
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 59 
treated as controls in multilevel studies of legal outcomes, despite the fact that legal 
factors consistently exert the strongest influences on sentencing outcomes. 
 
FUNCTIONALIST EXPLANATIONS 
  Jurisdictional differences in the severity of sentencing may merely reflect 
differences in levels of crime and the composition of cases courts process.  This view is 
consistent with instrumentalist or functionalist perspectives, which view the purpose of 
punishment in terms of controlling crime and fear (Tyler and Boeckman, 1997).  
According to Garland, “although legal punishment is understood to have a variety of 
aims, its primary purpose is usually represented as being the instrumental one of reducing 
or containing rates of criminal behavior” (1990: 18).  Viewed this way, sentencing is a 
means to an end, and the severity of sentencing is expected to increase in proportion to 
the severity of the offense (or at the macro level, crime rates).  According to this 
perspective then, the majority of the variation should be explained by legally relevant 
case-level factors such as offense severity and the number of charges for which a 
defendant is convicted.  It is also consistent with instrumentalist perspectives to expect 
that any residual variation in sentencing not explained by these legal factors might be 
explained by variation across jurisdictions in levels of crime and fear.  The precise nature 
of these relationships and empirical evidence of their importance are described below. 
 
Case Composition 
Jurisdictional variation in the disposition of felony cases may reflect 
compositional differences in the types of cases and defendants that courts process 
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(Gibson, 1980; Huang et al., 1996).  Contemporary research on sentencing demonstrates 
that legal criteria such as offense severity and mitigating or aggravating circumstances 
consistently exert the greatest influence on criminal case outcomes, although the 
magnitude of the effect may vary across courts and types of defendants (e.g., Bumiller 
and Hagan, 1983; Bushway & Piehl, 2001; Dixon, 1995; Engen & Gainey, 2000; 
Eisenstein et al., 1988; Sampson & Lauritsen, 1997; Spohn, 2000).  These findings lead 
to the expectation that once controlling for offense severity, prior criminal history, 
defendant attributes, victim attributes, and differences in the way cases are processed, any 
observed differences in sanctioning severity across jurisdictions should reduce 
substantially.  The case level factors I review below are thus expected to exert the 
strongest influences on case outcomes. 
 
Prior Criminal History 
In addition to the severity of the offense, prior criminal history is an important 
factor judges weigh at sentencing.  Prior research suggests that first time offenders are 
more likely to be diverted out of the felony court system while those with a prior criminal 
history are significantly more likely to face conviction and sentencing (Spohn, 2000; 
Wooldredge and Thistlthewaite, 2004).  Although defendants previously arrested and 
convicted face significant disadvantages in the court system, defendants who have been 
incarcerated for any length of time can expect a substantially higher probability of going 
back to jail or prison (Welch, Gruhl, and Spohn, 1984).   
Today the importance of prior criminal history has taken on new meaning. 
Serious offenses committed by repeat offenders ignite public outrage and harsh 
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sentencing reforms, as evidenced by the Willie Horton scandal during the 1992 
Presidential election, and the Polly Klaas murder that triggered the passage of three-
strikes legislation in California and sex offender registration laws.  While concern over 
recidivism is fairly universal, the legal importance attached to prior criminal history  
varies across states, which may explain a substantial amount of variability in sentencing 
severity within the U.S.  For example, habitual offender laws may magnify the impact of 
prior criminal history in some jurisdictions, suggesting that prior criminal history may 
explain a substantial portion of the variability in sentencing severity between 
jurisdictions.  Judges are believed to be acutely sensitive to the public perception that the 
courts are ineffective at curbing the most dangerous offenders (Myers and Talarico, 1987; 
Steffensmeier et al., 1998).   Thus, there is a good reason to expect that given the public 
and political fears about the threat posed by repeat offenders judges and prosecutors will 
view repeat offenders as more blameworthy, unsuitable for rehabilitation, and will reduce 
any uncertainty that these offenders may offend again by resorting to incapacitation 
(Ulmer et al., 2008).  For these reasons, a history of felony arrests and convictions, and 
any record of prior jail or prison incarcerations should greatly increase the probability of 
imprisonment net of the severity of the offense.  This may be especially true in 
jurisdictions where states grant discretion to judges and prosecutors to sentence 
defendants under habitual offender laws.  Thus, one would expect that: 
The positive effect of a prior criminal history on the odds of incarceration will be 
stronger in jurisdictions that have habitual offender laws. 
 
In addition to habitual offender penalties, twenty-one states have adopted 
voluntary or mandatory sentencing guidelines that instruct judges to consider both prior 
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criminal history and offense severity when determining the type and duration of 
sentences, leading some to worry that sentencing guidelines may increase prison growth 
by simultaneously punishing offenders for their failure to learn from past mistakes on top 
of the sanction for the current offense (e.g., Engen and Gainey, 2000; see Kauder and 
Ostrum, 2008, Marvell, 1996, and Stemen and Rengifo, 2011 for reviews).4   The purpose 
of sentencing guidelines thus suggests that: 
The effect of prior criminal history on the odds of incarceration will be stronger 
in jurisdictions that have sentencing guidelines. 
Thus, prior criminal history is expected to exert both direct and conditioning 
influences on the probability of incarceration.  This research examines the influence of 
criminal history on sentencing with a series of measures that capture prior felony and 
misdemeanor arrests and convictions, as well as prior jail and prison terms served.   
 
Case Processing Factors 
Research has shown that case processing factors such as mode of adjudication, 
type of counsel, and pretrial detention exert important influences on the disposition of 
felony cases.  Penalizing defendants who exercise their right to trial through harsher 
sentences is particularly entrenched in U.S. legal culture.  Blumberg’s (1966) influential 
portrayal of prosecutor and defense attorney plea negotiations as a “confidence game,” 
                                                
4 In their study of in/out and sentence length decisions in Washington jurisdictions, Engen and Gainey 
(2000) demonstrated that the relationship between prior criminal history and sentence lengths is not linear.  
They argue that in guideline states researchers should consider modeling the interactive or quadratic 
relationships between offense severity and criminal history and final sentence disposition, or alternatively 
simply enter in a ‘presumptive sentence’ in lieu of offense severity and criminal history.  In a reply 
however, Ulmer (2000) demonstrated that this technique yields little to no improvement in model fit for 
equations predicting the decision to incarcerate.  Ulmer concludes that controlling for the linear, additive 
effects of prior criminal history and offense severity provides better model fit than the substitution of these 
factors for a legally prescribed ‘presumptive in/out’ measure. 
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illustrated that defense attorneys often urge their clients to relinquish their right to trial in 
order to efficiency expedite cases in exchange for greater leniency and certainty about the 
final sentencing outcome.  Indeed, across diverse jurisdictions and historical periods, 
research repeatedly documents that exercising one’s right to trial is associated with more 
severe sentencing dispositions, a penalty believed to stem from the burdens trials place on 
case processing efficiency (Brereton and Casper, 1981-1982; Eisenstein et al., 1988; 
Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Johnson, 2003; Ulmer, 1995; McCarthy and Lindquist, 1985; 
Ulmer, 1995, 1997; Ulmer and Bradley, 2006).  Although plea discounts are considered a 
universal feature of urban criminal case processing, the number and size of plea discounts 
may vary across communities and states. For example, in a general turn towards 
instituting more uniform sentences some states such as California adopted determinate 
and structured sentencing ranges that coincided with legal limits on prosecutors’ 
discretionary power to plea bargain (King et al., 2008; Tonry, 1996).  Despite some 
states’ attempts to regulate plea bargaining trials are relatively uncommon in large urban 
courts (Heumann, 1974; Padgett, 1985).  Data used in the current study indicate that only 
5% of cases proceed to trial.  Jurisdictions also differ in the types of pleas they offer.  
Depending on the type of plea allowed in the jurisdiction, pleas can yield dividends 
ranging from no sentence discounts, explicit sentence length reductions, a downgrade in 
charges, or the guarantee of a specific sentence agreed upon by judges (Padgett, 1985).  
While the trial ‘tax’ is widely regarded as pervasive across courts, other scholars argue 
that plea discounts are less frequently applied to defendants charged with more serious 
crimes (King, Soule, Steen and Weidner, 2005; Ulmer, 1997; although see Ulmer and 
Bradley, 2006).  Thus, controlling for the mode of adjudication is important in modeling 
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sentencing outcomes, although there are important reasons to suspect it does not yield 
much leniency for serious crimes and in some jurisdictions. 
The research remains mixed on whether private legal representation helps 
defendants avoid more punitive sentences.  Some scholars argue that public defenders 
place defendants at a disadvantage and that quality of counsel serves as a key source of 
sentencing disparity for poor and minority defendants who are unable to obtain private 
counsel (Spohn, Gruhl, and Welch, 1981-1982).  However, the degree to which attorneys 
shape sentencing outcomes appears to depend on court size and urban location.   In one 
of the first contextual studies of court processing conducted in three courts in 
Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Michigan, Eisenstein and colleagues document that defendants 
tend to distrust attorneys working for the government and that low salaries for public 
defenders attracted less talented attorneys who were not committed to “zealous 
advocacy” (1988: 287).  These reports substantiate the concerns voiced by Spohn and 
colleagues (1981-1982) that poor defendants (often synonymous being non-white in 
urban courts), face significant obstacles to obtaining a vigorous defense.  Even so, the 
authors qualify their discussion by pointing out that in urban courts indigent defense is a 
cause supported by special interest advocacy groups that help insulate public defenders 
from bureaucratic and political pressures.  Despite the concerns about the quality of 
public defense counsel, recent multilevel research offers little support to the claim that 
defendants with public defenders receive more punitive sentences (Fearn, 2005; Johnson 
et al., 2008; Wooldredge, 2007).  However, type of legal representation may be 
consequential for pretrial outcomes (e.g., case dismissal or prosecutorial diversion) and 
the conviction phase, both of which directly impact the risk of being incarcerated.  In the 
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present study, I control for county differences in the proportion of defendants represented 
by private legal representation and the proportion of cases plea- bargained with the 
expectation that both factors will be associated with less severe sentences. 
Another potential source of jurisdictional variation in sentencing severity may 
stem from county differences in how judges set bail and the ability of defendants to 
secure pretrial release.  There is a sizeable body of research that demonstrates a strong 
correlation between the severity of pretrial bail and release decisions and later conviction, 
incarceration, and sentence length outcomes (Albonetti, 1991; Free, 2001; 2002; 
Williams, 2003).  Unfortunately, the majority of contextual sentencing studies have been 
conducted using data that do not document pretrial adjudication outcomes.  
Consequently, its relevance for understanding final sentencing decisions remains an 
important but largely neglected component of the multilevel sentencing literature.  This is 
a potentially critical limitation to understanding how state and community context shapes 
sentencing for several reasons.  Pretrial confinement is a component of the adjudication 
process that has received little attention in the contextual study of sentencing despite 
some evidence that its influence on the decision to imprison defendants are nearly equal 
or greater in magnitude to the affects of offense seriousness (Fearn, 2005; Weidner et al., 
2004; Wooldredge, 2007).   While pretrial outcomes may seem relatively trivial, they 
deserve scrutiny because these decisions are less publicly visible than trial court 
decisions, defendants routinely negotiate initial pretrial proceedings without an attorney, 
and these decisions are not subject to judicial review as is often the case for sentencing 
decisions under presumptive guidelines (Free, 2002).  Furthermore, these decisions are 
made without the benefit of witness testimony, evidence presented at trial, and mitigating 
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defense arguments.  This makes judicial decision making at the pretrial stage highly 
discretionary, where assumptions of dangerousness and flight risk must be quickly made 
during arraignment.  This opens the door to substantial substantive decision making 
criteria, due in large part to the absence of reliable evidentiary material sentencing judges 
typically have access to (Ulmer and Kramer, 1998).  These factors combine to make this 
stage a locus of discretion, and potential class, racial, ethnic and gender and geographic 
disparities in punishment (Demuth, 2003; Schlesinger, 2005).  Although scant, some 
research suggests that the severity of pretrial sanctions varies across jurisdictions and 
should be controlled in multilevel sentencing studies.  Eisenstein and Jacob (1977) 
provide comparative aggregate and case level data on release decisions across Baltimore, 
Chicago and Detroit courts.  Mean bail amounts were double in Baltimore what they 
were in Chicago and Detroit, so it is not surprising that less than half of Baltimore 
defendants secured release (compared to 61% in Chicago and 60% in Detroit).  The 
authors concluded that “local culture” played a critical role in the exceptionally high bail 
fees in Baltimore compared to the other cities.  They attributed this variability to the fact 
that Baltimore officials implemented harsher standards for release in response to the more 
conservative views of the local population.  This research, combined with pretrial studies 
conducted at the individual level, suggest that during arraignment proceedings judges 
have much greater discretionary authority and less reliable or available legal information 
on which to base their decisions since bail decisions are typically made within 48 hours 
of arrest.  If these pretrial decisions exert important influences on sentencing dispositions, 
and research suggests that they do, then this raises the possibility that many community 
factors shown to be associated with more punitive sentencing outcomes may actually 
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reflect pretrial decisions.  I control for pretrial decision making with an indicator of 
whether defendants were denied bail or financially unable to secure their release. 
 
Substantive Criteria 
The literature remains mixed on the degree to which extralegal factors such as 
victim attributes, socioeconomic status, age, sex, race, and ethnicity factor into 
sentencing decisions.  Information on victim attributes is rarely made available in large-
scale sentencing data.  A handful of studies suggest that cases involving murder and rape 
victims with lower social status, or victims who provoke or engage in disreputable 
conduct during the offense, are less likely to be prosecuted and result in significantly 
shorter prison sentences (Albonetti, 1987; Baumer, Felson, and Messner, 2000; Baumer 
and Martin, 2011; Spohn and Holleran, 2001; Spohn and Horney, 1993).  In addition, 
several studies report an interactive relationship between victim-offender race and gender 
which suggest that black males convicted of assaulting white females face significantly 
greater risks of conviction and incarceration (LaFree, 1980; Spohn, 1994; Spohn and 
Spears, 1996).  Offender race and ethnicity also exert significant influences on sentencing 
outcomes, although these effects tend to be small and indirect in nature (Sampson and 
Lauritsen, 1997).  Additionally, studies show that race may exert more of an impact on 
earlier decisions such has charging and bail release, the effects of which accumulate as 
defendants move through the system (for reviews see Baumer, 2011; Sampson and 
Lauritsen, 1997; Spohn, 2000).   
 The research on sex disparities in sentencing suggests that while women 
contribute the greatest growth to the nation’s prison systems (Blumstein and Beck, 1999), 
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by comparison males continue to receive more severe sanctions, even after controlling for 
the severity of the offense and criminal history. The most extensive meta-analysis on the 
issue reviewed studies covering 50 court data sets, most of which relied on data from the 
1970s (Daly and Bordt, 1995).  The authors report that over half of the studies reviewed 
report evidence that women receive more favorable treatment in the courts, and typically 
during the decision to incarcerate.  Recent evaluations of the implementation of 
sentencing guidelines that aim to reduce sex-based disparities suggests that sentencing 
guidelines (and especially monitoring and publishing judicial decisions) have made 
sentencing a more objective process, but that defendant sex continues to be an important 
source of sentencing disparity (Griffin and Wooldredge, 2005; Koons-Witt, 2002).   
Studies that control for defendant age indicate that very young offenders are more 
often given probation, but that offenders in their twenties, especially black males, face a 
significantly greater risk of imprisonment until age 30, at which point the odds of 
incarceration reduce substantially (Helms, 2009; Myers, 1987; Steffensmeier, Kramer, 
and Ulmer, 1995; 1998).  Although the evidence remains mixed, the finding that youthful 
and much older defendants are more likely to avoid prison terms has been interpreted by 
focal concerns proponents as evidence of the type of ‘perceptual shorthand’ judges rely 
on to assess the potential for reoffending and chances of successful rehabilitation.  Other 
recent studies that analyze sentencing data from multiple jurisdictions report no 
significant relationship between defendant age and imprisonment (Fearn, 2005; Maxwell, 
Robinson, and Post, 2003; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2006; Weidner et al., 2005), 
although one study reports that older defendants receive significantly shorter sentences 
(Jacobs and Helms, 2002).  Based on the existing literature I expect a curvilinear 
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relationship between age and the probability of confinement that leaves defendants 
between the ages of 20 and 50 most at risk of incarceration upon conviction. 
To summarize, defendants charged with more serious offenses, those with more 
extensive prior records, males, black and Latino defendants, the very young and older 
offenders, those represented by public defenders and who exercise their right to trial, and 
those who receive pretrial confinement should explain why some jurisdictions more 
frequently incarcerate defendants.  Each of these individual level and case processing 
factors, especially offense severity and prior offending, are consistently found to be 
among the most powerful predictors of sentencing outcomes regardless of geographic 
location.  While early studies of community variation in punishment were unable to 
statistically partition the effects of case composition from structural attributes (e.g., 
Eisenstein et al., 1988; Myers and Talarico, 1987), recent multilevel studies show that 
although compositional differences account for the majority of the variation across 
counties in sanctioning severity.  Local court jurisdictions still exhibit significant 
variability in sentencing behavior even after adjusting for case level attributes 
(Bongtrager, Bales, and Chiricos, 2005; Britt, 2000; Fearn, 2005; Johnson, 2005, 2006; 
Kautt, 2002; Ulmer and Bradley, 2006; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Weidner and Pardoe, 
2004).  In theory, this residual variation should be explained by the legal, organizational, 
and the social climate within which courts operate.  Below I outline the legal and 
organizational factors that operate at the state and local level to shape variability in the 
severity of criminal sentencing.   
Levels of Community Crime and Fear   
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 It is now well established that communities vary in their levels of fear of crime 
(Liska et al., 1981), which may help to explain jurisdictional variation in the sentencing 
severity.  The link between fear of crime and punitive sanctioning may reflect a 
pragmatic instrumental response to real or perceived concerns for public safety and 
personal victimization.  This instrumentalist perspective has been used to examine public 
support for the death penalty as well as the passage of determinant sentencing policy in 
the state of Washington (Baumer et al., 2003; Steiger, 1998), and support for greater 
levels of crime control in the form of police force size (Liska, Lawrence, and Benson, 
1981).  While Garland (2000) specifically links fear in urban areas to demands for harsh 
justice, the literature has not established a consistent relationship between the two.  For 
instance, some surveys reveal that trends in fear of personal victimization are not related 
to trends in support for the death penalty (Warr, 1995) and that the public supports 
punitive sanctions not because of personal fears about the risk of victimization, but 
because they view crime as a symptom of the decline of moral values and social cohesion 
(Stinchecombe et al., 1980; Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997).   
However, I include fear of crime for two key reasons.  First, as Garland (2001) 
has suggested fear of crime may be more salient among residents in or near major 
metropolitan areas that were largely the subject of media-fueled accounts of the crack and 
gun violence epidemics in the eighties and nineties.  Even though survey data of adults do 
not provide a consistent link between fear of crime and public support for punitive 
measures, this is not necessary for models predicting criminal case processing.  What is 
necessary is that you establish a plausible link between public fear and judicial behavior.  
It may be the case for example, that public fear does not fuel public support for punitive 
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responses to crime, but judges in these jurisdictions (influenced in part by media accounts 
and interactions with politicians and the public) may perceive shifts in levels of fear and 
feel it their duty to respond more harshly as gatekeepers of public safety (a key focal 
concern of judges), especially in jurisdictions where judges are elected.  These arguments 
suggest the following hypothesis:  the odds of incarceration will be significantly higher 
in jurisdictions with higher levels of fear among local residents. 
 
NEO-WEBERIAN PERSPECTIVES:   
LEGAL POLICIES AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFICIENCY 
 
Our understanding of the social contexts of punishment have been advanced 
greatly by empirical findings that highlight the tension between judicial and public 
sentiments about sentencing, what judges are expected to do according to the law, and 
what judges can do under various fiscal and organizational constraints (Eisenstein and 
Jacob, 1977; Gibson, 1983; Myers and Talarico, 1987; Kramer and Ulmer, 2002).  
Recognizing this tension, both multilevel and macro level studies of incarceration place a 
strong emphasis on assessing the ways in which policies both control judicial discretion, 
and dictate the severity of the sentencing options judges have to choose from.  Much of 
the research describing the evolution of sentencing guidelines casts legal decision making 
in either “substantive” or “legally rational” terms (Salvesberg, 2002; Ulmer and Kramer, 
1996).  The concept of substantive versus rational law can be traced to Weber’s “ideal” 
type of law which views punishment as highly rationalized, especially in large complex 
bureaucracies such as urban courts. Researchers frequently draw upon Weber’s sociology 
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of law to describe how neoclassical reforms have altered the uniformity and severity of 
sentencing (e.g., Engen and Steen, 2000; Garland, 2000; Johnson, 2005; Kramer and 
Ulmer, 2002; Ulmer and Kramer, 1996; Zhang, Maxwell, and Vaughn, 2009).   
Describing what he termed “formally rational law,” Weber argued that in modern 
democratic societies the ‘ideal’ system of law can be characterized as highly specialized, 
bureaucratic, and dominated by formal procedure (Engen and Steen, 2000; Kramer and 
Ulmer, 2002; Myers and Talarico, 1987; Weber, 1978).  Under this type of legal system, 
the sentencing process is dispassionate and objective.  It hinges on the neutral and 
uniform application of laws that are tailored to make sentencing highly predictable. 
Viewed through this lens, legal decision-making in highly bureaucratized courts is devoid 
of the irrational forces of politics and public sentiment and is guided instead by formal-
rational decision-making.  Formally rational law occurs when courtroom decisions are 
guided by legal rules in a “neutral managerial” style that also seeks to “promote cost 
efficiency and administrative convenience” (Garland, 1990: 192). The key factor 
distinguishing this perspective from conflict and neo-Durkeimian models is that this 
perspective views highly rationalized bureaucracies as less accessible to the public, and 
insulated from public opinion about crime.  Summarizing the development of more 
rational and bureaucratized punishment in the last 100 years, Garland remarks “these 
developments have had the effect of reducing the immediacy with which popular 
sentiment or political concern can be expressed within the act of punishing- as well as 
decreasing the direct knowledge and experience that most citizens have of this process,” 
(1990: 187). From this perspective, legal factors like offense severity and criminal history 
should dominate sentencing decisions, and any variability in the severity of sentencing is 
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believed to reflect jurisdictional differences in the severity of its legal code and 
sentencing philosophies.  
Drawing on Weber’s legal framework, Savelsberg maintains that the new brand of 
legal formalism views offenders as rational beings, that legal sanctions will reflect the 
goals of retribution and deterrence, that the modes of decision making will be determinate 
and predictable, and that prisons will be the preferred means of delivering punishment in 
lieu of therapy, probation, or welfare (1994).  Although Savelsberg applied Weber’s 
concepts to the adoption of sentencing guidelines, Garland (2001) and others point to 
other attempts to make the legal process more objective and retributive:  determinate 
sentencing, mandatory enhancements, and habitual offender laws (Barker, 2006; Tonry, 
1996, 1999).  These policies reflect differing goals, but each are consistent with the 
neoclassical ethic of punishment as “without regard to substantive concerns about the 
offender, the perceived causes of criminality, or the anticipated consequences of 
punishment for the individual offender,” (Engen and Steen, 2000: 1361).  
In sum, this perspective points to a variety of contextual factors that create the 
overall legal culture in which judges and prosecutors process cases. These include other 
sentencing policies and rules besides guidelines that also control (or eliminate) judicial 
discretion as well as substantive penal statutes that guide the severity of sanctions judges 
may mete out, including determinate sentencing structures, mandatory minimums, three-
strikes legislation and habitual offender statutes, truth in sentencing provisions, and the 
specific minimum or fixed penalties state legislatures mandate for certain offenses.  
Based on the Weberian perspective, one would expect that sentences are determined 
primarily by legally relevant factors associated with the case, and as a result structured 
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sentencing schemes such as guidelines and determinate sentencing should be expected to 
reduce the amount of residual variation among counties within states that operate under 
those laws.  But the logic of this argument also suggests that when and if substantive 
legal policies that dictate harsher sanctions compared with the policies in other 
jurisdictions, we should expect to observe more punitive sentencing outcomes.  
In addition, neo-Weberian perspectives also emphasize that legal-decision making 
is highly bureaucratized and should be expected to reflect a managerial style that values 
efficiency.  Using this logic, researchers have identified several aspects of the 
organizational climate that are in keeping with Weber’s view of institutions as 
preoccupied with issues of cost and efficiency.  These include court case load pressures, 
inefficiencies that arise from prison and jail crowding, the amount of financial resources 
states devote to paying for the sanctions that courts mete out, and the ability of local and 
state agencies to offset the high costs of prison and jail by charging fees for community 
supervision.  These two forces, legal rationality and organizational efficiency, often 
coexist in conflict with each other since the goals of law may undermine organizational 
priorities for efficiency (Engen and Steen, 2000; Ewing, 1987).  Irrespective of the 
tension between the goals of formal legal rationality and the interests of organizational 
efficiency, these two aspects of court context are predicted to exert the most proximate 
influences on courtroom decision-making.  
 
 
 
SENTENCING POLICY 
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Building off of Weber’s emphasis that judges behave according to rules and laws, 
the current study examines the effects of several policies that the literature suggests might 
exert important influences on the overall severity and geographic uniformity of 
punishment.  These policies include guidelines and determinate sentencing structures, 
mandatory minimum enhancements, truth in sentencing requirements designed to 
increase the certainty of punishment, habitual offender laws, and the severity of state 
penal codes that dictate the sentence ranges for felony offenses.  A brief description of 
these policies and their hypothesized effects are discussed below. 
A number of scholars attribute growth in the use of prisons (and the severity of 
punishment generally) to changes in sentencing legislation (Barker, 2006; Garland, 2001; 
Merritt, Fain, and Turner, 2006; Tonry, 1996, 1999).  Sentencing practices have been 
dramatically refashioned by many legislatures to reflect new sensibilities about crime that 
are more in line with the goals of deterrence and retribution, while at the same time 
redistributing discretion across the justice system (i.e., to prosecutors, parole boards, etc.; 
Garland, 2000, 2001).   Sentencing structures, the severity of legal penalties, and local 
courts’ willingness to comply with state policies varies substantially.  There has been a 
concerted effort in recent years to document the impact of sentencing policy choices on 
the levels and growth of state incarceration rates (see Stemen and Rengifo, 2011 for a 
review).  Analyzing changes in prison admissions between 1973 and 1986, Langan 
(1991) concludes that changes in state sentencing practices explained just over half of the 
increase in prison populations during this period.  In an similar analysis, Blumstein and 
Beck (1999) report that 88 percent of the rise in prison populations in the use can be 
attributed to rises in prison admissions due to sentencing policies, more so than 
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significant changes in the probability of arrest or conviction.  A good deal of ambiguity 
remains however over whether the effects of sentencing policy on incarcerated 
populations is the result of changes in judicial propensities to incarcerate offenders or 
average sentence lengths.  This ambiguity stems from the fact that the types of analyses 
highlighted above analyze aggregate data that do not contain information on cases, which 
means that some changes in sentencing could plausibly be due to changes over time in 
the severity of cases police and prosecutors bring into the court system.  Nevertheless, 
empirical and theoretical research provide grounds to suggest that state policy choices 
may prove a significant source of geographic disparity in the probability of incarceration 
because they represent a more general shift towards a penal philosophy that emphasizes 
the goals of deterrence and incapacitation (Raphael, 2009; Stemen et al., 2005; Tonry, 
1999).    
While there seems to be a consensus that policies help determine the use of 
imprisonment, disagreement exists over which sentencing legislation matters and whether 
local courts even fully implement legislation.  Some argue that the passage of punitive 
habitual offender laws during the 1990s was largely symbolic, that the implementation of 
sentencing reform at the local level is often mediated by the local legal culture and 
political environment, and that the most punitive laws only targeted a small group of 
repeat violent offenders and should contribute little to jurisdictional differences in the use 
of prison (Spohn, 2000; Merritt, Fain, and Turner, 2006; Kramer and Ulmer, 2002; 
Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin, 2001).  Yet, interest in the determinants and 
consequences of state policy choices remains at the forefront of efforts to explain local, 
state, and cross-national variability in punishment (e.g., Garland, 2001; Tonry, 1999; 
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Zimring et al., 2001).  For instance, commenting on the adoption of determinate and 
mandatory sentencing laws, the director of The Sentencing Project observed that “The 
impact of these sentencing changes on prison populations has been dramatic, and far 
outweighs any change in crime rates as a contributing factor,” (Mauer, 2001: 6).   In a 
recent exchange on the role of spending and sentencing policy in the expansion of state 
prison populations, another author similarly concludes that 83% of the increase in 
incarceration between 1984 and 2002 was attributable to changes in policy, remarking 
that “…behavior, in terms of variation in crime rates, is a bit player in the story, whereas 
policy is of first-order importance,” (Raphael, 2009: 91).   What is more difficult to 
discern, and what often gets overlooked in discussions about the impact of reforms, is 
how policy may impact incarceration rates (e.g., by increasing the probability of 
incarceration, by lengthening sentences, or by removing parole release mechanisms?).  
Though the precise impacts of policy remain murky, empirical research on mass 
incarceration reviewed above and the tone of the debate surrounding the adoption of 
many of these reforms seems to implicitly argue that they have altered state incarceration 
rates over the last 10 years by increasing the proportion of all offenders that are 
sentenced to incarceration.  Following this logic, the presence or absence of several key 
sentencing policies may signal more punitive legal contexts that increase the risks of 
incarceration for offenders, independent of defendant and offense characteristics.   
 
 
 
Sentencing Guidelines 
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Though the goals and content of guidelines vary, they generally function to 
increase the uniformity and predictability of sentences by requiring judges to mete out 
similar sentences to similar defendants convicted of similar crimes.  Guideline systems 
achieve this through the form of a sentencing grid, which calculates a presumptive 
sentence based on scores that are determined by a defendant’s prior criminal history and 
the severity of the conviction offense.  Though judges are expected to impose the 
presumptive term, most states allow judges the discretion to depart from the 
recommended sentence.  While guidelines in some states are merely advisory (e.g., 
Maryland), other states have instituted presumptive guidelines that typically require 
judges to document a rationale for departing from the guidelines.  This departure decision 
may then be subject to judicial review.  Between 1975 and 2002, nine states adopted 
presumptive sentencing guidelines (Stemen et al., 2005). 
The primary purpose for adopting the guidelines appears to have implications for 
the severity of the sentences contained in the grid.  Five state legislatures have followed 
Minnesota’s model by passing guideline laws that require state sentencing commissions 
to draft sentencing ranges that pay special consideration to resource management (e.g., 
prison overcrowding).  Other legislatures and the Federal government have placed an 
emphasis on risk management and sentencing equity when formulating guideline grids 
(Frase, 2005; Marvell, 1995).  This variation in the goals across guideline systems has 
been cited as one possible factor that accounts for why determinate sentencing laws 
(many of which accompanied the adoption of guidelines) are associated with substantial 
decreases in incarceration rates in some states (particularly Washington and Minnesota) 
(Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Marvell and Moody, 1996; Smith, 2004; Stemen et al., 
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2005).  As others point out though, the use of sentencing policy by legislatures can be 
motivated by a desire for “get tough” sentencing practices or reforms can be motivated by 
interests in managing prison populations and justice system resources- thus, the exact 
effect of guidelines on the severity of punishment is unclear (Stemen et al., 2005).  
Regardless, a number of aggregate level and multilevel studies find that the presence of 
presumptive guidelines is associated with significantly lower prison admission rates, 
slower growth in incarceration rates, and significantly lower likelihoods of being 
sentenced to prison (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Sorensen and Stemen, 2002; Spelman, 
2009; Wang and Mears, 2010; Weidner et al., 2005).  In sum, empirical evidence from a 
handful of multilevel and aggregate level studies suggests that:  all else being equal, 
defendants will face a lower likelihood of incarceration when processed in jurisdictions 
with guidelines.    
Guidelines may also impact sentencing severity in an indirect manner.  For 
instance, though several studies report that guidelines are associated with lower 
incarceration rates and more lenient sentencing, the mechanisms by which this occurs is 
not entirely clear.  One possibility is that states with presumptive guidelines crafted 
guideline grids with presumptive sentence ranges that were either sufficiently narrow or 
included enough options for alternative sanctions that these states were able to 
successfully regulate prison admissions and to manage correctional resources; such was 
the goal in Washington, Minnesota and other states that later passed guidelines (Stemen 
et al., 2005).  However, as Engen (2009) aptly points out, aggregate level studies are 
unable to test the effects of guidelines in a way that disentangles the effects of reforms 
from the effects of legally relevant variables on which the guidelines base sentencing.  
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Thus, multilevel studies that control for the presence of guidelines may not find that 
guidelines exert any direct influence on sentencing above and beyond the effects of 
offense severity and prior criminal history (although two of the studies in Table 2.1 do 
report that guidelines significantly influence the overall severity of sentencing). Though it 
has not been explored in published research comparing sentencing across states with and 
without guidelines, this logic suggests that rather than expecting a simple negative 
relationship between guidelines and sentencing severity, guidelines may actually increase 
the severity of sentencing in an indirect manner by placing greater weight on having a 
prior criminal history than we would otherwise observe in jurisdictions without 
guidelines.  This leads to the expectation that: the presence of presumptive guidelines will 
significantly increase the odds of incarceration by strengthening the magnitude of the 
positive association between prior criminal history and sentencing severity.  Put another 
way, the odds of incarceration will be even higher for defendants with a prior criminal 
history when sentenced in guideline jurisdictions.  
 
Determinate Sentencing and Truth in Sentencing Requirements (TIS) 
 Determinate sentencing describes sentencing structures that are designed to 
ensure that judges control or “determine” the actual amount of time offenders will serve 
in an effort to make punishment more certain and predictable.  Under determinate 
systems, state legislatures control judicial discretion by removing broad sentencing 
ranges and replacing them with narrow or fixed sentence terms.   Judges are expected to 
impose these terms, and offenders are released from prison at the completion of the term 
the judge imposes, minus any “good time” sentence reduction credits. Some states, such 
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as Virginia, have also abolished parole in conjunction with adopting presumptive 
sentences.  Under indeterminate systems, judges typically choose from a broad range of 
sentencing options and parole boards determine the amount of time offenders serve, 
rather than the sentence imposed by the judge.  Since the 1970s, seventeen states have 
adopted determinate sentencing, though not all of these states abolished parole release 
(McCoy, 1984; Shepherd, 2002; Stemen et al., 2005).   
Like determinate sentencing, truth in sentencing (TIS) provisions require 
offenders to serve a certain proportion of their sentence.  TIS provisions typically require 
offenders to serve at least three-fourths of their fixed or minimum sentence.  Most states 
have adopted these requirements, which have allowed indeterminate states to still 
exercise control over the amount of time that offenders serve while maintaining parole 
release (Sabol, Rosich, Mallik-Kane, Kirk, and Dubin, 2002; Stemen et al., 2005).  States 
vary widely though in their willingness to embrace TIS requirements. As of 2002, the 
percentage of sentences offenders must serve before they become eligible for parole 
ranged from as low as 33% in Alabama to 100% in Michigan (Stemen et al., 2005).  
Truth-in-sentencing requirements have undergone some significant changes in the last 
thirty years.  For instance, in 1975 state offenders were required to serve an average of 
70% of their minimum or fixed sentence.  By 2002, this average had risen to 93% 
(Stemen et al., 2005). 
Some argue that determinant sentencing structures and TIS provisions should 
increase incarceration rates through their impact on release decisions rather than any 
impact they may have on sentencing behavior (Stemen et al., 2005; Stemen and Rengifo, 
2011).  But there are several reasons to expect that the adoption of determinate 
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sentencing or time-served requirements may significantly increase or decrease the 
probability of incarceration independent of case-level characteristics. First, led by 
California, TIS and DSL came about as part of a broader push away from the 
rehabilitative ideal and toward crafting laws that promoted the goals of deterrence and 
incapacitation.  Thus, these structural changes to state legal systems have been viewed as 
evidence of a more punitive legal culture generally (Mauer, 2001; Shepherd, 2002).  
Sabol and colleagues (2002) evaluated the impact of TIS reforms in the 1990s and 
concluded that by giving judges greater control over sentencing outcomes, the TIS model 
may increase the use of incarceration because “judges are in a better position to evaluate 
the effects of their decisions.”  The authors found that in several states TIS reforms were 
associated with an increase in the proportion of felons sentenced to prison because 
“judges are in a position to expand the use of prison for more violent offenders, achieve 
some incapacitation or just deserts effects- while not changing appreciably the amount of 
time that violent offenders are required to serve, “ (2002: 11).  Consistent with this 
argument, one study finds that the immediate adoption of the DSL contributed to a 
significant increase in the number of prison admissions in California (McCoy, 1984).  
However, another possibility is that judges may be significantly less likely to 
impose incarceration for some offenders under DSL and TIS systems out of concern over 
the length of time that offenders are certain to serve on those sentences.  A number of 
aggregate level studies find that support for this latter hypothesis, and report incarceration 
and prison admission rates are significantly lower in most states that have adopted 
determinate sentencing (Greenberg and West, 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2002; 
Marvell and Moody, 1996; Smith, 2004; Stemen et al., 2005; Stemen and Rengifo, 2011; 
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Zhang et al., 2009).  Consistent with this logic, the one published study that has examined 
the effects of varying time-served requirements on incarceration rates, found that states 
who require prisoners to serve most or all of their sentences have lower incarceration 
rates, although the effect is not significant once controlling for the presence of other 
sentencing policies (Stemen et al., 2005).  Previous multilevel studies have not examined 
the effects of TIS or DSL on the odds of incarceration.  On the whole though, several 
evaluations of the effects of DSL/TIS adoption and empirical research on state 
incarceration rates suggest that: DSL and TIS time-served policies should exert important 
influences on judges’ willingness to incarcerate offenders, but the direction of the 
relationship may be positive or negative.   
 
Three-Strikes Laws 
 The policies described above represent efforts by states to alter the procedural 
aspects of sentencing and release decisions (Stemen et al., 2005).  States have also passed 
a number of policies in the past thirty years that impact the substance of penal law by 
targeting certain offenders and offenses for more punitive sanctions.  Among the more 
controversial of these reforms is habitual offender legislation.  Though habitual offender 
laws that increase punishment for repeat offenders have been in existence for decades, the 
concept was repackaged in the 1990s as “three-strikes and you’re out” (Clark, Austin, 
and Henry, 1997).  These laws were first passed by public ballot initiative in California, 
Washington and Oregon between 1993 and 1994.  Soon after, twenty-four states passed 
similar laws and mandated incarceration for third-time felony offenders. These laws were 
designed to not only incarcerate third-time offenders, but to do so for a substantially 
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longer period of time (typically at least twenty-five years).  States vary substantially in 
their definition of a “strikeable” offense, how long in the past a prior offense must have 
occurred, and whether three-strikes laws mandate that judges impose incarceration if 
incarceration was not otherwise required for the current conviction (Stemen et al., 2005).   
The diversity of these laws makes it difficult to assess the effects of these provisions, but 
some evidence suggests that many states simply passed these laws as a symbolic gesture 
to appear tough on crime, and that only Georgia and California sentence offenders under 
three-strikes provisions with any regularity (Chen, 2002; Schultz, 2000; Zimring et al., 
2001).  Despite the relative irregularity with which courts actually use three-strikes laws, 
sentiment among legal observers was that three-strikes laws signaled a broader populist 
wave towards more punitive crime control that would increase the number of individuals 
sentenced to prison and the length of time they would serve (Zimring et al., 2001).  For 
example, in the year California voters passed their three-strikes law, Austin (1994) 
cautioned that the law would increase the demand for jury trials, reduce the rate of 
pretrial bail release, delay court processing, and increase the number of prisoners 
sentenced to prison and the length of time they serve.  Sutton elaborates on a more 
nuanced argument put forth by Feeley and Kamim (1996), who suggested that three-
strikes laws are in reality an example of “symbolic crusades” that initially motivate 
lawmakers and judges to enthusiastically “swim with the political tide” and then 
following a period of uncertainty about how to absorb the impacts of the law, result in 
efforts by local authorities to use their discretion to undermine the intent of the law 
(Sutton, 2010).  Thus, while three-strikes provisions may be expected to increase the odds 
of incarceration over and above what would be expected in non-three strikes 
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jurisdictions, another intriguing possibility that has not yet been examined with case-level 
data is that three-strikes provisions may provoke a “push back” effect on the part of local 
county courts who may either not agree with the intent of the law or who may feel that 
the law undermines the efficient processing of cases (i.e., obtaining guilty pleas).   
 Research on the implementation and impact of these laws supports this 
proposition (Austin, Clark, Hardyman, and Henry, 1999).  A handful of aggregate level 
studies have assessed these claims.  On the whole, these studies do not find that three-
strikes laws are associated with significantly higher incarceration rates, and that in some 
instances they are actually associated with a significant decline in state incarceration rates 
(Spelman, 2009; Stemen et al., 2005).  In fact, one study that examines the rate of new 
court commitments finds that three-strikes provisions (at least in a cross-sectional 
context) are associated with significantly lower rates of new court commitments to state 
prisons (Zhang et al., 2009).  The current study examines the possibility for three-strikes 
laws to impact the overall propensity to mete out incarceration, but the direction of this 
relationship may be positive or negative. 
No multilevel studies have yet compared the probabilities of imprisonment for 
defendants processed in jurisdictions with and without three-strikes laws. However, one 
study has used the SCPS to examine the impact of three-strikes in California on the 
processing of felony cases before and after the passage of the law.  The author found that 
the law impacted average sentence lengths primarily by increasing the importance of 
having a prior criminal history, but had a negligible impact on the odds of incarceration 
(Sutton, 2010).  Though this study did not find evidence of a significant interaction 
between three-strikes and prior criminal history in California for the decision of whether 
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to incarcerate, the intent of the law theoretically suggests that:  three-strikes laws may 
indirectly increase the probability of imprisonment by strengthening the magnitude of the 
effect of having a prior criminal history.  
 
Mandatory Minimums 
 Another controversial sentencing policy to emerge in the last thirty years is 
mandatory minimum or “enhancement” penalties.  These laws, perhaps more so than any 
other recent reform, have been criticized as contributing substantially to the growth in 
state and federal incarceration rates (Barker, 2006; Beckett and Sasson, 2000; Stemen et 
al., 2005).  These laws not only impact sentencing procedure by removing judicial 
discretion altogether, but they also alter the substance of criminal law by targeting certain 
types of offenses for more punitive sanctions. Between 1975 and 2002 every state 
adopted some form of mandatory minimums. The breadth of offenses targeted for 
mandatory enhancements varies substantially across states, but a few popular targets for 
these laws are offenses involving weapons (especially guns), offenses committed near 
schools, crimes against protected populations such as minors and members of certain 
race, sex, and religious groups, sex offenses, and any crime involving aggravated bodily 
harm (Stemen et al., 2005).  In most states that have adopted these laws, a “triggering” 
offense requires a judge to impose a mandatory term of incarceration and/or requires the 
judge to impose a lengthier prison term.  
 Though these laws have received considerable attention, their effects on the 
probability of prison and on imprisonment rates are not frequently addressed in empirical 
studies of sentencing or in the macro level research on incarceration.  In one study to 
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examine the effects that mandatory enhancements have on incarceration rates, Stemen 
and colleagues (2005) find that the number of mandatory enhancements that are triggered 
by weapon use, offenses against protected victims, and offenses committed while under 
state supervision are associated with significant growth in state incarceration rates, 
though the precise mechanism that explains this effect (i.e., prison admissions versus 
sentence lengths) remains unclear.  In their conclusion, the authors of the study suggest 
that “we do not believe that these specific laws are leading to increased incarceration 
rates….Rather, these laws likely act as a proxy for a state’s overall use of mandatory 
sentencing policies.”  (Stemen et al., 2005: 125).  The fact that most states mandate 
incarceration for offenses that trigger mandatory penalties leads to the expectation that: 
the odds of incarceration will be higher in jurisdictions with a larger number of 
mandatory minimum provisions. 
 
Punitive Drug Laws  
 Several observers have argued that a major factor driving growth in incarceration 
is the passage of more punitive drug penalties, which are believed to have sent a larger 
proportion of low-level drug offenders behind bars (Blumstein and Beck, 1999).  Arrests 
of drug offenders tripled between 1980 and 2001, but the increase in imprisonment 
(1,195%) suggests that the war on drugs drove increases in incarceration rates primarily 
by increasing the proportion of offenders who were sentenced to jail or prison (Harrison 
and Beck, 2005).  Given the significance of this shift, the current study also examines the 
impact of state variability in drug penalties on the probability of incarceration.  
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States have passed more complex and more punitive drug laws, beginning perhaps 
most notoriously with New York’s Rockefeller drug laws.  Passed in the 1970s, these 
laws were noteworthy for their strict minimum penalties for possessions of small amounts 
of drugs, and because the laws were accompanied by a ban on plea-bargaining.  Many 
states have since adjusted their statutory penalties for drug crimes to include alternative 
sanctions such as drug courts that mandate treatment.  Other states have maintained 
relatively severe penalties for the sale and possession of drugs, with some of these states 
also incorporating mandatory minimums based on quantity and where drugs are bought 
and sold.  Such penalties have grown increasingly severe over time.  For instance, 
Stemen et al. (2005) document that minimum sentences for possession of 1 ounce of 
cocaine averaged 13 months in 1975.  By 2002, state statutes indicated that the average 
minimum sentence for possession of 1 ounce of cocaine increased to 28 months (a 115% 
increase) (Stemen et al., 2005: 22).  Though there are no published studies which have 
examined how state variation in the severity of drug laws impacts the sentencing of drug 
offenders, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that states with higher minimum 
sentences for cocaine possession and sales and more mandatory minimum provisions for 
drug offenders, have experienced significant growth in their incarceration rates over the 
past thirty years (Stemen et al., 2005).  It is not clear from these types of aggregate 
studies however if more punitive drug laws drive incarceration rates because they 
indicate a more punitive legal culture in general, or whether they actually contribute to an 
increased probability of imprisonment for drug offenders specifically.  The current study 
examines this hypothesis with the expectation that:  drug offenders sentenced in 
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jurisdictions with more punitive drug laws can expect a higher likelihood of being 
incarcerated upon conviction. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFICIENCY 
The goals of sentencing policy are often mediated by pressures to efficiently 
process cases and must be balanced by the costs of punishment.  With respect to these 
issues, organizational and court community perspectives have greatly advanced our 
understanding of the relationship between court social contexts and sentencing 
dispositions (e.g, Dixon, 1995; Eisenstein et al., 1988; Ulmer, 1997).   These perspectives 
highlight that the costs incurred by punishment, case processing efficiency, and local 
legal cultures that define the ‘going rates’ of punishment all impact sentencing 
dispositions.  Although a comprehensive assessment of courtroom legal cultures across 
U.S. counties is not presently possible, important developments in the study of 
incarceration point to the importance of examining differences across jurisdictions in 
fiscal resources and offsets that may override the desires of communities and politicians 
to respond more harshly to crime, and may foster a local court room culture more open to 
alternatives to prison (Spelman, 2009).   According to economic perspectives and 
deterrence theory, high conviction rates signal the certainty of punishment, prison 
crowding and corrections budgets signal the burdens of it, and attempts to offset the costs 
of expanding prison populations may be tied to changes over time in the use of probation. 
The present study examines the ways in which prison capacities exert independent 
influences on criminal case dispositions.  In addition, I go beyond prior research by 
investigating the incentives against imprisonment by examining state differences in 
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corrections spending.  Additionally, I investigate how state and local probation laws 
dictating the amount of supervision costs that may be charged to probationers may 
significantly alter the appeal of sentencing individuals to prison.  These last two 
organizational attributes have not received explicit attention in prior multistate studies, 
but they may provide important clues as to why some jurisdictions send significantly 
fewer offenders to prison. 
 
Physical and Fiscal Capacity to Incarcerate 
Scholars have interpreted the relationship between bureaucratic arrangements and 
sentencing outcomes using economic/deterrence models of punishment and the court 
community theory of sentencing (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Eisenstein et al., 1988; 
Ulmer, 1997).  Both of these argue that sentencing outcomes will reflect interests to 
effectively manage the punishment process with minimal cost and greater efficiency.   
Economic perspectives of social control argue that crime control efforts will reflect an 
instrumental response to levels of crime across all jurisdictions, but that the severity of 
punishment can only be understood in relation to its certainty and costs (Chamlin and 
Langworthy, 1996; Cooney and Burt, 2008; Liska, 1992).  Jurisdictional variation in the 
severity of sentencing then, is believed reflect a balance between the goals of deterring 
future offending and the costs imposed on the system by relying on harsh measures aimed 
at deterring crime.  One important factor that may mediate the punitive-oriented goals of 
sentencing policies are the fiscal capacities to punish, the physical opportunities to punish 
in the form of prison and jail space, and the presence of incentives that help offset the 
burden of these costs.  The capacity to punish has become so important that several states 
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have crafted sentencing schemes with the purpose of providing ‘cost-effective’ sanctions 
and assisting the state with avoiding prison overcrowding (Kauder and Ostrum, 2008).  
Washington’s sentencing commission for example, states that a central goal of their 
guidelines is to sanction offenders by making “frugal use of the state’s and local 
government’s resources,” (Kauder and Ostrum, 2008: 26).   
The key resources that may constrain the ability of states and local courts to 
impose more punitive sanctions are state spending on corrections and the availability of 
prison and jail space.  A number of studies have explored the effects of jail or prison 
crowding on sentencing, but measures of crowding provide an incomplete portrait of the 
constraints facing state and local correctional systems because capacity measures 
reported by states and local governments do not capture the volume of prisoners that are 
in private prisons or housed in other states due to overcrowding.  A more accurate picture 
of the full burden states bear to incarcerate offenders is corrections spending.  As 
Spelman explains, “as we fill prisons beyond capacity or farm prisoners out to other 
states or institutions, we incur both the higher financial costs (increased transportation 
costs, profit, an inconvenience premium) and higher inchoate political and administrative 
costs (these prisoners remain our responsibility, but we cannot control and take care of 
them directly)” (2009: 43).  One implication of these arguments is that as the costs of 
punishment increase, state and local governments will respond with less severe 
sentencing to help manage the expense of housing prisoners as well as the space to do so. 
While there is some evidence to suggest this is true (Spelman, 2009), the 
economic model of punishment has received less attention in the multilevel sentencing 
literature.  Only one existing multi-state contextual study of sentencing has assessed the 
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degree to which judges’ propensity to incarcerate is shaped by state prison capacities and 
crowding (Wang and Mears, 2010), despite evidence from Pennsylvania which suggests 
that defendants face a significantly greater likelihood of confinement when sentenced in 
counties with greater jail space (Johnson, 2006; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).   In one metro 
county court in Pennsylvania, one judge explained the rationale for using jail 
overcrowding to depart from the sentencing guidelines for less serious offenders: “A 
retail theft or marijuana possession or something, I’m not going to put that person in jail. 
I say, ‘Look, you might deserve to be there, but I don’t have the space to waste on you’” 
(Ulmer, 1997: 87).  This leads to the expectation that:  all else equal, the odds of 
incarceration will be lower in jurisdictions experiencing higher rates of prison and/or 
jail overcrowding, 
And also that:   
All else equal, the odds of incarceration will be lower in jurisdictions within states that 
spend more money per capita on corrections. 
Other factors besides prison crowding and corrections costs may provide 
incentives against the use of incarceration. Garland (2001: 177) points out that probation 
and parole have been refashioned in recent years to resemble “real” punishment instead 
of a means of rehabilitation and reintegration.  Though a number of studies have 
examined this transformation of probation and parole, there is little research on how 
probation policies influence the decision to incarcerate.  There are potentially important 
reasons to consider how community differences in probation policies may impact a 
jurisdiction’s reliance on incarceration.  One way that lawmakers can appear tough on 
crime while balancing the costs associated with incarceration is to expand the rationale 
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for probation.  In other words, probation may serve as an organizational safety valve that 
helps to regulate prison populations.   
In a climate of finite resources, some states and counties may offset the costs of 
punishment by charging offenders for their probation supervision (Diller, 2010; Ring, 
1989; Wheeler et al., 1989).  Probation has not only had to expand to include more 
serious offenders, but it has been reconfigured as a community-based extension of the 
prison (Bannon, Nagrecha, and Diller, 2010).  Both adult and juvenile probation 
monitoring now frequently includes more intrusive measures such as electronic 
monitoring and drug testing, and operates under the goals of calculating and containing 
risk (Garland, 2001: 177).  These all come at great cost to the state; costs the government 
may offset by charging felons a monthly supervision fee for the duration of their 
supervision (Morris and Tonry, 1990).  All but four of the states included in the current 
study charge probationers for their supervision, a fee that varies from ten dollars in 
Washington to seventy-six dollars a month in Florida.  In the state of Florida, where 
probationers are fully responsible for the costs of their supervision and nonpayment is 
considered grounds for revocation of parole or probation, supervision fees alone 
generated nearly 26 million dollars in revenue during the 2007-2008 fiscal year (Bannon 
et al., 2010; Diller, 2010; Florida Department of Corrections, 2009: 14).5  Similar to 
practices in other states, Georgia’s probation program is supported by the supervision 
fees charged to all probationers (Morris and Tonry, 1990: 133-134).   Although most 
                                                
5 Most states are reluctant to revoke probation or parole for nonpayment of fees.  The constitutionality for 
such punishment based on income is also questionable.  In response to the legal concerns associated with 
tying punishments to socioeconomic status, Florida was among the first states to require payment of 
supervision fees; in lieu of revoking probation for nonpayment, the state allows probationers to complete 
their term of supervision with the requirement that they eventually pay all fees incurred during their 
supervision.  Similar to income tax debt, probation fee debt will not be terminated until the probationer 
remits payment or proves their inability to pay. 
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states do not consider the inability to pay fees a probation violation, Morris and Tonry 
claim that the mere prospect that these fees can fuel the support and expansion of 
probation services provides a powerful incentive to collect such revenue that is not 
otherwise immediately available to a correctional system that relies heavily on 
imprisonment (although some states also charge parole supervision fees and debt incurred 
for health services).  In sum, if states can finance probation in more creative ways and 
reduce the amount of non-violent offenders imprisoned, then defendants can be expected 
to face significantly lower odds of imprisonment.  Although no prior research has 
examined the relationship between state efforts to offset the costs of supervision and 
sentencing decisions, according to the economic model we should expect that states and 
counties that charge a higher monthly probation supervision fee have a greater incentive 
to sentence defendants to some term of probation because they can offset more punitive 
methods of probation with costs recovered through probation fees.6  Thus, I expect that 
defendants convicted in jurisdictions that charge a higher fee for probation supervision 
will, on average, be significantly less likely to receive a prison sentence. 
 
Caseload Pressures   
The ability to obtain convictions and dispose of cases is influenced by the 
workload pressure placed on courts. Research by Eisenstein and colleagues found that 
higher caseloads provide incentives to plea bargain, which in turn, reduces the severity of 
sentencing (Eisenstein et al., 1988). Research in Federal districts and in Pennsylvania 
courts documents that defendants are significantly more likely to receive downward 
                                                
6 In all but two of the states in the current study, the state controls probation supervision and sets a standard 
supervision fee.  In New York and California, probation is organized at the county level, and local 
governments determine the supervision fees. 
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departures in jurisdictions where there is greater pressure to process a higher volume of 
cases (i.e., more cases per judge).  However, sentencing studies that control for whether 
defendants plea bargain contradict these findings, demonstrating a higher likelihood of 
incarceration for defendants processed in courts with higher caseload pressure (Ulmer et 
al., 2008).  Thus, while theory suggests that high caseloads will reduce the severity of 
sentencing indirectly by increasing conviction rates, the evidence from studies that 
control for plea bargaining rates across counties suggests the opposite.  Thus, I expect 
that that: caseload pressures will significantly influence the severity of sentencing, though 
the direction of this relationship may be positive or negative.   
 
 
COMMUNITY CONTEXT: 
SOCIAL THREAT AND CONFLICT 
 
Presently, conflict theory is the dominant framework guiding the literature on the 
social structure of legal sanctioning.  Departing from the consensus-based portrayal of 
punishment as a social ritual carried out by the government for the collective good, 
conflict theorists maintain that legal sanctioning is a coercive tool carried out by the state 
to further the interests of the powerful at the expense of subordinate groups (Chambliss 
and Seidman, 1971).  Classic neo-Marxist conflict focused on the threat to capitalist 
mode of production posed by surplus labor, stimulating a large body of research linking 
levels of unemployment to general imprisonment rates and the sentencing of individual 
defendants (Rusche, 1978).  While economic interests remain at the forefront of conflict 
theory, competition for resources intersects with racial and political divisions.  The social 
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threat hypothesis is a specific proposition drawn from conflict theory, which predicts that 
the severity of punishment will be greater against members of groups perceived as either 
a criminal or economic threat to ‘elites.’  Although elites were traditionally defined in 
Marxist terms as the government and property owners, scholars now recognize the 
middle class as an ‘elite’ demographic given that they are the least insulated from 
threatening groups and street crime, are powerful enough to politically mobilize and 
communicate their interests, and are more often employed as criminal justice actors with 
the authority to use the justice system to their advantage (Liska, 1993; Sampson and 
Laub, 1993).  In the conflict tradition, the poor and racial and ethnic minorities are 
believed to represent threats to white, as well as upper and middle- class groups.  
According to the threat hypothesis, the relative size of these threatening groups should be 
positively associated with more severe sanctions levied against poor, Black, and Hispanic 
defendants (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Blalock, 1967; Liska, 1993). 
Increasingly though, scholars now include the size of the poor, Black, and 
Hispanic population in studies that examine incarceration rates and sentencing decisions 
for offenders from both majority and subordinate groups, inferring that the presence of 
threatening populations should be expected to increase the severe sanctioning of all 
crime, primarily in an indirect way by increasing levels of fear and insecurity (Liska, 
1992). Nearly every aggregate or multilevel study of penal sanctioning now includes 
measures unemployment, income inequality, and racial composition and these affects are 
almost always interpreted as the evidence or absence of threatening conditions.  Yet from 
a theoretical standpoint, it is unclear why judges in communities with larger poor and 
minority populations would punish defendants from threatening and non-threatening 
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groups with equal severity.  I describe several reasons why these conditions may impact 
sentencing behavior below, and ways in which we might begin to resolve conflicting 
interpretations about the affects of racial and ethnic composition on sentencing. 
 
Unemployment and Economic Inequality 
Economic threat models of punishment generally posit that during periods of 
economic prosperity, punishment is less necessary.  In ‘Punishment and Social Structure’ 
(1939), Rusche and Kirchheimer provide one of the first explanations of the ways in 
which structural conditions are associated with distinct styles of punishment.  They argue 
that in capitalist societies the frequency of imprisonment will be positively related to the 
changing size of ‘surplus labor’.7  During periods of labor surplus, the value of labor is 
diminished and the growing ranks of unemployed are perceived believed to pose a threat 
that is neutralized through a greater use of incarceration (Myers, 1993; Quinney, 1977).  
Motivated to reassert state legitimacy amidst declining prosperity, capitalist governments 
are even further motivated to punish workers so as to counteract the public fear that 
workers are redundant and economic advancement illusory (Chiricos and Delone, 1992).  
Thus, adverse economic circumstances are believed to form the perception that 
punishment becomes necessary in order to quell unrest and panic among the unemployed, 
and to reassert the legitimacy of the capitalist political economy. 
Building on this early neo-Marxist formulation of the economy-punishment 
relationship, scholars have refined the bases for a link between unemployment and 
incarceration to characterize the threat of the unemployed in symbolic and cultural terms, 
                                                
7 The Rusche-Kirchheimer hypothesis was originally formulated to explain historical trends in 
incarceration.  Increasingly however, the proposition that unemployment is positively related to 
incarceration features prominently in cross-sectional studies of sentencing and incarceration. 
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and support for the position that the value of labor determines the instrumental use of 
incarceration has declined in favor of a general social threat hypothesis of formal social 
control (Melossi, 2003).  Extending Rusche and Kirchheimer’s (1939) work, Spitzer 
(1975) argues that high unemployment is related to greater coercive state because it 
produces two problem populations:  those who are unproductive and unwilling to work 
but are otherwise harmless to elites; and second, those who are alienated by the 
conditions of underclass life (e.g., poor black residents) and are perceived as more likely 
to question their economic oppression (e.g., young males), a group Spitzer terms ‘social 
dynamite.’  Other scholars argue that economic threat is best captured by evaluating the 
gap between the rich and the poor.  For instance, Chambliss and Seidman assert that “The 
more economically stratified a society becomes, the more it becomes necessary for 
dominant groups to enforce through coercion the norms of conduct that guarantee their 
supremacy,” (1971:33; quoted in Jacobs and Carmichael, 2002).  To summarize, the 
thrust of these neo-Marxist perspectives suggests that unemployment and income 
inequality trigger more punitive sentencing practices because they threaten the economic 
interests of upper income groups.   
Another theoretical basis for the unemployment-punishment link is the perceived 
criminal threats posed by larger poor populations rather than threats to the economic 
hegemony of the upper class.  Sampson and Laub (1993) for example, point out that the 
poor often do not come into contact with the rich, or their property.  Thus, the threats 
posed by the poor are largely symbolic and signify a growing cultural divide between the 
poor and the middle and upper classes.  According to this view, unemployment and 
poverty is believed to elicit more punitive sentencing because of ideological assumptions 
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that these conditions foster crime (Box, 1987), that the poor are subject to criminal 
temptation, and that prison is the only successful deterrent to economically motivated 
offending (Chiricos and Delone, 1992).  Thus, unemployment is believed to shape 
sanctioning severity due to a prevailing cultural assumption that economic strain causes 
an increase in threatening acts (crime), and a growth in the size of threatening groups (the 
criminally-prone poor).  Greenberg (1977) ties this logic to judicial decision-making to 
suggest that economic conditions will shape judicial assessments about the risks of 
recidivism.  For instance, assumptions about the role of employment and crime risk have 
been codified in legal practices in Washington and North Carolina, where judges are 
permitted to consider defendant employment status (Greenberg & West, 2001), 
perceptions which may be shaped by larger aggregate conditions (e.g., Myers, 1993, 
1987).  To the extent that the poor make up a disproportionate share of those arrested and 
facing incarceration, adverse economic circumstances are expected to be positively 
associated with sentencing severity.  Regardless of the economic status of suspects 
though, Greenberg asserts that economic insecurity is predicted to lower tolerance of all 
crime, primarily because economic uncertainty fosters fear and insecurity.  
In conclusion, social threat explanations argue the use of incarceration is a 
response to unemployment and income inequality.  In theory, these conditions 1) are 
perceived as threatening to elites’ superior economic position, and/or 2) higher levels of 
unemployment and inequality affect the severity of sentencing indirectly because these 
conditions are believed to heighten fear and the intolerance of crime.  These hypothesized 
affects are expected to persist after adjusting for levels of crime.  Scholars continue to 
disagree on the causal connections between unemployment and punishment, and whether 
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unemployment and inequality should be expected to increase risks of imprisonment for 
all defendants, regardless of socioeconomic status.  Notwithstanding these 
inconsistencies, the guiding assumption is that in the context of economic strain and 
uncertainty courts will intensify punishment in order to neutralize threats to middle and 
upper classes interests (Myers, 1993).  The results in the expectations that: 
Sentencing outcomes be more severe in communities experiencing relatively 
higher rates of unemployment and/or economic inequality; and that levels of fear should 
help account for a portion of the relationship between economic strain and sentencing 
severity. 
Researchers have evaluated the validity of economic explanations of punishment 
using several indicators of economic conditions that range from unemployment rates, 
poverty, income inequality, and indices of socio-economic disadvantage.  Generally, this 
perspective has received little consistent support in the contextual sentencing literature 
(e.g., see Table 2.1) 
 
Linking Racial and Ethnic Composition to the Severity of Punishment 
 A large portion of the literature on sentencing and incarceration is concerned with 
modeling the ways in which the police and court decision making respond to minority-
majority group relations.  Social threat explanations argue that compared to white and 
upper income defendants, minority defendants are subject to more severe legal sanctions 
in an effort to insulate majority group members from potential threats to the existing 
social and economic hierarchy that benefits middle and upper class whites (Blalock, 
1967).  The degree to which majority group members perceive blacks and Hispanics as 
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threatening is believed to be strongly correlated with the size of their representation in the 
community.  According to the social threat hypothesis, a greater presence of Blacks and 
Hispanics is expected to be met with greater attention from police and more severe legal 
sanctioning based on the rationale that a greater presence of minority groups cultivate 
perceptions of vulnerability and threat among majority group members (Blalock, 1967). 
However, scholars frequently apply this reasoning to the sentencing and social 
control of the general population, and there is evidence that the severity of punishment in 
general is related to the size of racial and ethnic groups in the community.  For instance, 
the results summarized in Table 2.1 suggest that among the more consistent predictors of 
more punitive sentencing is the relative size of the non-white population (Helms, 2009; 
King et al., 2010; Myers, 1987; Myers and Talarico, 1987; Weidner et al., 2005). 
What explains this relationship between the racial makeup of the population and 
geographical and defendant level disparities in punishment severity?  Due in large part to 
data restrictions limiting scholars to the use of Census data, we can only presume to know 
the meaning between racial composition and decisions regarding appropriate sanctions 
for individual felony defendants.  This project goes beyond previous examinations of this 
issue to include more proximate measures of several processes hypothesized in the 
literature to mediate the link between racial composition and the intensity of formal 
social control.  Two possible mechanisms can be gleaned from the literature on social 
disorder and fear (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004) and social/minority threat theory 
(Blalock, 1967; Liska, 1992).  Specifically, the disorder literature suggests that greater 
concentrations of racial minorities and the poor heighten public perceptions (among both 
blacks and whites) of disorder and crime, which may produce more punitive sanctions 
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towards all defendants through the more proximate mechanisms of fear or support for 
punitive sanctions.  Thus, I expect that: (a) the odds of incarceration will be higher in 
jurisdictions with a larger Black and Hispanic populations, but also that (b) racial and 
ethnic composition may also influence sentencing in an indirect manner through their 
impact on local levels of fear. 
 
NEO-DURKHEIMIAN PERSPECTIVES:  
COLLECTIVE SENTIMENT AND SOCIAL COHESION 
 
Durkheim’s view of punishment as a reflection of moral consensus and the 
maintenance of social cohesion remains an influential force in contemporary studies of 
law and punishment (e.g., Garland, 2001).   In its most basic sense, a neo-Durkheimian 
perspective on punishment argues that the community’s reaction to crime flows from the 
basic moral and ideological orientation of its residents.  Though Durkheim originally 
formulated a theory describing the functions of punishment more so than severity of it, 
his work has been influential for its suggestion that like crime, punishment can be viewed 
as expression of “collective sentiment” such that punishment’s “real function is to 
maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by sustaining the common consciousness of all 
its vigor,” (Durkheim, 1893, quoted in Cotterrell, 1991: 924).  The assumption that public 
sentiment influences the legal process implies that in communities where cultural 
sentiments and norms support for punitive justice responses should be associated with 
more retributive or repressive forms of social control.  According to Garland, the views 
of the public enter into the legal system in an “oblique” fashion by providing “a general 
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context of support for the laws and institutions which exist…..and they are referred to as 
a proper ‘consideration’ in the formation of policy and in individual sentencing 
decisions” (1990: 66).  This conceptualization of punishment may be particularly relevant 
in the U.S. legal system because there is greater pressure to translate public sentiment 
into decision-making, and much more opportunities to do so either through jury 
participation or by pressuring the choices made by popularly elected prosecutors and 
judges (Salvesberg, 1992). 
Attention to the role that the public plays in criminal sanctioning has prompted a 
stream of research concerned with identifying the sources of individual attitudes about 
crime and punishment.  This research forms the basis for several of the hypotheses 
examined in this study that predict that public sentiment and levels of interpersonal trust 
exert moderate but important influences on how courts come to define appropriate “going 
rates” of punishment (Eisenstein et al., 1988).  Below, I describe research identifying the 
social sources of support for punitive justice.  If the community “consensus” is consistent 
with a punitive social climate then we should expect, all else equal, that defendants 
processed in such punitive social climates face a greater odds of incarceration than 
defendants processed elsewhere.  Common examples of this highlighted in the literature 
are religious conservatism, political conservatism, social trust, racial resentment, and 
support for repressive measures of social control.  The rationale for incorporating these 
types of mechanisms into the study of sentencing is rooted in research indicating that 
while the legislature defines the boundaries of sanctioning authority, it is the public and 
political sphere within which judges and prosecutors develop norms about appropriate 
reactions to crime (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977).  Assumptions about the ability of local 
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cultural and political climate to shape legal outcomes is consistent with contemporary 
theories of legal decision making which suggest that legal actors operate within a context 
of bounded rationality and base sentencing decisions on perceptions of risk, 
blameworthiness and organizational constraints that may reflect values and concerns of 
the local climate (Albonetti, 1991; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  Specific elements of local 
collective sentiments, and their hypothesized effects are detailed below. 
 
Punitive Attitudes  
Although it has received little attention in the literature on jurisdictional variation 
in criminal case processing, it is reasonable to expect that community variation in levels 
of support for punitive justice may have implications for jurisdictional variation in the 
types of sanctions applied to felony defendants. Building off of these ideas, much of the 
early American work in formal social control focused on the honor culture in the South 
believed responsible for support for retributive justice as a response to norm violations 
(Vidmar, 2002).  There are a number of reasons why researchers have assumed that 
southern communities are more punitive.  Survey research suggests that southerners are 
more likely to support harsh sanctions such as the death penalty, exhibit lower levels of 
social capital and trust, that southerners exhibit higher levels of religious and political 
conservatism, and because traditional forms of prejudice have been higher in the South.  
Each of these social characteristics has been linked to more punitive attitudes, which in 
the aggregate, should indicate greater support (or demand) for harsh sanctions on the part 
of criminal justice authorities.   
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Religious Fundamentalism  
 Because of religion’s centrality to Durkheim’s view that values and morals 
undergird the punishment styles of society, sociologists have long been captivated by the 
relationship between punitive mentalities and religious beliefs.  The connection between 
religious faith and punitive attitudes may be particularly important for understanding 
American penology given the “persistence of religion in American society” and the 
powerful force of religion in politics (Applegate, Cullen, Fisher, and Vander Ven, 2000: 
722; Grasmick et al., 1993).  A long line of survey research has established a consistent, 
but complex relationship between individuals’ adherence to fundamentalist faiths and 
more punitive orientations towards crime and rule breaking (Cook and Powell, 2003; 
Unnever and Cullen, 2006).  A number of studies report that fundamentalist Christians 
are significantly more likely to support the death penalty, more punitive criminal justice 
legislation, harsher local courts, and more support for retributive penal philosophies 
(Borg, 1997; Britt, 1996; Grasmick et al., 1992, 1993; Unnever et al., 2005; Young, 
1992).  Some of these studies suggest that the key mechanism linking adherence to a 
fundamentalist faith to more punitive attitudes is the tendency toward biblical literalism 
(i.e., belief that the Bible is the literal word of God), which tends to be more prevalent in 
the South (Borg, 1997). 
Other research though suggests a more complex relationship, and that some of 
these aforementioned studies overemphasize the authoritarian aspects of Christian 
fundamentalism. Applegate et al. (2000) find that fundamentalists may adhere more 
strongly to retributive punitive orientations, but that aspects of their faith also promote 
support for rehabilitation and a belief in forgiveness.  Arguing that previous research 
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presents a “distorted” picture of religion by ignoring the more compassionate side of 
religion, the authors conclude that “one possible source of the tenacity of rehabilitation as 
a correctional ideology is the Judeo-Christian belief in forgiveness, and relatedly, the 
belief that sinners of all sorts can be transformed.” (Applegate et al., 2000: 741).  In 
summary, the research on religion and punitive attitudes suggests that Christian 
fundamentalists exhibit strong views on punishment, although the nature of the 
relationship is complex.  According to the most recent and comprehensive studies on the 
matter, the nature of the relationship between punitive ideology and religious 
fundamentalism turns on whether fundamentalists view God as loving and forgiving, and 
whether those who adhere to a fundamentalist doctrine interpret the Bible literally 
(Applegate et al., 2000; Unnever et al., 2005).  Though there are some exceptions in the 
literature, as a whole research suggests that for jurisdictions in which a higher proportion 
of residents adhere to a Christian fundamentalist doctrine, support for harsh sentencing 
should be greater.  This yields the expectation that: all else equal, sentencing will be 
more punitive in jurisdictions that contain a larger population of residents who identify 
as Christina fundamentalists. 
 
Conservative Political Climate, Support for the Death Penalty, and Racial Prejudice 
Political climate is the most consistently cited feature of communities expected to  
impact legal decision-making and aggregate differences in incarceration, pretrial bail and 
detention, and application of the death penalty (Beckett & Sasson, 2000; Eisenstein & 
Jacob, 1977; Garland, 2001; Greenberg & West, 2001; Helms & Jacobs, 2002; Huang et 
al., 1996; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001, 2002; Smith, 2004; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004).  
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Research in this vein tends to focus on two aspects of the political climate:  the effects of 
political structures and the effects of political sentiment or ideology on sanctioning.  
There are several theoretical reasons to expect that conservative ideology might shape 
jurisdictional differences in the application of felony pretrial and sentencing sanctions.  
Beckett and Sasson (2000) view the effects of politics in cultural terms, where 
conservative efforts to politicize the crime problem shifted public discourse away from 
the social sources of crime, effectively reframing the issue in terms of individual choices.  
Specifically, the authors make a compelling case that beginning in the 1964 Presidential 
election conservative Republicans have included crime control and “get tough” rhetoric 
as a cornerstone of their political platform.  This platform called for penalties harsh 
enough to deter would be criminals from “choosing” violence, drugs and poverty, tacitly 
depicting the issue in urban, racialized terms (Beckett & Sasson, 2000; Tonry, 1995).  
While provocative, this claim is not without merit.  In a recent study of the link between 
racial prejudice, conservatism, and punitiveness, Chiricos et al. (2004) report findings 
demonstrating that among conservatives, net of respondent gender, fear of crime, and 
racial prejudice (all of which were reduced to non-significance for conservatives in the 
sample), it is perceptions of crime as a black phenomenon that most strongly predict 
support for harsher penal sanctions.   
Consistent with assertions that conservatives support harsh sanctions, research has 
also shown that conservatives are more likely to support the use of the death penalty for 
murderers, which is a leading indicator of more punitive attitudes.  According to the 
Gallup Poll and the General Social Survey, support for the death penalty and the belief 
that courts are not harsh enough has increased over time (Cullen et al., 2000).  Roughly 
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50 percent of Americans supported the death penalty in 1970.  By 1996, GSS data 
indicate that this figure had grown to 70 percent.  Among Black Americans, research 
indicates less support for the death penalty, partly due to perceived injustice among 
Blacks (Johnson, 2008).   
Accurately capturing Americans’ attitudes about punishment is notoriously 
difficult due to the complexity of feelings individuals have towards crime.  Nevertheless, 
this trend indicating a growing punitive orientation has led to suggestions that a shift in 
public support for punitive crime control is a major factor responsible for the growing use 
of incarceration in the U.S.  Though overall support for the death penalty remains high 
among whites, this varies across communities, suggesting one possible factor that may 
account for community variation in the severity of sentencing (e.g., Baumer et al., 2003; 
Borg, 1997; Soss et al., 2003).   On the whole, these streams of research suggest a more 
punitive social climate in communities with higher levels of political conservatism and 
support for the death penalty.  This yields the expectation that: sentencing will be more 
severe in jurisdictions characterized by higher levels of political conservatism and 
support for harsh sanctions. 
 A relatively recent line of research has attempted to isolate some of the 
underlying attitudes that help to account for why some individuals (especially whites) 
tend to hold more punitive orientations.  An intriguing finding to emerge from this work 
suggests that racial prejudice may be key to explaining the racial divide in support for the 
death penalty and punitive attitudes more generally (Johnson, 2008).  Using a variety of 
data sources such as the GSS and the National Election Studies (NES), multiple studies 
show that racial prejudice among whites is one of the strongest and most consistent 
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predictors of support for the death penalty and support for other harsh crime control 
policies (Barkan and Cohn, 1994,1998; Bobo and Johnson, 2004; Soss et al., 2003; 
Unnever and Cullen, 2010; Unnever et al., 2008; Unnever et al., 2005).  For instance, 
Unnever and Cullen (2005) find that nearly one-third of the support for capital 
punishment among whites can be explained by measures tapping white racism (see also 
Unnever and Cullen, 2010).  Additional survey research finds that among whites, 
preferences for harsh sentencing are correlated strongly with perceptions of “racialized 
threat” and that harsh criminal sanctions offer whites a means with which to vent this 
racial animosity (Soss et al., 2003; Unnever and Cullen, 2007, 2010).  What is 
particularly noteworthy about these studies is that they typically find that whites’ racial 
prejudice is associated to punitive attitudes generally, and not simply directed at blacks.  
Unfortunately, a more comprehensive examination of the precise reasons why white 
prejudice would stimulate more punitive reactions to criminals of all races has yet to 
emerge from this research.  Nevertheless, these findings suggest that: sentencing will be 
more severe in jurisdictions where whites’ racial resentment is higher. 
Social Trust 
Lastly, I draw on classic propositions regarding the role of community social 
cohesion and informal social control to help explain variation in the severity of 
sentencing.  Durkheim (1893), and more recently Donald Black (1989), describes 
community differences in the quantity and severity of formal social control as a function 
of weak informal social controls, the strength of which is reinforced by trust, 
cohesiveness and reciprocity among members of the community (Sampson et al., 1999).  
This community cohesion and coordination for the sake of punishment may take on one 
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of two forms.  Braithwaite (1989) posits a negative relationship between social cohesion, 
trust and punitive sanctions.  Specifically, he argues that communitarian locales 
characterized by more involvement, trust, and interdependencies may be less apt to rely 
on the state for punitive sanctioning in favor of informal shaming.  Consistent with 
Braithwaite’s theory, survey research reveals that individuals who express higher levels 
of interpersonal trust in others are significantly less likely to support harsh sanctions such 
as the death penalty (Soss et al., 2003).  Researchers have interpreted this relationship to 
mean that trust is the foundation to civic engagement and that it expresses a commitment 
to the rights of other individuals in ways that promote forgiveness and a belief in second 
chances (Putnam, 1993; Soss et al., 2003). 
In contrast to Braithwaite’s view of community cohesion, Vidmar (2002) relies on 
a functionalist perspective to argue that close knit, cohesive communities will actually be 
motivated to punish defendants more harshly in order to restore the legitimacy of local 
rules and to maintain social cohesion.  Legal violations in relatively cohesive, tight-knit 
communities challenge the norms governing acceptable behavior in these areas.  This 
challenge may potentially trigger particularly retributive responses from the courts that 
are meant to reinforce the parameters of acceptable behavior.  Tyler and Boeckmann 
(1997) present evidence consistent with this expectation.  In a survey of California 
residents following adoption of the three strikes initiative, the central concern of 
individuals that supported the law was not fear of crime, but rather a concern about the 
decline of values and consensus. 
Despite interest in the role of community trust, cohesion and involvement in 
relation to crime, only one multilevel study of sentencing has examined the effects of 
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social capital on individual legal outcomes (Baumer and Martin, 2011).  While a 
promising start, the study by Baumer and Martin (2011) focused on outcomes for 
convicted murderers, and thus may not be generalizeable to broad samples of felony 
cases (which are dominated by drug and property offenses).  This study attempts to 
broaden our understanding of the effects of social trust by examining whether it impacts 
the sentencing outcomes for felonies in general, but also whether social trust may be 
particularly salient for understanding the legal sanctioning of non-violent drug offenders. 
Conflicting theoretical accounts highlighting the importance of trust and cohesion, and 
thus provide no single prediction about the direction of its effect on the severity of 
sanctioning.   
 
SUMMARY 
Four major theoretical models of punishment that guide contemporary macro and 
multilevel research on social control inform the hypotheses examined in this chapter.  
Each of these models underscores the importance of different state, county, and court-
level attributes.  Legal models draw upon Weberian theory to stress the formal and 
rational behavior of legal actors.  Legalist perspectives thus view sentencing as a formal, 
bureaucratic, and predictable process guided by rules rather than moral outrage, political 
pressure, or organizational priorities.  Viewed, this way, sentences are expected to be 
more geographically uniform in states that structure judicial discretion through the use of 
guidelines or mandatory penalties, and sentencing can be expected to more severe in the 
context of a legal culture where laws embody a “get tough” approach to crime.  
Organizational efficiency models stress the importance of accounting for variability 
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across courts in workload pressure, resources required to mete out certain sanctions, and 
the ability of government to generate revenue to offset the fiscal burdens of crime 
control.   Social conflict models, which remain a dominant force in the broader literature 
on social control, conceive of repressive punishment as a response to a perceived threat 
among elites and the middle-class to symbolic threats posed by the poor and minority 
racial and ethnic groups (Liska, 1992; Sampson and Laub, 1993).  Though rarely tested in 
contextual or macro-level research on crime control (although see Stults and Baumer, 
2007), an implicit assumption of this perspective is that fear and insecurity are critical 
intervening mechanisms that link the presence of “problem populations” to efforts to 
manage these populations through more severe sentencing.  The final set of hypotheses 
examined in this study was formulated from neo-Durkheimian perspectives, which 
emphasize the moral and cultural roots of punishment (Garland, 1990).  Viewed through 
this lens, punishment is a passionate response on behalf of the community, with roots in 
cultural sensibilities, morals, values and social cohesion; a view not inconsistent with 
research which shows that community norms and expectations help define court workers’ 
concepts of proper “going rates” of punishment (Myers and Talarico, 1987; Ulmer, 
1997). 
Table 2.2 summarizes the hypotheses developed from these theories that are 
tested in the current study.  This table also serves as a guide to the order in which the 
results of these models are presented in Chapter 4 (findings).   
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Table 2.2.  Summary of Hypothesized Relationships Between Jurisdictional Climate and the Severity of Sentences Applied to Felony Defendants 
Theoretical Model of Sentencing Tested Direction Hypothesis Tested in Analyses 
   
Legal Models of Sanctioning  Hypotheses about the main effects of legal policies and statutory penalties on the severity of 
sentences imposed. 
Structure of Sentencing Process in each State   
     Determinate Sentencing  +/- No direction predicted. 
 
     Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines  - A) Controlling for presence of presumptive guidelines will reduce residual variation in 
sentencing outcomes across jurisdictions.  B) Defendants processed in jurisdictions operating 
under presumptive sentencing guidelines are expected to receive less punitive sentences on 
average compared to defendants processed in jurisdictions without presumptive guidelines.   
 
     Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines - A) Controlling for presence of voluntary guidelines will reduce residual variation in 
sentencing outcomes across jurisdictions.  B) Defendants processed in jurisdictions operating 
under voluntary sentencing guidelines are expected to receive less punitive sentences on 
average compared to defendants processed in jurisdictions without presumptive guidelines.   
     Truth in Sentencing Time-Served Requirements +/- No direction predicted. 
     Mandatory Enhancement Score  + Defendants processed in jurisdictions that have adopted a greater # of mandatory enhancement 
statutes are expected to receive more punitive sentences. 
     Mandatory Enhancement Score for Drug Offenses + Defendants processed in jurisdictions that have adopted a greater # of mandatory enhancement 
statutes related to drug offenses are expected to receive more punitive sentences. 
     Three Strikes Policy +/- No direction predicted. 
 
     Severity of Penalties for Possession 1 oz Cocaine + Defendants processed in jurisdictions with more severe penalties for possession of cocaine are 
expected to receive more punitive sentences. 
     Severity of Penalties for Sale 1 oz Cocaine + Defendants processed in jurisdictions with more severe penalties for sale of cocaine are 
expected to receive more punitive sentences. 
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Indirect Effects of Legal Culture:  Hypotheses about characteristics of legal climate expected to shape severity of sentences by 
conditioning the relationship between defendant criminal history and the odds of 
incarceration. 
 
Presumptive Guidelines x Prior Felony Conviction  + Presumptive guidelines will increase the odds of incarceration by strengthening the magnitude 
of the effect that prior criminal convictions exert on the odds of being sentenced to prison or 
jail. 
 
Three Strikes You're Out Law x Prior Felony 
Conviction 
+ "Three Strikes' legislation will increase the odds of incarceration by strengthening the 
magnitude of the effect that prior criminal convictions exert on the odds of being sentenced to 
prison or jail. 
   
Organizational Models of Sanctioning   
     Jail Space Constraints - Jurisdictions with limited jail space will impose less punitive sentences (i.e., probation) than 
jurisdictions with greater availability of jail space. 
     Prison Space Constraints  - Jurisdictions with limited prison space will impose less punitive sentences (i.e., jail or 
probation) than jurisdictions with greater prison space availability. 
     Per Capita Corrections Expenditures (in $) - Jurisdictions that spend more money per capita on corrections are expected to sentence less 
punitively.  
     Average Monthly Probation Supervision Fee (in $) - Jurisdictions that charge more on average for monthly probation supervision fees are expected 
to impose less punitive sentences (i.e. probation vs. incarceration). 
     Prosecutor Caseload Pressure  +/- No direction predicted. 
   
Social Threat/Conflict Models of Sanctioning   
     Size of Black Population + Jurisdictions with larger Black population will sentence more punitively. 
     Size of Hispanic Population + Jurisdictions with a larger Hispanic population will sentence more punitively. 
     Wealth Inequality (Gini coefficient) + Jurisdictions with greater income inequality will sentence more punitively. 
     Unemployment Rate + Jurisdictions with a larger population of unemployed persons will sentence more punitively. 
     Fear of Crime + Jurisdictions where a greater percentage of residents are afraid to walk in their neighborhood 
at night will sentence more punitively.   
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neo-Durkheimian Models of Sanctioning:   
Public Sentiment and Social Cohesion   
     Southern Jurisdiction + Southern jurisdictions will sentence more punitively. 
     Levels of Support for Capital Punishment  + Jurisdictions where a greater % of residents support use of capital punishment for murderers 
will sentence more punitively. 
     Levels of Social Trust/Cohesion +/- No direction predicted. 
     Levels of Religious Fundamentalism + Jurisdictions containing more residents who identify as religious fundamentalists will sentence 
more punitively. 
     Levels of Conservative Political Ideology + More politically conservative jurisdictions will sentence more punitively. 
     Levels of White Anti-Black Racial Animus + Jurisdictions with higher levels of anti-Black racial animus among whites will sentence more 
punitively. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
CASE-LEVEL DATA 
 I test the theoretical propositions outlined in Chapter Two using individual level 
data on adult felony case filings from the publicly available State Court Processing 
Statistics (SCPS) that have been merged with aggregate data capturing the local social, 
cultural, organizational and legal climate within which these cases are processed.  The 
SCPS is a publicly available data set collected by the Pretrial Justice Institute on behalf of 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  The data are publicly available through the 
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR study #2038).  The 
SCPS is a biennial data collection effort that began in 1988.  I use data on felony case 
filings for the most recent years of the SCPS series (1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004) that 
were publicly available at the beginning of the current study.  Together, this cross-section 
of felony cases from 1998 to 2004 provides information on the processing of 
approximately 60,000 defendants initially arrested for felony crimes.  The SCPS contains 
extensive data on prior criminal history, including the number and nature of prior arrests 
and convictions (misdemeanor, felony, and violent felony), any prior jail and prison 
incarcerations, and whether the defendant was on parole or probation at the time of arrest. 
One of the unique contributions of the SCPS is that it is the only large national sentencing 
database specifically designed to follow defendants throughout the adjudication process.  
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Information is recorded across major decision points between defendants’ initial 
arraignment and the final adjudication of guilt and the sentencing disposition.  The data 
include charging decisions at both the arrest and adjudication stage, the mode and 
outcome at adjudication (i.e., plea bargain, trial adjudication, diversion, or dismissal), 
data on the type of legal representation obtained by defendants, pretrial processing 
decisions regarding bail amount and the denial of release, the decision to confine an 
offender to jail or prison versus probation or other noncustodial punishment, and the 
duration of incarceration and/or probation. 
 
SCPS Sampling 
The geographic scope and sampling strategy of the SCPS are unique to sentencing 
research in several respects and merit a brief description.  First, the design of the SCPS is 
intended to provide data on the processing of defendants within a representative sample 
of the 75 largest urban counties across approximately 20 states from each region of the 
US.  Unlike the majority of sentencing studies in the literature, one of the goals of the 
SCPS is to situate the final disposition of felony cases within the broader context of urban 
court processing. Thus, the SCPS differs from datasets describing sentencing in single 
states (e.g., Pennsylvania and Washington) in that the data are not intended to provide 
estimates of sentencing behavior that are generalizable to the state in which these county 
jurisdictions are located.    
The SCPS employs a multi-stage sampling procedure designed by the U.S. 
Census Bureau for selecting felony cases. Using a 2-stage stratified design, 40 of the 75 
most populous counties in the US are selected during stage one (Kyckelhahn and Cohen, 
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2008; United States Dept. of Justice, 2010).  Ten counties are included in the sample with 
certainty due to the size of their respective populations and felony caseload filings (e.g., 
Los Angeles; Cook; Miami-Dade; Maricopa).  The remaining 30 counties are chosen 
from a pool of the remaining 65 largest counties in the US “based on the variance of their 
felony case filings” (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 2010: 6).  The remaining 30 counties chosen to 
participate in the SCPS in a given year have a smaller sample of felony filings to draw 
from, and each are allocated to noncertainty strata with corresponding sampling weights.8  
In the second stage of the sampling procedure, felony case filings within each of the 40 
counties are systematically selected to represent all defendants with a felony charge filed 
with the court during the month of May.  Each participating county for that year then 
provide data for each felony case filed on selected days during the month of May.  A 
felony filing is followed for a period of one year, and murder cases are followed for two 
years.  A small number of case filings involving death penalty cases may not be included 
in these data since capital cases require a lengthier adjudication period.  When weighted 
according to their sample selection strata the approximately 15,000 cases sampled each 
year represent all felony cases (approximately 57,000 total in any given year) filed in the 
nation’s 75 most populous counties during the month of May (Cohen and Reaves, 2006).   
In 2004 the SCPS sampling frame was representative of 38% of the nation’s population 
(Kyckelhahn and Cohen, 2008), and according to the UCR, 45% of all serious violent 
crime reported in the nation in 2004, including over half of all robberies, 43% of assaults, 
and 43% of all murders.  Therefore, the SCPS provides a unique glimpse into legal 
                                                
8 The largest counties sampled with certainty receive a weight of 1.0 and smallest counties with fewer case 
filings receive the highest weight of 2.50.  Because the remaining 30 counties are chosen with uncertainty, 
some counties will appear in the SCPS every year (i.e., the largest 10 counties) while some counties may 
only appear in 1998, 2000, 2002, or 2004, respectively.  
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decision making in the counties that process nearly half of all serious crime in the US; 
jurisdictions that are in a position to contribute significantly to the national incarceration 
rate through both prison commitment and duration decisions.  All descriptive statistics 
and regression estimates in the current study are based in unweighted SCPS data.  Details 
on the sample used in the current study, sample attrition out of the criminal justice 
system, and the removal of cases due to missing defendant or jurisdictional level data are 
discussed below. 
 
Level 1 Sample 
The SCPS is a database of accused defendants facing conviction and 
incarceration.  Each defendant constitutes a ‘felony case filing.’  Thus, the unit of 
analysis in the current study is the defendant, rather than the charge.  For each defendant, 
the most serious arrest and adjudication charge is identified as the primary offense.  In the 
case of those arrested on multiple charges, there is also information on the second offense 
each defendant is initially charged with. The sample used for the present study is 
restricted to the portion of this sample convicted of a felony since in several states (e.g., 
Washington) sentencing guideline recommendations only apply to felony cases (Engen 
and Gainey, 2000).  
Figure 3 charts the extent and sources of sample attrition from the initial charging 
decision to final disposition, and identifies the initial sample sizes of all possible cases for 
use in the analyses of incarceration.  An asterisk (*) indicates that sample sizes may not 
total to the original accused sample size due to missing data at key stages in the court 
process.  At the individual level, sample attrition occurred when a defendant was initially 
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charged with a felony but convicted of a misdemeanor, the case was dismissed, the 
defendant acquitted, the case was still pending after one year, or the case was diverted out 
of the felony court to another adjudication setting (e.g., drug court) or an adjudication of 
guilt was “deferred.”  Beginning with an initial sample of accused defendants whose 
cases moved forward past the arraignment stage and for which there is adjudication 
information (N= 59,159), and omitting 4,017 cases the prosecutor either diverted out of 
the court or deferred an adjudication of guilt, and those cases dismissed by the court or 
the prosecutor (13,151) provides a sample of 41,991 defendants adjudicated from 1998 to 
2004.  Of those, nearly 6,525 cases (mostly rape and murder cases) were still pending a 
year after data collection, 420 defendants were acquitted, and approximately 35,046 
defendants were convicted.  Of the latter, it could be determined that 27,707 defendants 
were convicted of a felony charge.  From this pool of felony convictions, I removed an 
additional 1,353 defendants from the sample for three reasons.  First, I removed 57 cases 
from three counties (Erie, NY; Westchester, NY; and Jefferson, KY) that had fewer than 
25 convicted defendants per county.  Although the consensus in multilevel modeling is 
that a large number of level two groups is more consequential for statistical power than a 
large number of individuals per group, larger samples of individuals within groups is 
necessary when the focus is on accurately probing for cross-level interactions, which is 
one component of the analyses examining the effects of legal policies on incarceration 
decisions.  Reviewing simulation studies on the question of statistical power, Kreft and 
De Leeuw (1998: 125) conclude that at least 30 groups and 30 observations per group are 
required to obtain sufficient power to detect cross-level interactions. Next, sixty-eight 
cases were removed because data on the final sentencing disposition were missing.  
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Lastly, I removed 1,285 cases that were adjudicated in counties for which important 
jurisdictional level data were unavailable.  Five of the counties in the 1998-2004 SCPS 
were not part of the General Social Survey sampling frame from 1990 to 2002.9  There 
were also no geographically proximate metropolitan areas near these counties that the 
GSS sampled that could be explored as potential substitutes for these five counties.  After 
the omission of the cases from these eight counties from the level one defendant file, the 
final sample consists of 26,354 defendants that judges may sentence to prison, jail, or 
probation/fines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 These include Honolulu, HI; Salt Lake City, UT; El Paso, TX; Orange, FL; and Milwaukee, WI.  
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Figure 3.1 Case Flow Through Court System and Sample Attrition, 1998-2004 SCPS 
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Limitations of the SCPS 
Although the SCPS is limited in important ways, it is currently the most 
comprehensive database available for studying multi-state adjudication processes from 
arrest to final disposition.  Like many other data sets used to study sentencing, the SCPS 
does not contain information on defendant employment or family status, victim attributes, 
or data on judges and prosecutors involved in the case.  These shortcomings are common 
across nearly all major sentencing datasets used in published research. 
Another significant shortcoming of the SCPS, one that extends to almost all 
sentencing databases, is the lack of more precise detail on the severity (i.e. offense class) 
of arrest and conviction charges.  The descriptions of the conviction offenses in the SCPS 
include crime types (murder, rape, robbery, assault, drug sales, drug possession, etc) but 
no specifics about each offense.  For instance, it is not clear in the SCPS if the offender 
was armed with a gun (unless it was a weapons offense), if the offender knew the victim, 
if the victim was a minor, if there were multiple victims, or the time and location of the 
crime.  This may hinder my ability to precisely predict the expected sentence for some 
offenses.10  Bushway and Piehl (2007) recently used the SCPS to compare sentencing and 
charging outcomes across two guideline states, one voluntary (Maryland) and the other 
presumptive (Washington).  They point out that one disadvantage of using the SCPS to 
examine sentencing in a guideline state is that unlike most studies of sentencing in 
Washington and Pennsylvania, the SCPS does not provide the guideline worksheets that 
include the offense severity and criminal history scores that determine the presumptive 
sentence.  The result is that the controls available in the SCPS for prior criminal history 
                                                
10 For example, some states punish drug sales that occur on or near schools more punitively than drug sales 
that occur elsewhere.  
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and offense type may be less precise than the standard controls in studies from 
Pennsylvania and Washington that include the severity scores, the presumptive sentence 
from the guideline worksheet and whether a mandatory was applied by the prosecutor or 
judge.  On the whole though, the content of the SCPS conform to most contemporary 
sentencing datasets, and contain more detail about a wide array of jurisdictions than any 
other data set on felony adjudication.  
 
CONTEXTUAL DATA 
The contextual data were compiled from several sources that describe various 
county, metropolitan, and state-level attributes predicted to affect sentencing severity. 
The sources for these data are provided in Table 3.1.  Each contextual data source 
contained county and state census-derived FIPS codes that were used to attach cases in 
the SCPS (which also contain county and state FIPS codes) to data describing the county 
and state context in which defendants were processed.  Data describing various aspects of 
each jurisdiction’s sentencing structure and penal code are derived from a database of 
legal statutes dating from 1972 to 2002 that were collected by researchers at the Vera 
Institute (Stemen and Rengifo, 2005).  Because the SCPS data extend beyond 2002, I 
consulted each state’s penal code in 2003 and 2004 using Lexis-Lexis Academic 
Universe to verify whether each jurisdiction’s legal policies were altered by state 
legislatures after 2002.  To capture jurisdictional differences in organizational context, 
data were gathered on jail and prison capacities, state correctional spending, and the 
amount of supervision fees states and/or counties charge probationers each month.  
Information on county jail populations and capacities are available in the Annual Survey 
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of Jails and the 1999 National Jail Census, both of which were accessed through ICPSR.  
State prison population and capacity estimates were obtained from the National Prisoner 
Statistics bulletin series published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (e.g., West, 2010).  
State correctional expenditures were obtained from the Expenditure and Employment 
Data for the Criminal Justice System database, which is collected annually for all states 
in the U.S. and is publicly available through ICPSR.   One measure of organizational 
context required some primary data collection.  The Vera database obtains information 
indicating the presence of monthly fees states charge probationers for the duration of 
their supervision up to 2002.  I consulted state penal codes and contacted probation 
department representatives in every other state to verify probation supervision fee 
schedules for 2004.  Also, the Vera database did not contain probation fee information for 
California and New York because such fees are determined at the local level rather than 
by the state legislature.  I contacted these counties’ local probation departments and 
conducted phone interviews with probation department supervisors to obtain monthly 
probation fee schedules from 1998 to 2004.  Data describing the demographic makeup of 
each county are from the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2002 American Community 
Survey.  County crime data are derived from the Uniform Crime Reporting program and 
were accessed through ICPSR.  Data describing conservative religious and political 
ideologies and public sentiment were obtained from the General Social Survey (GSS).  
The GSS is conducted and made available by the National Opinion Research Center 
(NORC).  
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CONSTRUCTING THE HIERARCHICAL DATA FILE 
 There are three implied levels of analysis in the current study.  Data at the first 
level of analysis consist of felony case filings nested within fifty-two county state court 
jurisdictions for which individual case data are available (the second level of analysis).  
County court jurisdictions are “natural” aggregates for the study of legal decision-making 
because state trial courts and prosecutor offices are organized at the county level in all 
U.S. states (Weidner and Frase, 2003).  These county court jurisdictions included in the 
SCPS between 1998 and 2004 are nested within 19 states (the third level of analysis).  
As previously mentioned, not every county in the SCPS is sampled with certainty and 
thus, will not appear in every year of the series.  In all, 52 counties are included at least 
once during 1998-2004, some of which may only appear in 1998 or 2000.11   There is a 
“break” in the county sampling frame in the SCPS after 1998.  This is common among 
studies that use geographically stratified sampling designs to obtain nationally 
representative data (e.g., the General Social Survey).  The break occurs because larger 
counties are sampled with certainty, and counties with smaller populations are chosen 
according to the size and variation of their caseload each year.  Prior to the development 
of the American Community Survey, the sampling strata were based on decennial Census 
estimates of each county’s population.  Therefore, the “break” between 1998/2000 in part 
reflects county population changes between 1990 and 2000.  Table 3.1 summarizes the 
counties included in the analyses and the years for which they provided felony case 
filings.  Twenty-one (40%) of the 52 counties appear in all four years of the SCPS.   After 
                                                
11 These 52 counties are those included in the current sample after the omission of counties that had 
inadequate sample sizes at level one, or for which key aggregate level data were unavailable. 
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2000, the county sample remains virtually identical and forms a consistent grouping of 40 
jurisdictions that participated in data collection for 2002 and 2004.  Conceivably, each of 
these 52 counties could be treated as a single level two unit in hierarchical regression 
models.  Given the structure of the SCPS though, it would be imprecise to treat each of 
these jurisdictions as static.  Because some counties appear in multiple years, it was 
necessary to collect “real time” data in order to accurately reflect the shifting legal and 
social contexts that influence sentencing decisions.  Legal and organizational 
characteristics changed considerably between 1998 and 2004 in some jurisdictions.  For 
example, Florida and Michigan contribute felony cases in every year of the SCPS and 
both experienced significant changes to sentencing policy in 1999.12  Ideally, one could 
simply nest each felony case within its year-specific jurisdictional context.  In Table 3.2, 
this is denoted with an ‘*’ symbol and footnoted at the bottom of the table.  
Unfortunately, partitioning each felony case by both location and year yields small cell 
counts for jurisdictions with fewer felony cases.13  This restricts the statistical power 
required for maximum likelihood estimation as well as the power needed to detect the 
presence of sentencing disparities since HLM estimates separate regression equations 
within each level two group.  To increase within-county sample sizes while also 
accounting for shifts in the social and legal climate, I pooled cases in counties appearing 
in 1998 and 2000 together, and similarly pooled cases decided in 2002 and 2004 together.  
The grouping procedure is illustrated in Table 3.2, with an ‘x’ denoting a county’s 
                                                
12 In late 1998, Florida did away with sentencing guidelines and adopted a determinate sentencing structure 
that abolished discretionary parole for most offenses.  In conjunction with this shift, the state adopted the 
Criminal Punishment Code, which allowed for greater discretion to go above the legal statutes in 
determining punishment and lowered the threshold required for mandatory incarceration.  In 1999, 
Michigan shifted from a voluntary to a presumptive guideline structure. 
13 For example, Kings NY has 264 convicted defendants in the pooled 1998-2004 SCPS.  If you break this 
down by year, however, there are only 42 defendants in 1998. 
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inclusion in a given year of the SCPS.  Using Jefferson, AL as an example (the first row 
of the table), defendants processed in either 1998 or 2000 are nested within data 
describing the local context during that time period (1997-2000).  Structurally then, these 
Jefferson, Alabama defendants are nested within a single level-two group.  Using the 
same logic, for those defendants processed in Jefferson during 2002 or 2004, I appended 
contextual data that describes the jurisdictional climate in Jefferson from 2001 to 2004.  
These 2002 and 2004 SCPS defendants thus form the second level 2 group in the 
hierarchical file used in all analyses.  If a county only appeared in the 1998 SCPS, then 
data describing the county during that time period (e.g., 1997) were appended to each 
defendant at level one.  Likewise, if the county only provided cases in 2000, then 
jurisdictional data for the year 1999 were appended to each case at level two in the 
hierarchical file.  This structure achieved dual purposes. It allowed for more temporally 
precise contextual data while creating level 2 groups with an adequate number of 
defendants necessary for multinomial logistic regression analyses.  Structuring the felony 
cases this way yielded 91 county-year groups at level two nested within 19 states at level 
three.  This relatively small sample of states precludes a formal three level model that 
incorporates state characteristics at level three.  Therefore, all jurisdictional data 
described below are provided at the county level, such that state legal data and 
correctional spending data are included as variables at level two and capture whether a 
county is located in a state with that operates under various legal and organizational 
conditions. 
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Table 3.2. Counties and States Included in Analyses and Nested Data Structure  
County and State   1998 2000 
Level 2 
Case # 2002 2004 
Level 2 
Case #    
Jefferson, AL  {x x} = Case 1 {x x} = Case 2   
Maricopa, AZ  {x x} =  3 {x x} =  4   
Pima, AZ  {x x} =  5 {x x} = 6   
Alameda, CA  {x x} =  7 {x x} = 8   
Contra Costa, CA   {x} = 9 {x x} = 10   
Los Angeles, CA  {x x} = 11 {x x} = 12   
Orange, CA  {x x} = 13 {x x} = 14   
Riverside, CA   {x} = 15 {x x} = 16   
Sacramento, CA  {x}  = 17      
San Bernardino, 
CA  {x x} = 18 {x x} = 19   
San Diego, CA   {x} = 20 {x x} = 21   
San Francisco, CA  {x}  = 22      
San Mateo, CA   {x} = 23 {x x} = 24   
Santa Clara, CA  {x x} = 25 {x x} = 26   
Ventura, CA  {x}  = 27      
New Haven, CT   {x} = 28      
Broward, FL  {x} {x} 
= 29 and 
30* {x x} = 31   
Dade, FL  {x} {x} 
= 32 and 
32* {x x} = 34   
Hillsborough, FL  {x}  = 35      
Palm Beach, FL   {x} = 36 {x x} = 37   
Pinellas, FL   {x} = 38 {x x} = 39   
Fulton, GA   {x} =  40 {x x} = 41   
Cook, IL  {x x} = 42 {x x} = 43   
DuPage, IL  {x}  = 44      
Marion, IN  {x x} = 45 {x x} = 46   
Balt. County, MD   {x} = 47 {x x} =48   
Baltimore City, 
MD  {x}  = 49      
Montgomery, MD  {x x} = 50 {x x} = 51   
Macomb, MI   {x} = 52 {x x} = 53   
Wayne, MI  {x} {x} 
= 54 and 
55* {x x} = 56   
Jackson, MO  {x}  = 57      
St. Louis, MO  {x}  = 58      
Essex, NJ   {x} = 59 {x x} = 60   
Bronx, NY  {x x} = 61 {x x} = 62   
Kings, NY  {x x} = 63 {x x} = 64   
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Monroe, NY  {x}  = 65      
Nassau, NY   {x} = 66 {x x} = 67   
New York, NY  {x}  = 68      
Queens, NY  {x}  = 69  {x} = 70   
Suffolk, NY  {x}  = 71      
Franklin, OH   {x} = 72 {x x} = 73   
Hamilton, OH  {x}  = 74      
Allegheny, PA  {x}  = 75      
Montgomery, PA     {x x} = 76   
Philadelphia, PA  {x x} = 77 {x x} = 78   
Shelby, TN  {x x} = 79 {x x} = 80   
Dallas, TX  {x x} = 81 {x x} = 82   
Harris, TX  {x x} = 83 {x x} = 84   
Tarrant, TX   {x} = 85 {x x} = 86   
Travis, TX   {x} = 87 {x x} = 88   
Fairfax, VA   {x} = 89 {x x} = 90   
King, WA   {x}   = 91          
* Denotes a break in the sentencing structures for Florida and Michigan. This break only impacts counties 
that appeared in both 1998 and 2000. Thus, Broward, FL, Dade, FL, and Wayne, MI cases are appended to 
contextual data describing the year those cases were decided in order to reflect the shift in sentencing 
structures in 1999.   
 
MEASURES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Judges must determine two things during sentencing:  the appropriate type of 
punishment and its duration.  The focus the current study is the final disposition, or 
sentence type, applied to convicted felons.  Generally, researchers have gauged the 
decision to incarcerate in three ways.  The majority of sentencing studies model this 
decision as the conditional probability of receiving any type of incarceration vs. a non-
custodial sanction of probation, fines, and/or restitution (e.g., Britt, 2000; Johnson, 2006; 
Myers, 1987; Ulmer and Bradley, 2006; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Ulmer et al., 2008).   
This is commonly regarded as the ‘in/out’ or ‘total incarceration’ variable.  Holleran and 
Spohn (2004) have questioned the standard practice of combining jail and prison 
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 133 
outcomes together, especially when examining the relationship between race, ethnicity, 
and incarceration.  They argue that judges have several options to choose from and that 
the dependent variable should reflect the simultaneous probability of receiving either of 
those options. Though this issue is widely acknowledged in the sentencing literature, 
variation in state court sentencing in multilevel research conducted after the publication 
of Holleran and Spohn’s (2004) study are almost always modeled using the total 
incarceration variable or as the log-odds of receiving a prison sentence versus jail or 
probation (e.g., King et al., 2010; Pardoe and Weidner, 2006; Ulmer and Bradley, 2006; 
Wooldredge, 2007; though Wang and Mears, 2010 and Fearn, 2005 are exceptions).  In 
one of the only two multilevel studies that have modeled jail and prison as distinct types 
of incarceration, Fearn (2005) found that jurisdictional attributes play an important role in 
determining whether offenders receive prison versus jail, leading to speculation that 
previous evidence relating jurisdictional attributes to sentencing may more accurately 
reflect imprisonment patterns rather than incarceration generally, suggesting that the 
assessment of jurisdictional context on sentence type may be sensitive to the coding of 
the dependent variable.14  The SCPS includes information on both the most severe 
sentence handed down, as well as whether the most severe sanction was combined with a 
less serious sanction such as jail time followed by a period of probation.  The most 
serious sanction is a term of incarceration in a state prison, followed by incarceration in a 
local jail, and then noncustodial sanctions such as probation and fines (non-custodial 
sanctions consisted of fines as the most serious sanction; all involved a period of 
probation, usually in conjunction with fines).  Using information on the most serious 
                                                
14 In a more recent multilevel sentencing study in Pennsylvania the authors acknowledge the importance of 
examining jail and prison decisions apart from each other, but are unable to do so because some 
communities may commonly use one type of incarceration (jail or prison) but not both (Ulmer et al., 2008).  
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sanction judges applied, sentence type is gauged using a trichotomous variable where 
prison sentences are coded as ‘1,’ jail sentences are coded as ‘2’, and noncustodial 
sanctions represent the third category of the dependent variable. 
 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
I include as contextual predictors each of the jurisdiction-level measures 
highlighted in Table 3.1.  These state and county level measures are derived from the five 
theoretical models summarized in Chapter 2 and thus are hypothesized, net of case level 
controls and levels of crime, to significantly influence sentence type. These state and 
county level measures capture legal and organizational context, social conflict and group 
threat, and variation in punitive social climate. 
 
Measures of Legal Context 
Each of the measures of legal context used in the current study are derived from 
the Vera Institute ‘Fragment and Ferment’ sentencing policy database, which contains a 
variety of indicators of state sentencing structure as well as information on the statutory 
sentence ranges, and substantive legal policies that alter the severity of punishment for 
certain types of offenders (e.g., repeat offenders) and certain types of offenses (i.e., 
violent crime involving a weapon).  Sentencing structure for each state is measured using 
three dummy variables that are coded as ‘1’ if a state has presumptive sentencing 
guidelines, determinate sentencing, and voluntary sentencing guidelines.  The coding of 
these variables is consistent with the scheme used by Stemen and colleagues (2005).  As 
Stemen et al. (2005: 10) explain, determinate sentencing refers to states that have 
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abolished discretionary parole release in an effort to ensure that the amount of time 
offenders serve is dictated by the length of sentences judges impose, as opposed to parole 
boards.   Many determinate sentencing states such as California, Ohio, and Washington, 
also introduced presumptive recommended sentences for each offense class when they 
shifted from an indeterminate to determinate sentencing structure.  Though the severity of 
the statutory ranges of these sentences varies across determinate sentencing states, such 
attempts to structure sentencing in determinate states should reduce the amount of 
residual variation in the log-odds of incarceration across counties and states. 
Punitive legal culture is measured using six measures that tap variation across 
states in amount of prison time offenders are expected to serve when incarcerated, laws 
that target habitual offenders, the degree to which states embrace mandatory sentencing 
enhancements, and the severity of drug laws.  The first variable, labeled Truth in 
Sentencing Requirements in Table 3.1, is a continuous level variable that measures 
variation across states in the minimum percentage of a sentence most offenders are 
required to serve before release (Stemen et al., 2005: 166).  Although similar in spirit to 
determinate sentencing structures, many states have time-to-serve requirements while 
also maintaining discretionary parole release (Stemen et al., 2005).  Higher values on this 
variable indicate more punitive “law and order” legal cultures, where some states such as 
Michigan require offenders to serve 100 percent of their sentence.  Thus, this measure 
does not capture variability in the actual severity of state statutes (for example, Michigan 
may require offenders to serve 100 percent of sentences that are statutorily lower than 
other states’) it merely represents a commitment by states to increase the certainty of 
punishment. 
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Substantive sentencing laws are those that target certain types offenders and 
certain types of crimes for more punitive sanctioning (Stemen et al., 2005).  I examine the 
effects of three laws that have been highlighted in the literature on mass incarceration as 
among the more controversial efforts by states to increase the severity and certainty of 
criminal sanctioning:  three-strikes laws, mandatory enhancements, and more punitive 
penalties targeting drug offenders (Gottschalk, 2009; Spelman, 2009). The presence of a 
“three-strikes” law is measured with a binary variable coded ‘1’ if a state has a specific 
(and the most punitive) type of strike system, where any current felony conviction 
qualifies as a “strikeable” offense and mandates that the judge impose a term of 
incarceration.  Coding the presence of three-strikes this way ensures that all felony 
offenders in these states qualify to be sanctioned under the three-strikes provision (as 
opposed to three-strike laws that target only violent felonies).  The variable in Table 3.1 
labeled mandatory enhancement score is a continuous variable originally constructed by 
Stemen and colleagues that represents the total number of mandatory enhancements that 
are triggered by four aspects of crime that are commonly considered to be aggravating 
factors.  Specifically, this “score” summarizes the following: 1) the total number of 
mandatory minimums triggered when a weapon is used during the course of a crime, 2) 
the number of mandatory minimums triggered when the offender inflicts serious bodily 
harm or threatens to do so, 3) the number of mandatory minimum laws triggered when 
the crime is against a victim with “protected status” such as age, disability, race or 
religious affiliation, and 4) the number of mandatory minimum laws that target offenses 
committed while under state criminal justice supervision (i.e., probation, parole, 
imprisonment) (see, Stemen et al., 2005: 167).  Higher scores indicate a more punitive 
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legal environment, where offenders convicted of otherwise similar crimes (e.g., burglary) 
may receive experience significantly different odds of incarceration in states that will 
enhance the sentence based on these aggravating factors versus states that do not mandate 
that judges increase the severity of sentences under such circumstances. 
Given the attention to the war on drugs in the literature on sentencing and mass 
incarceration and evidence of a net-widening effect of arrest and incarceration for drug 
offenders (Beckett and Sasson, 2000; Blumstein and Beck, 1999), a series of models also 
explores the degree to which states and counties vary in the propensity to incarcerate drug 
offenders. Three variables were included that tap state variation in the severity of laws 
aimed specifically at drug offenders.  The first of these is a continuous variable similar to 
the mandatory enhancement score described above.  This variable, labeled mandatory 
enhancements for drug offenses in Table 3.1, consists of a composite “mandatory” score 
created by Stemen et al. (2005) that captures the variability across states in twelve 
different types of sentencing enhancements that target the most common drug offense 
types (i.e., sales and possession of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana).  As explained by the 
authors, data on twelve enhancements for each of these three drugs “represent factors that 
may increase a sentence for the underlying offense if found by the jury at trial or by the 
judge at sentencing” (2005: 165). Five of these triggering factors include: 1) the location 
of the offense (i.e., near public housing, a church, or school property), 2) if the offense 
involved excessive quantities of drugs, 3) and drug offenses involving minors, 4) weapon 
use, 5) and gang activity.  In addition to measuring the coverage of drug enhancements 
across various offense types (e.g., the above five criteria), the authors gauged the severity 
of each of the enhancements triggered by the above five criteria based on if the 
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enhancement is sale-related, possession-related, or both.  Higher scores were given to 
states where mandatory enhancements targeted both sale and possession offenses.  Using 
this method, three separate enhancement scores were calculated for each state: scores 
summarizing the severity and number of enhancements for marijuana, scores for 
enhancements targeting heroin, and scores that summarize the number and severity of 
enhancements that apply to either the possession, sale, or the manufacturing of cocaine.  
Additional details on the construction of each state’s mandatory minimum score for drug 
offenses are provided in Stemen et al., (2005: 165).   
Two additional variables are included in the regression models to examine 
whether more punitive legal contexts increase the severity of sentences applied to a sub-
sample of SCPS drug offenders.  These continuous variables capture state variation in the 
minimum statutory sentence (in months) for the sale of cocaine and the minimum 
statutory sentence for the possession of 28 grams (1 ounce) of cocaine.  
 
Measures of Organizational Context 
Various measures of organizational context in examined in order to estimate the 
effects of the costs of punishment to the state, states’ efforts to offset to those costs, 
constraints on the capacity to mete out incarceration, and variability in the workload 
pressure on local courts and prosecutors.  The analyses include three indicators of 
organizational efficiency and workload:  prosecutor caseload pressure, and the size of 
county jail and state prison populations as a percentage of their rated capacity.  The 
variable labeled prosecutor caseload pressure in Table 3.1 is measured as the number of 
felony indictments (i.e., the aggregate number of felony indictments per county as 
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provided in the SCPS) divided by the number of chief and assistant county prosecutors 
per county.   Although prior multilevel research has considered the effects of caseload 
pressure, these studies have conceptualized of workload pressures as a constraint on 
judges rather than prosecutors (Farrell et al., 2009; Johnson, 2005; Ulmer and Bradley, 
2006; Ulmer, Bader, and Gault, 2008; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).  This is a logical choice 
for analyses of data that contain defendants processed within both small and large 
jurisdiction types.  However, in the SCPS (a sample of large urban counties) 95% of all 
the cases are adjudicated via a guilty plea, which suggests that the burden of processing 
and disposing cases falls more squarely on prosecutors rather than judges.   
Following the lead of Wang and Mears (2010) and the practices of the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (West, 2010), state prison capacity is measured as the total size of the 
state prison population at year end expressed as a percentage of the total rated capacity of 
each state’s prison system.  Data on prison populations and capacities were obtained from 
the BJS ‘National Prisoners Statistics’ (NPS) series.  It is important to note though that 
variation in state prison capacities is difficult to measure (Spelman, 2009).  State prison 
population counts frequently omit prisoners held in private prisons and thus may not 
provide valid information in which to calculate overcrowding.  Second, authors of the 
most recent NPS report note that there is no uniform measure of capacity across states 
(West, Sabol, and Greenman, 2010).  Most states provide estimates of their official 
“rated” capacity, but some report only their design capacity, and others report their 
“operational” capacity.  One state, Connecticut, has not report capacity data at all since 
1994.  For the current study, rated capacity was available for eleven states, design 
capacity had to be used for four states (NJ, PA, AZ and CA), and operational capacity 
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only was available for three states (MI, MO, and MD).  For Connecticut, capacity 
information from 1994 was used.  Similarly, jail space constraints were computed as the 
total county jail population expressed as a percentage of each county’s rated jail capacity.  
Data on jail populations and capacities were obtained from the Annual Survey of Jails.  
This measure of jail capacity conforms fairly closely with measures used in prior studies 
(Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Wang and Mears, 2010). 
One important consideration commonly overlooked in research on sentencing is 
that the costs of punishment and the amount of state resources that are devoted to 
correctional punishment varies substantially across state and local jurisdictions (see e.g., 
discussions by Liska, 1992: 9; Sampson and Laub, 1993; Spelman, 2009).  Variation in 
the extent to which states devote resources to punishing offenders is measured as the 
state’s correctional spending per 100,000 residents.  This measure was calculated using 
data available in the annual Criminal Justice Employment and Expenditures data bases 
available through ICPSR (see description in Table 3.1).  These data show that the 
overwhelming bulk of state correctional spending is devoted to maintaining and building 
prisons.  Macro level research on incarceration has also shown that the varying ability of 
states to fund or offset these costs through collecting revenue is associated with the size 
and growth of incarcerated populations (e.g., Greenberg and West, 2001; Spelman, 
2009).  In the context of sentencing decisions that more frequently result in jail and 
probation terms (functions that require funding at the local level), a more proximate 
source of fiscal offsetting that has not been considered in prior studies is the varying 
willingness of states and local authorities to force probationers to pay monthly fees 
toward the cost of their supervision as a means of offsetting the growing costs of prison 
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and jail terms.  This method of generating revenue to offset the costs of punishing the 
most rapidly expanding share of the correctional population has become increasingly 
important as states have begun grappling with the soaring costs of imprisonment by 
cutting funding to probation functions (Diller, 2010; Ring, 1989).  Measuring variability 
in the amount of dollars they charge probationers per month can capture the degree to 
which states and counties can conceivably offset probation costs, and thus avoid more 
costly sanctions involving incarceration.  In the current study, this revenue is measured 
using a variable that captures the standard monthly probation service fee (i.e., the fee for 
simply being on felony probation) states and counties charge probationers.   The measure 
excludes the costs associated with “specialized” probation programs such as drug 
treatment and high-risk electronic monitoring programs; the costs of which varied 
substantially across the jurisdictions included in the SCPS.  The data for this measure was 
gathered in two stages.  Initial state-level estimates of probation fees were gathered from 
the Vera Institute sentencing policy database, which provides both the amount states 
charge as well as the authorizing statute in each state’s penal code.  Most states dictate in 
their penal codes whether they permit state and local probation departments to gather 
such fees.  In most instances, state law also dictates either a fixed or maximum fee 
probation departments may charge.  In two states, New York and California, state law 
directs local probation offices at the county level to determine the monthly supervision 
fees they charge probationers. Preliminary analyses of these fees reveal that over time 
they have increased in many states and that in several instances, state statutes did not 
dictate the amount of money probation departments are permitted to charge.  A 
subsequent effort was made to collect this missing information.  Phone interviews and 
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subsequent email correspondence with state and local probation supervisors provided 
more detailed “year-specific” fee schedules, clarified the maximum amount of fees 
probationers may be charged, as well as how the range of these fees varied across 
counties located in California and New York. 
 
Measures of Social Conflict/Threat 
As discussed in the previous chapter, social conflict and threat perspectives on 
punishment dominate contextual and macro level research on social control.  The 
theoretical literature on conflict theory emphasizes five structural conditions that are 
predicted to increase the severity and certainty of punishment:  unemployment, income 
inequality, and the size of the non-white population.  In addition to the size of the poor 
and non-white populations, fear of crime has been identified in the literature as a key 
intervening variable linking these structural conditions to more punitive social control 
(Liska, 1987).   Each of these measures is described below. 
There are various ways scholars have operationalized the types of adverse 
economic conditions predicted to foster more repressive social control in a number of 
ways.  Researchers have measured threatening economic conditions using the poverty 
rate, unemployment, median household income, per capita income, an index of 
disadvantage, and income inequality as economic indicators (e.g., see Table 2.1).  I 
include a measure of each county’s civilian unemployment rate for several reasons.  First, 
it is the most consistent indicator of economic conditions used in multilevel sentencing 
research (see Table 2.1).  Second, classic conflict theories linking social structure to 
incarceration hinge on the assumption that states incarcerate more frequently in response 
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to the symbolic threats to order posed by a “labor surplus” (e.g., Rusche and 
Kirchheimer, 1939).   Admittedly, unemployment may not be the most reliable indicator 
of economic insecurity since unemployment in some areas may be temporary, while in 
others it may represent the permanent elimination of a large sector of workers.  
Unemployment indicators likely also neglect the working poor.  Nevertheless, given its 
centrality to conflict theories of punishment I follow the lead of prior multilevel 
sentencing studies and include a variable measuring county variation in the 
unemployment rate.   This variable, labeled unemployment rate in Table 3.1, is calculated 
as the percentage of civilian residents ages 16 and older in the labor force that are 
unemployed.  Income inequality is measured using the Gini index, the most commonly 
used measure of income inequality used in social science research (Swanson, Siegal, and 
Shryock, 2004).  The index is a summary measure of income inequality that measures the 
distribution (or evenness) of income within a county across county households (Webster 
and Bishaw, 2007).  It does so by first ranking households from poorest to richest, and 
then comparing the share of total cumulative income among each type of household. The 
Gini coefficient ranges theoretically from zero (complete equality) and 1 (complete 
inequality).  Thus, larger values indicate more adverse (and threatening) economic 
conditions.  Lower Gini scores mean that all households have about the same amount of 
income each year and that income inequality is relatively low.  Higher Gini coefficient 
scores (approaching 1.0) indicate that the majority of income in a county is in the hands 
of relatively few households (i.e., greater inequality). 
Prior research has primarily measured the size of the non-white population by 
including variables capturing variation in the size of the non-Latino black and the size of 
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the population of Latino ethnicity.  The size of the black population is measured as the 
proportion of the total county population that is black (multiplied by 100) to create the 
variable labeled percent Black.  The size of the Latino population is measured as the 
proportion of the total population that is Latino (multiplied by 100) and is labeled percent 
Hispanic.   
Drawing upon survey research linking racial composition to perceptions of 
disorder and crime, variation in the size of non-white populations is thought to represent 
the degree to which the public perceives that crime and disorder are a problem. Thus, a 
key intervening variable included in the social threat models is a variable labeled Fear of 
Crime.  Community variation in fear of crime was measured by aggregating responses for 
a GSS survey item asking respondents if there is a location within a mile of their home 
where they are afraid to walk alone at night (Warr, 1995).  Though neither the main nor 
intervening effects of fear on sentencing have not been examined in previous multilevel 
sentencing research, prior research has shown that levels of fear vary substantially across 
communities (Liska et al., 1981); see also Stults and Baumer, 2007).  It should be noted 
that the item tapping fear in the GSS suffers from some important limitations, chief of 
which stems from the fact that the question does not specifically ask residents about their 
fear of crime, uses only one item to tap a complex phenomenon, and is hypothetical and 
assumes respondents would actually walk alone at night (Kleck and Kovandzic, 2009: 
55).  Nevertheless, these are the only national data tapping individuals’ fear, and given 
the emphasis placed on fear in the theoretical literature these data warrant at least some 
initial consideration in multilevel sentencing research.  Details on the process of 
aggregating GSS responses are provided below. 
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Measures of Punitive Community Social Climate 
In the previous chapter I described four dimensions of public sentiment predicted 
to foster a more punitive social climate:  support for harsh sanctions such as capital 
punishment, southern jurisdiction, levels of social trust, conservative political and 
religious beliefs and racial resentment.  One of the oldest and most common techniques 
for attempting to capture spatial variation in punitive culture is through the use of a 
dummy variable indicating if the jurisdiction is located in the South versus a non-
Southern region (e.g., Farrell et al., 2009; Fearn, 2005; King et al., 2010; Wang and 
Mears, 2010; Weidner et al., 2004).  In keeping with previous research on sentencing and 
incarceration, I include a variable labeled South that is coded ‘1’ if a defendant was 
sentenced in a southern county jurisdiction and coded ‘0’ if sentenced elsewhere. 
 I include measures of local public sentiment that are drawn from individual-level 
survey responses pooled across the 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 General Social Survey 
(GSS) that when aggregated, represent metropolitan area estimates of the social climate.  
Although the use of individual and aggregated GSS data is not new to studies of crime, it 
has only recently been used to study legal decision- making and warrants discussion. 
 The GSS is the leading source of time-trend research on social indicators in the 
United States and has been fielded biennially since 1994 (annually from 1972 to 1993).  
Each year NORC selects approximately 3,000 individuals to be interviewed in person.  
The questionnaire gauges public attitudes on a wide array of issues that range from 
abortion, levels of marital satisfaction, gun ownership, social activities, and a permanent 
set of questions about race relations, religious views, interpersonal trust, attitudes on 
punishment, and fear.  The GSS uses a stratified, multistage area probability sample of 
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households to generate a nationally representative sample of English-speaking adults in 
the continental United States (Davis, Smith, and Marsden, 2009 - Appendix A).  This 
multistage sampling process occurs in three major stages, each of which involve 
sampling at progressively smaller units of analysis.   The GSS is administered through 
face-to-face interviews and consistently achieves a high response rate (approximately 71 
percent) (GSS cumulative codebook, 1972-2006).  The data I use are drawn from the 
1990 sampling frame, which was in place between 1990 and 2002.  This sampling frame 
contains the initial 100 primary sampling clusters (PSUs) from which households and 
respondents are sampled.  Within each of these 100 PSUs, NORC selects blocks, and 
then housing units within each block. 15  Because the GSS uses metropolitan county 
clusters (MSAs) and single nonmetropolitan counties as their primary sampling area from 
which to randomly select respondents, samples within each PSU are designed to be “self-
representing.”  That is, PSUs are initially selected so as to provide nationally 
representative survey estimates.  These PSUs only remain nationally representative if 
                                                
15 In the 1990-2002 GSS, 100 PSUs were selected at the first stage of sampling.  Nineteen PSUs are 
sufficiently large that they are sampled with certainty.  PSUs consist of counties, MSAs, and independent 
cities.  Within each PSU, a second stage of sampling determines block groups are selected after first 
stratifying each block group within the MSA by race and income.  Within block groups, blocks are selected 
with probabilities proportionate to the number of housing units.  Within each PSU, anywhere from three to 
twenty six block segments were selected.  The GSS uses full probability sampling only down to the block 
level.  Within each block an average of five households are sampled using a less expensive “quota” 
procedure to select respondents.  Interviewers are instructed to begin a travel pattern that begins with the 
first household located at the Northwest corner of the block and continuing until census-derived quotas 
have been met.  These quotas require samples of respondents that correspond with 1990 census-tract 
figures for that area.  These quotas ensure that each block group, when combined, provide for a sample of 
respondents that are proportionate to their share of the population.  In this way, the samples from each 
MSA are “self representing.”  That is, the sampling procedures are formally designed to yield respondents 
that represent the blocks within which they live, and these blocks represent the county or MSA within 
which they are located. Together, the responses from all PSUs provide nationally representative estimates.  
Additional details on GSS sampling procedures are provided in the GSS codebook, Appendix A and 
available at www.norc.org.   
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within each of these PSUs, respondents are then selected in ways that represent the local 
population.16   
 Although researchers primarily use the GSS to examine public sentiment at the 
individual level, geographic identifiers that link respondents to their respective PSU have 
recently been made available by NORC.  Researchers are increasingly using these 
geocoded versions of the GSS to study the social context of individual attitudes (e.g., 
Baumer et al., 2003; Kleck, 1996; Kleck and Kovandzic, 2009; Taylor, 1998; Wong, 
2007) and to aggregate survey responses to describe levels of racial prejudice (Baumer 
and Stults, 2007), gun ownership (Moody and Marvell, 2005), social capital (Kawachi et 
al., 1997; Rosenfeld et al., 2001), mutual trust (Hemenway, Kennedy, Kawachi, and 
Putnam, 2001), and conservative social ideology (Brace et al., 2002).  In particular, the 
advancement of methods to assess the reliability of aggregated survey data has fueled the 
use of aggregated survey items in political science (e.g., Jones and Norrander, 1996) and 
in criminological studies on the neighborhood contexts of crime (e.g., Sampson, 
Raudenbush and Earls, 1997).   
Following the procedures outlined in previous studies using these data, I 
aggregated individual responses to estimate levels of fear, racial animus, interpersonal 
trust, conservative ideology, support for the death penalty, and religious fundamentalism 
in the metropolitan areas within which the SCPS courts are located.  In all, the 52 SCPS 
counties included in this study are located within 30 metropolitan areas sampled in the 
                                                
16 Because the “natural” aggregate areas for sampling in the GSS are county clusters, most researchers 
caution that the data are not appropriate for aggregation to the state level (Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner, and 
Prothrow-Stith, 1997: 1492).  This is because GSS sampling procedures tend to favor large areas that only 
represent a fraction of the state population.  However, Brace and colleagues (2002) show that some items in 
the GSS do exhibit adequate levels of reliability and face validity when individual responses are aggregated 
up to the state level.  Given the focus on local social climate in the current study, all GSS data were 
aggregated to the PSU level, which provides an estimate of the social climate for the MSA in which each 
SCPS county is located. 
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GSS that yielded 4,788 survey respondents.  All of the GSS items I include are part of a 
“core” set of items asked of respondents every year.  I pooled responses from 1996-2002 
(4 years of surveys) to create sample sizes large enough to produce reliable aggregate 
estimates of each item.  Depending on the survey item, the average number of 
respondents per PSU ranged from 76 respondents on one item to an average of 220 
respondents for another item.  In a handful of PSUs however, the number of respondents 
that answer questions about racial perceptions is considerably lower (e.g., 10 to 20 
respondents) because these items are only administered to half of GSS respondents each 
year.  Thus, smaller PSUs with fewer respondents may yield less reliable aggregate 
estimates of the survey items.   
Not withstanding concerns about small within-PSU sample sizes, any study 
relying on samples rather than the population yields survey estimates with some degree 
of sampling error.  However, a central concern when aggregating public opinion data is 
whether individual responses truly reflect the broader sentiment among residents who 
reside within each MSA.  There are several ways scholars have grappled with estimating 
the reliability of aggregated opinion data, each of which rest on the basic tenet that 
aggregate reliability is a function of the ratio of aggregate to individual level variation in 
the item (Jones and Norrander, 1996: 298).  Recently, Raudenbush and Sampson (1999) 
presented their method of assessing ‘ecometric’ reliability that provides an estimate of the 
precision with which survey based measures capture the aggregate climate.  Rooted in 
generalizability theory, their proposed coefficient for reliability (λ) relies upon the degree 
to which individuals within aggregate PSUs “agree” and the number of respondents per 
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PSU.17  I used this formula to calculate aggregate reliability coefficients for each of the 
measures I initially considered in the GSS.  Although the rules of thumb vary, Jones and 
Norrander (1996: 302) consider coefficients greater than or equal to .70 to be highly 
reliable; coefficients between .60 and .70 to be moderately reliable, and coefficients < .60 
to be unreliable indicators at the aggregate level.  Each of the GSS items I use to 
construct aggregate estimates of the local social climate yielded reliability coefficients 
greater than or equal to .60.  These coefficients are presented below in Table 3.3.18  
Below, I describe each of the aggregate measures constructed using these GSS items. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 The formula for lambda is provided in equation 3.58 in Raudenbush and Bryk (2002: 49).  Alternatively, 
the equation for lambda can be expressed as 
€ 
Σ τ00 /(τ00 +σ 2 /n j )[ ] /J .  As described by Morenoff et al. 
(2001: 526), the lambda coefficient is a function of (1) the sample size within each PSU and (2) the 
proportion of the total variance between PSUs (τ) relative to the amount of variance that is within each 
PSU (σ2).  These scores are calculated within each group and then averaged across the groups.  A 
straightforward way of calculating lambda is to estimate an unconditional model in HLM where the 
individual survey item is the outcome.  By default, HLM output includes an estimate of lambda labeled 
‘Reliability.’   
18 Estimating these reliability coefficients is an important first step and one that to my knowledge is not 
frequently performed in studies using the aggregated GSS.  However, there are still additional obstacles to 
using aggregated survey responses worthy of consideration.  In PSU’s with fewer respondents the precision 
of the aggregate estimate for a given item (e.g., fear to walk alone at night) could feasibly be lower than the 
precision of the estimate for a PSU like Chicago, which has nearly 500 respondents.  This could be thought 
of as measurement error that varies across places.  It is unclear if this is a problem in the current research 
because reliability coefficients generate precision estimates averaged over all PSUs.  Raudenbush and 
Sampson (1999) propose estimating a multilevel latent variable model to assess the degree of inter-rater 
agreement and measurement error that arises from aggregating survey responses across larger geographic 
units.  Unfortunately, their method appears to be exclusive to the construction of scales at the individual 
level and they do not illustrate or discuss methods of assessing general sources of error that may arise when 
aggregating single items across geographic units. This is an issue I will be addressing in more detail in 
future research. 
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Table 3.3.  Ecological Reliability Coefficients for Aggregated GSS Survey Items Included in Analyses. 
    
GSS Item/Scale (R= Respondent)     
30-PSU Sample  
(N= 4,788) 
   Reliability Coefficient (l) 
Religious Fundamentalism Scale Indicators (2-item scale)    
     R Believes Bible Literal Word of God   .79 
     R Belongs to Fundamentalist Religion   .88 
R Afraid to Walk in Neighborhood at Night   .70 
Mean Level of Politically Conservative Ideology (on scale from 1 to 7)   .70 
R Favors Capital Punishment for Convicted Murderer   .73 
Social Trust/Cohesion Scale Indicators (2-item scale)    
     R Agrees, Generally Most People Can Be Trusted   .65 
     R Agrees Most People are Fair   .62 
Whites' Anti-Black Racial Animus (7-item scale)    
     R Agrees Blacks Should Work Way Up w/o Favors to Overcome Prejudice   .72 
     R Agrees Black-White SES Differences due to Blacks' Lack of Motivation/Will   .64 
     R Disagrees Black-White SES Differences due to Discrimination Agst. Blacks   .68 
     R Agrees Govt. Does Too Much to Help Improve Conditions for Blacks   .80 
     R Opposes/Strongly Opposes preferential hiring/promotion of Black candidates   .60 
     R Agrees/Strongly Agrees Gov't Not Obliged to Give Blacks Special Treatment   .72 
        in Order to Improve Conditions for Blacks.    
     R Agrees Somewhat/Very Likely Black Applicant Get Job/Promo Over   .60 
        Equally or More Qualified White Applicant    
Note: 'R' denotes term 'respondent.'  Reliability coefficients calculated using HLM.         
Coefficients estimated using data from PSUs included in the current study.    
 
Christian Fundamentalism 
Religious beliefs are an important source of cultural sensibilities about crime and 
punishment, and religious coalitions are particularly effective at mobilizing those beliefs 
to affect public policy (Unnever et al., 2006).  Levels of religious fundamentalism in each 
county are estimated using a standardized additive scale containing two items from the 
GSS.   The scale is designed to combine adherence to fundamentalist beliefs (i.e., 
fundamentalist ideology) with a measure of respondent affiliation with fundamentalist 
denominations.  I combine the two dimensions to acknowledge that fundamentalist views 
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may not necessarily correspond with a punitive orientation.  If they do, individual 
religious views do not necessarily influence government functioning in the absence of 
churches and religious coalitions that are capable of mobilizing their members.  Thus, it 
is important to capture variation in ideology, as well as variation in the size of 
fundamentalist denominations across jurisdictions.   
The first item consists of the percentage of respondents who indicate that their 
feelings come closest to “the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, 
word for word,” compared with respondents who feel that “the Bible is the inspired word 
of God but not everything in it should be taken literally” and those who responded that 
“the Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by 
men.”  This measure is commonly used in individual-level survey research examining the 
influence of “biblical literalism” on punitive attitudes (Unnever et al., 2006).  The 
ecological reliability of this item is .79.   
The percentage of respondents in a county who reported affiliation with a 
fundamentalist Christian denomination was measured using an item originally designed 
by Smith (1990) and included in each year of the GSS. This measure of Christian 
fundamentalism is arguably most widely used indicator in the social sciences and was 
created to assist analysts (especially those not deeply familiar with religious studies) who 
did not wish to construct their own typology (Smith, 1990; Steensland et al., 2000).  This 
variable, labeled ‘FUND’ in the GSS data, classifies each GSS respondent along a 
continuum of fundamentalist, moderate, and liberal Christian faiths (Smith, 1990: 227). 
Smith (1990) used five different criteria for classifying denominations along the 
continuum:  “1) prior classification schemes used in the literature on religion, 2) 
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membership in theologically oriented ecumenical associations, 3) surveys of 
denominational members, 4) surveys of denominational clergy, and 5) theological beliefs 
of denominations,” (Smith, 1990: 226).  This measure exhibits relatively high ecological 
reliability (λ = .88).  Smith’s classification scheme has been criticized on a number of 
fronts.  Steensland and colleagues (2000) argue that the measure is flawed because 
respondents do not identify themselves as fundamentalist, that the complexity of religions 
in the U.S. cannot be distilled down to a three-part typology, and that it cannot account 
for non-denominational faiths.  Each of these are valid criticisms.  However, given its 
longstanding use in the literature on religion, its broad conceptualization of 
fundamentalism generally (i.e., not simply Christian fundamentalism), and unique ability 
to capture fundamentalism among whites specifically, the GSS measure constructed by 
Smith is still preferable to measures used in prior research that merely tap the number of 
conservative or fundamentalist Christians within a county (e.g., Fearn, 2005; Ulmer et al., 
2008). 
Because each of these items were initially measured on different scales and for 
the purposes of assigning equal weight to each measure in the index, I standardized the 
aggregated responses (i.e., the percentage of respondents who believe that the Bible is the 
actual word of God and the percentage belonging to a fundamentalist denomination) 
using z-score transformations.  This transformation consists of subtracting the average 
score for each item across counties and dividing by the standard deviation of each 
measure.  Thus, once transformed, each measure included in the additive scale (but not 
the scale itself) will have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  Expressed this 
way, each county’s value for these two measures represents how far the county is from 
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the mean level of fundamentalism expressed in standard deviation units.  The shape of 
the distribution of values among the counties remains the same; only the metric (or 
scaling) changes.  
 
Support for Harsh Sanctions 
Community variation in levels of support for punitive legal sanctions is gauged by 
aggregating the number of GSS respondents within each PSU that who indicate that they 
favor  (versus oppose) the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.  This GSS item 
is frequently used in individual level research examining the sources of punitive attitudes 
(e.g., see Applegate et al., 2000; Barkan and Cohen, 1994; Unnever et al., 2006).  Ideally, 
other items that tap GSS respondent’s feelings about the appropriateness of harsh 
sanctions would be used to form a multi-item composite measure of punitive attitudes.  
An initial two-item additive scale of punitive attitudes included an indicator of whether 
respondents feel the courts in their area were not harsh enough.  However, this GSS item 
exhibited weak ecological reliability (λ = .58) at the aggregate level and did not perform 
well in a scale combining it with the item tapping support for the death penalty because 
the two items are not strongly correlated (r = .422). 
 
Levels of Social Trust 
 Prior research has used aggregated GSS responses to capture spatial variation in 
levels of social capital and trust (Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001).  Ideally, the 
goal of the current study was to capture variation in levels of social capital broadly (e.g., 
participation in volunteer organizations, time spent socializing with neighbors, etc).  
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However, several indicators included in the GSS that tap social ties and cohesion did not 
exhibit sufficient ecological reliability.  Thus, I rely on a measure of social trust (rather 
than social capital in a broader sense), which has been emphasized as a key ingredient to 
more “communitarian” societies where mutual trust is believed to nurture multual 
obligations and a greater reliance on others (Braithwaite, 1989).  Higher levels of trust 
and communitarianism are predicted to foster less repressive punishment in favor of 
restorative justice measures.  Social trust is measured a scale that combines two items 
from the GSS tapping levels of trust in others and perceptions of others as fair.  The 
measure included in regression models is measured by summing the standardized scores 
on two items in the GSS. The first item asks respondents “Do you think most people 
would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try and be fair?”  
At the aggregate level, the measure was constructed to represent the percentage of 
respondents who agree that most people try to be helpful.  The second measure of trust 
was based on the following question: “Would you say most of the time people try to be 
helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?” These two items were 
aggregated to the PSU level to represent the percentage of respondents who agree that 
most people try to be helpful and the percentage that agree that most people try to be fair.  
At the aggregate level these measures exhibited less than desirable, but still adequate, 
ecological reliability (i.e., λ = .60; see Table 3.3).  
 
Conservative Political Climate  
Deriving a valid measure of political conservatism is notoriously difficult, and 
there is little consistency in the literature on this issue.  Many authors have measured 
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community variation in conservative ideology by measuring the percentage of county 
voters that are registered Republicans, or the number of votes cast for Republican 
candidates in general elections.  These are among the most common measures used in 
previous multilevel sentencing studies examining the effects of conservative political 
climates, but these measures suffer from some important limitations.  First, measuring 
how voters label themselves does not capture actual voter behavior that may fluctuate as 
different candidates and issues compete for public attention.  Some researchers have 
understandably criticized using measures of votes cast for Republican candidates, arguing 
that in today’s political climate, no single party is soft on crime (Greenberg and West, 
2001).   Others scholars have used dichotomous variables indicating the presence of a 
Republican governor, but state wide elections may be dominated by counties outside the 
larger areas considered in this study.  Too, many Democratic governors have increasingly 
initiated sweeping criminal justice reforms, leaving little differentiation between the two 
parties on criminal justice issues.19  Thus, a better and more direct barometer of political 
conservatism was computed by aggregating responses to a GSS item that asks 
respondents:  ‘We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives.  I’m 
going to show you a seven-point scale on which political views that people might hold 
are arranged from extremely liberal (point 1)- to extremely conservative- (point 7). 
Where would you place yourself on this scale?’  This measure, labeled Conservative 
Political Ideology, represents the mean level of political conservatism (or liberalism) for 
each county. Though not used in previous multilevel sentencing research, this measure of 
political orientation is commonly included in research that uses the GSS to understand 
                                                
19 For example, in a move at odds with liberal ideology, Governor Jerry Brown (D) of California was one of the first 
Governors to abolish parole, along with prison rehabilitation programs.   
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individual-level variation in punitive attitudes such as support for the death penalty (see 
e.g., Barkan and Cohn, 1994; Borg, 1997; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski, 2006).  At 
the aggregate level this measure exhibited sufficient ecological reliability (λ = .70). 
 
Whites’ Racial Resentment  
 As discussed in Chapter two, one of the strongest and most consistent predictors 
of support for more punitive social control (e.g., capital punishment, criminal justice 
spending, police force size) is anti-black racial prejudice among whites (Barkan and 
Cohn, 1994; Cohn et al., 1991; Chiricos et al., 2004; Soss et al., 2003; Stults and Baumer, 
2007; Unnever and Cullen, 2007; Unnever et al., 2006).  Research in the area of whites’ 
racial prejudice has traditionally distinguished between two dimensions of prejudice.  The 
first type of prejudice identified in survey research consists of overt, or “old-fashioned” 
prejudice, is characterized by feelings that blacks are genetically inferior as well as a 
desire to avoid contact with blacks through segregation or by opposing interracial 
marriage (Stults and Baumer, 2007; Taylor, 1998; Unnever et al., 2006).  The second, and 
subtler, form of prejudice is characterized by whites’ denial that blacks’ conditions are 
due to discrimination, and opposition to programs that change the status quo by elevating 
the social status of Blacks (Schuman and Bobo, 1988; Unnever et al., 2007).  In their 
seminal study exploring the sources behind this contemporary form of racial animosity, 
Kinder and Sanders (1996) define this form of prejudice as “racial resentment,” and find 
that this resentment is manifested in the belief that blacks are unwilling or unmotivated to 
improve their condition and are thus, unworthy of government assistance (e.g., 
affirmative action) (see also Unnever and Cullen, 2007).  Bobo and Kluegal’s analysis of 
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GSS responses over time reveal a paradox, whereby this newer “symbolic” form of 
prejudice has become more widespread even as adherence to traditional “Jim Crow 
racism” has declined in the past forty years (1993: 443).   
 Unnever and colleagues (2006) recently analyzed GSS responses and found that 
this contemporary form of racial resentment, rather traditional prejudice, was 
significantly and strongly related to support for capital punishment.  This has helped 
refine our understanding of the relationship between racial animosity and punitive 
attitudes, while also suggesting that contextual and macro level research on the severity 
of social control should expand their models to include measures of racial animosity in 
addition to support for harsh sanctions and political and religious conservatism.   I 
examine the effects of contemporary racial resentment on sentencing severity using a 
standardized additive scale containing items in the GSS that tap respondents’ agreement 
(either somewhat or strongly) with the following statements:  1) Blacks should work their 
way up without favors to overcome prejudice (λ= .72); 2) Black-white differences in 
socioeconomic status are due to Blacks’ lack of motivation or willpower (λ = .65); 3) 
Black-white socioeconomic differences are due to discrimination against Blacks (reverse 
coded; λ = .69); 4) The government does too much to help improve the condition of 
Blacks (λ = .80);  5) The government is not obligated to give Blacks special treatment to 
improve the condition of Blacks (λ = .72); 6) Opposed/strongly opposed to preferential 
hiring or promotion of Blacks (λ = .60); 7) and that it’s somewhat or very likely that a 
Black applicant will get a job or promotion over an equally or more qualified white 
applicant (λ =.60).  The scale exhibits high internal consistency (α = .86) and is 
consistent with prior research that has measured contemporary anti-black prejudice using 
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GSS responses (Bobo and Kluegal, 1993; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Schuman and Bobo, 
1988; Unnever et al., 2006; Unnever, Cullen, and Jones, 2008; Williams et al., 1999). 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Individual-Level Case Controls 
 In each multilevel regression model I include a wide array of individual level 
variables research has shown to influence sentencing dispositions.  It is well established 
that the severity of criminal sentences primarily reflect the seriousness of the offense 
(Spohn, 2000; Ulmer, 2000).  Although the strength of the relationship may fluctuate 
depending on the race of the defendant or the jurisdiction, the general consensus is that 
offenders convicted of more serious offenses and those with more serious prior criminal 
histories are more likely to be incarcerated and for longer periods of time.  Failure to 
control for inter-jurisdiction variability in the seriousness of caseloads may overestimate 
the relative importance of jurisdictional attributes in determining sentencing outcomes.  I 
control for offense severity with a series of dummy variables that indicate the specific 
conviction charge, as well as the prior arrest, conviction, and incarceration history of each 
defendant.  The specific coding of these items and other case level controls is 
summarized in table 3.1. Independent of these legally-relevant characteristics, there is a 
growing body of research documenting that judges manage uncertainty when determining 
punishment by relying on decisions made by other justice system actors at the 
arraignment stage.  As a consequence, those defendants denied pretrial release prior are 
more frequently convicted and incarcerated (Albonetti, 1991; Williams, 2003).  I control 
for pretrial decision-making with a dummy variable that is coded 1 when defendants were 
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detained prior to sentencing and coded 0 if they were released.  Although evidence is 
mixed, some prior research suggests that extralegal defendant characteristics are 
associated with sentencing severity (e.g., see Zatz, 2000).  I also control for defendant 
age, race, and sex to account for demographic differences in court caseloads.   Research 
has consistently established evidence of a “trial tax” for those defendants who exercise 
their right to trial, and that severity of the trial tax is sensitive to jurisdictional attributes 
(Johnson, 2003; Ulmer and Bradley, 2006).  Although there is very little variation in the 
mode of adjudication among cases in the SCPS (95% plea bargain), a failure to control 
for plea bargaining rates could yield biased estimates at each level of analysis.  I include 
a dichotomous variable indicating whether the defendant plead guilty or was adjudicated 
via bench or jury trial.  As with mode of adjudication, it is now customary to control for 
the type of legal counsel defendants secure.  Predicting that defendants represented by 
public defenders may be more likely to secure more lenient sanctions and plea bargain 
deals, I include a control for whether defendants had a public defender appointed to them 
versus a private representation or court-appointed counsel from outside the public 
defender system.  Finally, I control for any unobserved sources of temporal variability in 
punitiveness through the use of dummy variables that indicate the year of adjudication.  
Controlling for the year of case may help capture unobserved factors influencing 
sentencing such as election cycles that alter courtroom workgroups, and any bureaucratic 
changes that impact plea bargaining policies, charging decisions, or the nature of the 
cases before the court.  Net of the contextual measures I describe below, differences 
across jurisdictions along any of these legal and extralegal dimensions should help 
explain why some jurisdictions more frequently incarcerate defendants. 
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County Crime Rate 
The leading alternative hypothesis to the theoretical models presented in Chapter 
2 is derived from functionalist models of punishment, which argue that the severity of 
punishment merely reflects differences across communities in levels of crime.  As such, 
the functionalist perspective posits that higher crime rates should legitimately trigger 
more punitive sentencing within a jurisdiction.  When measuring levels of crime and 
deviance, there is no consensus on what type of crimes to account for in 
multijurisdictional studies of sentencing.  As evident in Table 2.1, some scholars rely on 
arrest data as a proxy for caseload or the certainty of punishment, some studies account 
for drug arrests, while some rely on measures of violent crime that should reflect the 
public’s fear and demand for justice.  Rather than control for county violent crime rates, I 
include measures of the overall index crime rate because the majority of felony cases 
heard before state courts in the US involve non-violent offenses.  While violent offenses 
might understandably trigger fear among the public, so do burglaries, open-air drug sales, 
and the possession of illegal weapons.  Plus, while the violent crime rate provides a valid 
barometer of how judges might sentence violent offenders, it does not necessarily provide 
an appropriate means with which to predict how judges will sentence those convicted of 
fraud, larceny, or minor drug possession charges.  Consistent with the bulk of multilevel 
studies of incarceration, I measure variation in levels of crime by calculating an index 
crime rate using UCR data accessed at ICPSR.  Because two Illinois counties participate 
in the SCPS each year, I calculated an index crime rate that excluded rapes because data 
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for these crimes are not available in the UCR due to differences in the definition of rape. 
To control for yearly fluctuations, I use a three-year average index crime rate.   
 
ANALYTIC TECHNIQUE 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Consistent with the focus of this project, a series of three-level hierarchical 
regression models are used to estimate the main effects of individual level and 
jurisdictional attributes on sentencing severity. These models have become standard for 
analyzing nested data.  Multilevel models adjust for the fact that individual cases from 
the same county are likely to be more similar, which violates classic regression 
assumptions of independence among the observations.  Multilevel models adjust the 
standard errors of the parameter estimates for non-independence and overcome any 
correlation among individual and group-level residuals by modeling unique error term for 
each level-one and higher level unit as a function of both individual and aggregate-level 
variables (Hofmann, 1997). These models are particularly useful because they allow 
researchers to maintain the appropriate level of analysis when examining the effects of 
group-level variables, providing significance tests for level 2 parameters that are based on 
the appropriate level-two sample size instead of the level-one sample size.  
As mentioned previously, each of the 26,354 cases is nested within 91 county-
years and 19 states.  Due to the small number of states at level three (n = 19 states), only 
a random intercept parameter is modeled at level 3. What this means is that even though 
some of the jurisdictional attributes are actually state-level characteristics (i.e., legal 
statutes), these attributes are included at level 2 as a county level contextual measure.  
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Using determinate sentencing structure as an example, the level-two slope coefficient for 
determinate sentencing provides an estimate of the effect of being processed in a county 
court that operates under determinate sentencing, which is a partly a function of state-
level variation in the overall odds of a particular sentencing outcome, plus county-level 
error.  The primary purpose of each main effects model estimated is to assess the effects 
of Level 2 variables net of level-one characteristics.  Thus, with the exception of several 
cross-level interaction models that were estimated, the Level-one slopes are treated as 
fixed in these models.  Fixing the slopes assumes that the effects of all Level-one 
variables are assumed to be the same across counties and states.  
Because the dependent variable consists of a categorical measure of three possible 
sentencing outcomes (i.e., prison vs. jail, prison vs. probation, and jail vs. probation), I 
estimated a series of HGLM (hierarchical generalized logit models), which are 
appropriate for nominal data.  The HGLM for multinomial outcomes is an extension of 
the basic linear regression model.  When the data are sampled from a multinomial 
distribution, the HLM program uses the log-link function to predict the odds of being in 
the m-th response category versus M-th reference category (Raudenbush et al., 2004: 
101).  In equation form, the log-link function is expressed as: 
€ 
ηmij = log
φmij
φMij
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟  
where phi (φ) represents the expected level-one outcome, which is the predicted 
probability of a observing a given sentencing outcome versus the reference category (M).  
For each set of models presented in the next chapter, two sets of multinomial regression 
models were estimated which provide the odds of three possible outcomes occurring: a) 
prison vs. jail, b) prison vs. probation, and c) jail vs. probation.   Using the model for 
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prison versus probation as an example, the level 1 multinomial equation predicting the 
odds of prison (the ‘1’category) versus probation (the ‘3’ category) is modeled for each 
defendant as a function of the county-level average odds of prison, a series of individual 
level predictors (Xijk), plus random error (e):  
€ 
log(ϕ1ijk /ϕ3ijk ) = π 0 jk(1) +π1 jk(1)X1ijk +π 2 jk(1)X2ijk + ..... + eijk(1)  
where 
€ 
π 0jk(1)  is the mean log-odds of prison versus probation of county j in state k, and 
eijk(1) is the level-one error term for each felony case.  This error represents the deviation 
of each criminal case from the county-level average odds of prison.  In the Level-two 
model the average log-odds of prison versus probation for each county (π0jk) becomes an 
outcome, which varies randomly around the county’s state-level mean log-odds of prison. 
This level-two model takes the basic form: 
€ 
π pjk(1)= βp0k(1) + βpqk(1)Wqjk + ....rpjk(1)  
where 
€ 
β00k(1) is the mean log-odds of prison versus probation in state k and r0jk is a 
random county-level effect that is the deviation of county jk’s mean from the state mean 
odds of prison.20  The level-three model estimates variability in the mean odds of prison 
among states.  The level-three model takes the form: 
€ 
βpqk(1) = γ pq0(1) + upqk(1)  
where each state’s mean odds of prison versus probation is a function of the overall grand 
mean odds of prison (γ000(1)), and a unique error term for each state (u) represents the 
deviation of each state’s estimated mean odds of prison from the overall grand mean. 
Additionally, a series of random coefficient models and cross-level interaction 
models are estimated to examine the potential for any conditional relationships between 
                                                
20 Formulas for the basic three-level model are provided in Raudenbush and Bryk (2002: 229). 
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defendant prior criminal history, three-strikes laws and presumptive sentencing 
guidelines.   In these cross-level interaction models, the slope parameters for two level-
one indicators of prior record (having a prior felony conviction and having served a prior 
prison term) are allowed to vary across county-years at level 2 (they remain fixed at level 
three since there are no measures of legal context at level three to form a cross-level 
interaction).  These models are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
 
CENTERING 
Because the focus of the analysis is estimating the effects of jurisdictional 
attributes on sentencing after adjusting for variation in the composition of county and 
state caseloads, all level-one variables were grand-mean centered for two reasons.  First, 
centering reduced some of the instability stemming from moderate to high collinearity 
among several of the variables measuring prior criminal history.  Second, grand mean 
centering is more appropriate than group-mean centering when the focus is on estimating 
the effects of level-two predictors net of compositional effects at level-one.  This is 
because group-mean centered models lead to level 2 parameter estimates that confound 
individual and contextual level effects (Kreft and De Leeuw, 1998; Wu and Wooldridge, 
2005).  Depending on the theoretical goals of the research, Raudenbush and Bryk (2002: 
34) also note that it is often useful to center level-one dummy variables, even though a 
value of zero for these variables is meaningful.  If left uncentered for example, the 
intercept becomes the average odds of incarceration for any case scoring a zero on the 
dummy variables (e.g., the odds of prison for females, or for those with no prior criminal 
history), rather than providing the more useful estimate of the overall average odds of 
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incarceration that is adjusted for differences across counties in the proportion of court 
cases where the dummy variable (e.g., black defendant or male defendant) equals ‘1.’ 
Under grand mean centering, the model intercept provides an estimate of the odds of 
incarceration for the average defendant processed in a “typical” county, and represents 
between-county variance in the average odds of the outcome after partialling out the 
effect of level-one case characteristics (Heck and Thomas, 2000; Hoffman and Gavin, 
1998; Paccagnella, 2006).  This allows one to gauge how counties and states deviate from 
the average or “normal” propensity to mete out incarceration terms (prison or jail) versus 
probation. Grand-mean centering the level-one predictors does not change the 
interpretation of the level-one slope estimates.  The decision to center level-two variables 
is much less complex because the gamma coefficients can be easily interpreted in either 
raw or centered form (Enders and Tofighi, 2007; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2001: 35). 
However, it is particularly useful to grand-mean center continuous level-two predictors 
around their grand mean if any of the predictors are moderately or strongly correlated.21   
In each of the models estimated, continuous level-two variables are centered at their 
grand-mean and dummy variables are level-two are not centered.  This means the model 
intercept can be interpreted as the overall odds of a given sentencing outcome for the 
average defendant processed in a “typical” county that is not located in the south and that 
does not have present the structured sentencing schemes considered in the models (e.g., 
three-strikes, guidelines, and determinate sentencing).   
 
 
                                                
21 Several level-two variables exhibited bivariate correlations that exceed .65.  This was particularly the 
case for measures tapping state variation in penalties for sale and possession of cocaine (r = .70*).  All 
correlations among level-two variables are provided in Appendix B. 
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MODELING STRATEGY  
 Following the advice of Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), the analyses proceeded in 
several stages.  First, an unconditional model was fitted which estimates the overall grand 
mean log-odds of being sentenced to prison vs. jail, prison vs. probation, and jail vs. 
probation.  The unconditional model contains no level-one or level-two predictors and is 
a useful first step towards estimating the initial degree of cross-jurisdictional variation in 
the outcomes.  If no such significant variation exists, then all regression models can be 
estimated using standard fixed-effects regression models that control for only level-one 
covariates.  In the second step, all grand-mean centered level-one predictors were entered 
into the model to assess whether and to what degree any observed variation in the 
outcome across counties and states can be attributed to compositional differences across 
jurisdictions in the types of cases processed.  The results of this model also provide a 
revised estimate of the overall mean-adjusted (for level-one covariates) log-odds of each 
sentence type.  The next phase of the analysis focuses primarily on fitting a series of 
models that introduce blocks of theoretically relevant contextual attributes at level 2.  
Raudenbush and Bryk recommend that model building at level 2 be “theory-driven,” and 
that when the number of level 2 predictors is large relative to the number of level 2 
groups researchers should consider “dividing the level-two predictors into conceptually 
distinct subsets and fitting a submodel for each.  The strongest predictors from these 
submodels might then be combined in an overall model” (2002: 267).  The results 
presented in Chapter 5 are displayed this way, beginning with legal and organizational 
models (the factors that should, in theory, exert the most proximate influences on court 
decision making), followed by a conflict model of sentencing, and then a punitive social 
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climate model that contains measures of public sentiment and trust.  A final trimmed 
model is then estimated that retains significant level-two predictors from each theoretical 
“block,” along with all level-one case controls. 
 
METHODLOGICAL LIMITATIONS  
Potential Selection Bias in the SCPS 
The issue of sample selection bias is common in sentencing research, where the 
odds of reaching later stages in the adjudication process are not random across 
defendants.  In nearly every study of legal decision making the sample of defendants 
facing a decision of incarceration represents a nonrandom sample of suspects that come 
to the attention of police and prosecutors.  The SCPS is no exception.  As seen in Figure 
3.1, there is a considerable amount of sample attrition as cases move through the justice 
system. This merits scrutiny in the current study given the relatively high rate of 
dismissals (which can be observed in the SCPS) in some jurisdictions that resulted in the 
conviction of fewer and potentially different types of defendants.   
A more pressing problem concerns the interplay between patterns of nonrandom 
selection with omitted, or “unobservable” variables that influence both the selection 
process (conviction) and the substantive outcome (incarceration).  If samples for which 
we observe the outcome are not a random sub-sample of the population under study, 
Heckman (1976) and others have demonstrated that using only the observed cases can 
generate potential bias in the regression estimates (see also Bushway et al., 2007; 
Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997).  Censored data do not necessarily yield biased regression 
estimates.  Rather, potentials for bias arise from unobserved factors that underlie both the 
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selection and substantive outcomes.  In the case of incarceration, unmeasured factors that 
influence the likelihood of conviction and the decision to incarcerate will enter both 
equations’ error terms, inducing a correlation between the two (Bushway et al., 2007).  
This interdependency between processes of conviction and incarceration not only 
threatens external validity; it potentially biases all other parameter estimates in the 
equation.  This occurs when the omitted factor related to both selection and the outcome 
is also correlated with another predictor such as race or sex.  If this is the case, it becomes 
difficult to determine the “true” effect of defendant race or prior criminal history when 
predicting the likelihood of incarceration. 
This is not a trivial issue in sentencing research where detecting the potential 
sources and extent of racial disparity or the impact of having a prior criminal record are 
of great interest.  The threat of selection bias is virtually ubiquitous in criminology, a 
process Berk (1983: 392) terms “infinite regress.”22  The question becomes whether this 
bias is small enough to ignore.  If, for example, the strength of evidence and the odds of 
conviction are independent of the decision to incarcerate then this censoring is not a 
problem and the two processes can be modeled separately.  A more acute problem arises 
if strength of evidence is unobserved and related to conviction and incarceration.  The 
sub-sample of defendants that select into the incarceration stage effectively “carry” that 
unobserved error term with them.  In this way, Heckman frames the problem of selection 
bias as a more complicated instance of omitted variable bias, where omitted variables 
                                                
22 For example, in any study of formal social control, consider that only half of all crimes are typically 
reported to the police in any given year, that only some of these will result in a clearance by police, and so 
on.  This even extends to studies of parole decision-making where the inmates eligible for parole are not a 
random subset of those defendants the state convicts and sends to prison.  Likewise, any given longitudinal 
study of delinquency will experience some attrition of participants; particularly among those most at risk of 
delinquency.    
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predicting selection processes “interact” with the predictors in the substantive equation.  
Because the sources of selection bias are unobservable, it remains unclear the precise 
degree to which it threatens the validity of the parameter estimates for key exogenous 
regressors such as race.  As Berk aptly puts it, in the presence of selection bias “one is 
essentially flying blind.” (1983: 390). 
Although its application has been inconsistent, researchers typically employ the 
Heckman two-step method in an attempt to alleviate selection bias.  This involves first 
estimating the odds of selection, and then including a selection “correction factor” in all 
substantive equations.  Unfortunately, there are obstacles to implementing this approach 
for the current study.  There is no formal statistical procedure for the two-step correction 
of censored discrete outcomes that allows for the calculation of a corrective factor (i.e., 
the inverse Mills Ratio) that then could be imported into a multilevel statistical package 
and included as a control in analyses of incarceration.  Moreover, there is no estimator 
(two-step or otherwise) yet available that allows for any formal diagnoses of selection 
bias for nominal dependent variables.  With no clear statistical remedy, I referenced 
earlier scholars’ treatment of selection bias for discrete outcomes, but the issue either 
garnered little discussion or scholars incorrectly implemented the Heckman two-step 
estimator or other “ad hoc” methods (for a review, see Bushway et al., 2007).23   
                                                
23 In large part, researchers have limited their discussion on the sensitivity of their results to unobserved 
selection processes that impact sentence length equations.  Researchers rarely acknowledge selection 
processes that may bias incarceration equations, especially in studies of jurisdictional variation in 
incarceration decisions.  This reticence is understandable for a few reasons.  Many large-scale sentencing 
databases only include samples of defendants who were ultimately convicted and sentenced, precluding 
attempts to gauge the degree of nonrandom censoring that occurs during the conviction stage.  Second, and 
from an epistemological standpoint, problems with selection bias tend to be viewed through the narrow lens 
of understanding sentencing behavior, rather than criminal justice decision-making generally.  As Bushway 
et al. (2007) point out, concerns of incidental selection bias are often predicated upon the assumption that 
judges’ decisions regarding incarceration and sentence length occur in two stages, both of which contain 
varying degrees of discretion.  Perhaps because relatively less empirical attention is devoted to decisions to 
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Notwithstanding those limitations, I attempted to gain some intuition about the 
extent of selection bias at the incarceration stage using a derivative of Heckman’s 
original estimator without the second step of calculating and saving the inverse Mills 
ratio.24  Using Stata’s heckprob command, I estimated the log odds of receiving 
incarceration conditional upon factors that maximize the likelihood of conviction (which 
is modeled in a separate first-stage probit equation).   The model produces a coefficient, 
rho (ρ), which is an estimate of the degree of correlation between the error terms of the 
two equations (conviction and incarceration).   While the “true” residual correlation is by 
definition unknown, examining the size, direction, and significance of the rho parameter 
helps to diagnose the general direction and magnitude of selection bias (Stolzenberg and 
Relles, 1997).  Rho should be interpreted with caution though, as these estimates have 
been found to be extremely sensitive to model specification in simulation studies (e.g., 
Sartori, 2003).   Keeping such cautions in mind, any observed non-zero correlation 
between the residuals suggests the two stages are related, and that unobserved factors not 
captured in the model explain this interdependence.  Theoretically, rho ranges between -1 
to +1 and the interpretation of rho is similar to the interpretation of a Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient (Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997: 498).  Although the “rules of 
thumb” for interpreting rho seem vague, Stolzenberg and Relles (1997) argue that a 
residual correlation closer to zero suggests a considerable amount of random 
                                                
arrest, prosecute, and convict in the criminal justice system, sample selection bias often is limited to 
discussions of sentence length and relatively absent from studies regarding the decision to incarcerate.   
 
24 The Heckman two-step corrective method was originally applied to the problem of studying wages (a 
continuous outcome), rather than discrete outcomes.  This restriction to continuous outcomes is necessary 
because the calculation of the inverse Mills ratio (or, lambda) that derives from the first step (the probit 
equation predicting selection) requires several estimated parameters (the product of sigma and rho), one of 
which (sigma) is a function of a standard normal probability density function.  Ostensibly, this is the reason 
Stata does not calculate sigma or lambda following the ‘Heckprob’ procedure (the same is true of SAS).   
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unobservable factors determining the two processes.  A residual correlation of 1 would 
occur if selection (i.e., conviction) and the substantive process (incarceration) were 
“accomplished by identical processes” (pp. 499).  Given the interdependency of criminal 
justice system decision-making, I expected to observe a significant rho correlation 
coefficient.  However, in the SCPS sample judges do not often make both the 
determination of guilt and incarceration since most guilt verdicts are pleas.  Therefore, 
the rho correlation should not be extremely high (i.e., exceeding .80).  In fact, in the 
SCPS 95% of convictions result from guilty pleas extended on behalf of prosecutors, 
suggesting that different processes should underlie the conviction and incarceration 
outcomes to a good degree. 
I fit a Heckman’s probit model in Stata with the same level one coefficients 
included in all multilevel regression equations along with dummy indicators of 
jurisdiction. 25  The estimated residual correlation (ρ) is -.67* (p < .05).  This suggests a 
moderate level of correlation between the processes of conviction and incarceration.  The 
significance of rho is generally interpreted as evidence that the Heckman estimator 
should be used to fit the data.  Not surprisingly, the negative direction of rho suggests that 
there are one or more unobserved factors that make conviction more likely, but 
incarceration less likely.  There are two modal case dispositions in the SCPS- dismissal 
                                                
25 Following the advice of Bushway et al. (2007) I attempted to locate theoretically and empirically reliable 
exclusion restriction to enter into the selection equation predicting the likelihood of felony conviction.  An 
exclusion restriction is a variable that theoretically should be related to the odds of conviction, but not to 
the decision to incarcerate.  The exclusion restriction should help identify the sources and extent of 
incidental selection and hopefully, help to reduce any residual correlation between the selection and 
substantive equations.  I considered three exclusion criteria:  the speed of the process between arrest and 
conviction, the inability to afford pretrial release, and being charged with multiple offenses.  These are the 
only data provided in the SCPS that might be related to conviction, but perhaps not incarceration.  
Unfortunately, these measures failed to reduce the initial rho correlation I obtained from models without 
exclusion restrictions (i.e., they do not appear to compensate for unobserved factors that determine 
selection) and, from an empirical standpoint, were observed as being significantly related to the risk of 
incarceration when modeling incarceration separately.  
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and guilty pleas.  Thus, the court rarely decides guilt.  The negative residual correlation 
suggests that some factor other than race, sex, criminal history, offense severity, and 
pretrial incarceration motivates defendants to plea, but lowers their odds of incarceration.  
Intuitively, this makes sense and it underscores how urban courts function.  This pattern 
is consistent with Feeley’s (1992: 27) portrait of adjudication as a “mixed strategy game,” 
where plea bargains and dismissals allow prosecutors and defense attorneys to share in 
the gains and losses of case processing, while also expediting heavy caseloads.  Plea 
bargains avoid the cost of trial, the uncertainty of losing at trial and the uncertainty of the 
punishment that awaits the defendant if they exercise their right to trial.  On the other 
hand, if the case is dismissed the defendant avoids the stigma of conviction, and the 
prosecutor avoids a very public loss that may have resulted at trial.  Thus, estimating 
community variability in punitiveness may require the consideration of court differences 
in their “success” at processing cases.   In conclusion, I should stress that this rho 
correlation should be interpreted with caution and I present it only in the spirit of 
addressing potential selection bias in a more transparent way given its lack of attention in 
previous studies of incarceration.  Furthermore, it does not provide a clear sense of 
whether this residual correlation may bias the meaning we infer to some of the individual 
level characteristics such as defendant race and ethnicity for predicting incarceration.26  
Despite that lingering ambiguity and no readily available means of empirically 
addressing it, estimating the Heckman probit does provide important intuition about the 
degree of integration between adjudication and sentencing outcomes.  These diagnostics 
are not definitive by any means, but do suggest that some key unobserved factor may be 
                                                
26 With a continuous outcome, one could examine the correlation between lambda and defendant race 
and/or ethnicity.  Unfortunately, that is not possible in cases where the outcome is discrete, since lambda 
cannot be calculated.   
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informal prosecutorial bargaining practices and organizational case processing strategies.  
Thus, any community level influences on sentencing behavior likely reflect to some 
degree how the courts informally process cases, which cannot be observed with these 
data.  
 
Missing Data and Imputation Procedures 
As is often the case in large data collections, the SCPS suffers from missing data.  
Some scholars rely on multiple imputation procedures in both individual (Demuth, 2003) 
and multilevel studies using the SCPS (Pardoe and Weidner, 2006).  Some listwise delete 
all cases with any missing values (Schlesinger, 2005; Tomic and Hakes, 2008; Weidner 
et al., 2004; 2005).27  Others do not address missing data, or the degree of sample attrition 
caused by it (Fearn, 2005; Maxwell, Robinson, and Post, 2003).  I explored several 
options for handling missing data in the hopes of retaining statistical power while 
simultaneously generating valid regression estimates.   Below I describe how I handle 
missing data in the current study.  I address three issues.  First, what is the extent of the 
problem?  Second, are the data missing at random?  Third, I describe the methods and 
rationale for the use of multiple imputation procedures in the current study. 
It is customary in criminological research to handle missing data using listwise 
deletion.  Preliminary individual-level regression models predicting the likelihood of 
incarceration resulted in the listwise deletion of 6,045 cases (23% of the initial sample of 
                                                
27 In at least one instance when researchers used only one year of the SCPS (Weidner et al., 2004), listwise 
deletion appears to have resulted in a loss of nearly half of all cases where the defendant had been 
convicted and the case was otherwise eligible for inclusion.  Other authors did not report what the extent of 
attrition resultant from listwise deletion.  Therefore, the results reported herein may not be compatible with 
that of prior published work. 
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26,354 defendants).28  Over 4,000 of these cases were dropped from the analyses due to 
missing data on only one measure. The most common sources of missing data are items 
tapping race and ethnicity (5%), prior arrest (6%), prior prison sentences (7%), and type 
of defense counsel (7.5%).29  Deleting over 6,000 cases also would remove from the 
analyses five to seven counties that have smaller caseloads.  Thus, listwise deletion 
results in a considerable loss of data at both the defendant and county level, and reduces 
variation in the types of jurisdictions included in the study by disproportionately 
removing cases in jurisdictions with smaller caseloads.   
There are several processes thought to generate incomplete data and these 
processes determine the most appropriate method of handling missing values.  These 
processes can be classified in three ways.30  The first is when data are missing 
“completely at random” (MCAR).   MCAR narrowly defines the missing value process as 
being unrelated to any of the factors (X or Y) in the data matrix.  In other words, missing 
values are equally likely for all groups.  In practice, data are rarely MCAR.  If the data 
are MCAR then listwise deletion is an inefficient use of the data, but it will not bias the 
parameter estimates since each case will have a random probability of being deleted.  
Unfortunately, missing data in the SCPS cannot be treated as MCAR.  A t-test of mean 
differences indicated that those with missing data statistically differed from those with 
                                                
28 This analysis was restricted to defendants who had valid data for their conviction decision (since it 
determines the sample) and the outcome (prison, jail, probation).  Any additional losses that would occur 
from missing data on those measures are not included in the figure above since those two measures are 
considered outcomes of the criminal justice system, and imputed values are not appropriate for outcomes. 
29 In particular, the codebook for the SCPS indicates that in 2004 prior arrest data were not available in four 
New York counties (Kings, Bronx, Nassau, and Queens).  Fortunately, each of these counties appeared in 
previous years of the SCPS, leaving open the option that multiple imputation procedures could simulate 
imputed values for these counties informed by cases disposed in these counties prior to 2004. 
30 This is leaving aside for the moment processes such as censoring and when data are “missing by design” 
where respondent fatigue may prevent the completion of items towards the end of a survey. 
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complete data, and predictably, certain jurisdictions are more likely to contain missing 
cell values on indicators of race, prior criminal history, and attorney type.   
A more realistic assumption is that the data are ‘missing at random’ (MAR).  Data 
are MAR if the likelihood that an indicator is missing is unrelated to the unobserved 
value of that indicator, controlling for all other attributes (Acock, 2005; Little and Rubin, 
1987; see also Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002: 199).  For example, under assumptions of 
MAR the odds that a defendant is missing information on race cannot be the result of a 
process where coders systematically omit values for race if the defendant was Hispanic.  
Furthermore, other variables in the data should provide a “mechanism” to help to explain 
whether or not a respondent (or a jurisdiction) provided information (Acock, 2005; 
Schafer, 1997).  In the SCPS court jurisdiction helps to explain why some criminal 
history data are more readily available in some jurisdictions.  According to the codebook, 
some courts have computer access to FBI databases, while others are limited to local or 
state databases (1990-2004 codebook, ICPSR cite).31   Therefore, if the likelihood that 
prior criminal history is missing is a function of jurisdictional access to records but not a 
defendant’s actual unobserved criminal history, the data are MAR.  Multiple imputation 
procedures, if carefully specified, can provide efficient and unbiased estimates when data 
are assumed to be MAR (Acock, 2005; Allison, 2002; King et al., 2001; Little and Rubin, 
1987; Schafer, 1997). 
                                                
31 Most discussions of missing data surround survey-based concerns of item non-response.  Maltz provides 
a useful example of agency-based MAR processes (2007: 278).  He describes several plausible scenarios by 
which UCR data could be incomplete.  UCR statistics may be MCAR if a natural disaster strikes a state and 
those jurisdictions lose their data.  Crime figures can be considered MAR when computer problems arise, 
such as the transition from the UCR reporting program to the more complicated NIBRS program.  During 
these transitions, some agencies do not have access to UCR or NIBRS systems, resulting in non-reporting 
of some or all crime statistics for a particular year. 
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Last, missing data can arise from “non ignorable” (NI) or, alternatively, ‘not 
missing at random’ (NMAR) processes (Little and Rubin, 1987).  Under these conditions, 
data are missing as a function of the unobserved value (e.g., income is missing only for 
low-income respondents) and other variables in the dataset cannot predict which cases 
are more likely to have lower incomes (i.e., the other explanatory variables cannot predict 
which cases will be missing).  This is a more problematic process generating incomplete 
data for which neither listwise deletion nor multiple imputation procedures will provide 
unbiased estimates. 
  
Missing Data Procedures in the Current Study 
There are several ways to handle missing data, each of which depend on why the 
data are incomplete (i.e., MCAR, MAR, or NI).  I carefully weighed the pros and cons of 
using listwise deletion versus multiple imputation, and with the exception of one item 
(defendant race) I estimated all multilevel models with imputed data. 
Scholars strongly advise against using listwise deletion unless data are MCAR 
(King et al., 2001; Little and Rubin, 1987; Schafer, 1997).   Intuitively though, listwise 
deletion is appealing because 1) it is convenient, 2) it has become standard in studies of 
legal decision making, and 3) it avoids the perception one is “making up” data.  
Moreover, in one simulation study Allison (2000) reports that listwise deletion yielded 
virtually no biased estimates when data were MCAR or MAR.32  On the other hand, other 
scholars have shown that listwise deletion does yield significantly biased regression 
                                                
32 There has been some distortion of Allison’s findings in several studies where authors advocate for 
listwise deletion instead of multiple imputation.  Allison’s now well-known “cautionary tale” was in 
reference to using multiple imputation estimates produced by the SOLAS program.  However, the multiple 
imputation estimates generated by Schafer’s NORM program performed exceptionally well, and in several 
instances better, than listwise deletion. 
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coefficients (King et al., 2001: 51).  Listwise deletion may also bias the results due to a 
loss of statistical power.  For instance, simulations by King et al. (2001: 64) demonstrate 
that listwise deletion often produces results driven by a lack of information rather than a 
“true” relationship.   
Multiple imputation (MI) has two appealing properties that alleviate these 
limitations.  MI yields more efficient estimates by using all of information available to 
identify the conditions under which data are missing.  Listwise deletion not only discards 
valuable information for each case, it assumes a very precise structure to that loss of 
information that is not reflected in the standard errors.  Multiple imputation programs 
integrate that uncertainty by adjusting the standard errors for variability in the precision 
of imputed values.   Second, under MAR assumptions, MI corrects for biases shown to 
result from ‘ad hoc’ methods such as case deletion and mean replacement.  In principle, 
we cannot directly test the assumption that random processes generate missing values.  
However, all analyses that contain missing data rest on these untestable assumptions 
(Kenward and Carpenter, 2007: 204).  Thus, potentially biased estimates coupled with the 
loss of statistical power warranted the extra step of imputation, and at the very least, 
comparing the results of models using listwise deletion versus imputed data. 
Multiple imputation procedures are now integrated into Stata, S-PLUS, and SAS, 
and as well as in a few specialized software packages such as NORM (Schafer, 1997) and 
Amelia (Hornaker, King, and Blackwell, 2010).  Two multilevel software packages 
(Mplus and HLM) permit the analysis of imputed datasets but do not actually impute 
data.  I imputed five datasets using the ICE program developed by Royston (2005) and 
freely available for implementation in Stata.  While the computational algorithms are 
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available elsewhere (e.g., see Royston, 2004), ICE provides a relatively user-friendly 
method of imputation that can be distilled down to three steps.  First, ICE estimates 
imputed values for all items containing missing cells.  More formally, the program uses 
“regression switching,” an iterative procedure that involves specifying separate 
regression equations to estimate values for all incomplete items.  The program generates 
missing values by repeatedly sampling from the posterior distribution of the item using 
the observed values for that item in combination with a set of explanatory variables (Yu, 
Burton, and Rivero-Arias, 2007).  The program then produces m number of data sets 
where observable values remain unchanged and imputed values are inserted into missing 
cells.  The imputed values somewhat vary across each dataset to reflect uncertainty in the 
estimates.  Imputation is more precise with large samples that contain relatively few 
missing values on any given item.  Last, each imputed dataset was brought into HLM for 
regression analyses. HLM fits the substantive model using information from each dataset.  
The estimates are then pooled together to adjust for variability in the precision of each 
imputation iteration performed in Stata.   
As Allison (2000: 302) points out, specifying multiple imputation models must be 
empirically and theoretically “correct in some sense.”  Imputation models that contain 
less information than their analysis equations may bias the imputed values.33  A common 
misstep is a failure to omit the outcome in the explanatory portion of the imputation 
model as it helps identify the formal “structure” of the data (i.e., the joint distribution of 
X and Y) (Acock, 2005; Kenward and Carpenter, 2007; Royston, 2005).34   I specified 
                                                
33 King et al. (2001: 56) argues, “When the information is greater in the imputation analysis model, multiple 
imputation is more efficient than even the “optimal” application-specific method.  This is the so-called efficiency 
property (see also, Rubin, 1996).   
34 While I include information on the outcome in the explanatory portion of the imputation equation, missing 
values for incarceration are not imputed since MI is only appropriate for missing explanatory variables.  
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 179 
models that included all variables to be included in the sentencing analyses, as well as 
information on pretrial decisions, initial charging offense, and any misconduct on the part 
of the defendant while on pretrial release.  
Finally, although I initially imputed race and ethnicity, I do not include any 
imputed values for this item in my final regression models.  I did this for two reasons.  
First, it is not clear to me how one reliably imputes race.35  I searched for studies on this 
issue, and there is very little work on the implications of imputing race in social science 
settings.  Hopefully, as MI grows increasingly popular researchers will devote simulation 
studies specifically to this issue.  Second, because race and ethnicity are a central focus of 
this dissertation, I did not want to complicate efforts to compare the results to prior work 
that uses the SCPS in analyses of race and sentencing.  In lieu of imputation, I opted to 
include a dummy variable where a value of 1 indicates the defendant was missing this 
information and 0 if the case contained valid data (see e.g., Cohen, Cohen, West, and 
Aiken, 2003).  When the model is estimated, the results for race and ethnicity will 
resemble the same as those that would result from listwise deletion, but retain virtually 
identical statistical power in large samples (Acock, 2005).  Table 3.4 provides an item-
specific count of missing values, and identifies items used in multilevel regression 
models that contain imputed values. 
To assess the sensitivity of the results to differences in imputed versus complete 
case (CC) samples, I estimated binary regression models of incarceration with and 
without imputed data.  Table 3.5 provides a comparison of these estimates.  I urge caution 
                                                
Likewise, while I included information indicating if the defendant was convicted, I did not use any imputed 
values for conviction status in the regression models since this outcome determines my sample.   
35  I did impute defendant sex and kept those cases with imputed values since there were so few defendants 
missing this information (n= 14).   
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in conferring too much meaning to these comparisons, since CC samples only provide 
biased and efficient estimates when the data are MCAR.  I present these comparisons to 
assess the implications of relying on imputed data. As I expected, the standard errors are 
lower (due in part to retaining a larger sample) and some of the estimates shift in 
magnitude.  The overall theme though, is the results are generally similar, although the 
effects of race and ethnicity increase somewhat in the imputed models, and the effect of 
having a prior misdemeanor conviction is considerably attenuated because imputation 
increased the number of cases with valid data on prior arrests and incarcerations.  The 
dummy variable indicating that race/ethnicity was missing is positive and significant, 
suggesting the odds of incarceration are significantly higher for these defendants, 
although for unknown reasons.  Given these similarities and the desire for statistical 
power, I use imputed data in all final multilevel models. 
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Table 3.4.   Imputed Data in Sample of Felony Defendants Used in Analyses of  
                    Incarceration  
                
(N= 26,354)   # Missing Values   
# Imputed 
Values     
Defendant Characteristics       
        
 Race/Ethnicity  1,349 (5.1%)  0   
 Sex  14 (.1%)  14   
 Age  392 (1.5%)  392   
 Most Serious Prior Arrest  1,603 (6.1%)  1,603   
 Most Serious Prior Conviction  928 (3.5%)  928   
 Served Prior Prison Term  1,782 (6.8%)  1,782   
 Active CJ Status at Time of Arrest  1,359 (5.2%)  1,359   
        
Legal/Case Characteristics       
 Year of Arrest and Adjudication  0  0   
 County Jurisdiction  0  0   
 Type of Attorney  1,971 (7.5%)  1,971   
 Pretrial Detention  0  0   
 Mode of Conviction (plea vs. trial)  350 (1.3%)  350   
 Conviction Offense  0  0   
 Incarceration Outcomea  1,340  0   
     (Prison, Jail, Probation/Fine/Other)           
a There is no corresponding percentage for these missing values because they are not part of 
the final sample.  Dependent variables are not suitable for imputation procedures. 
 
One final issue merits comment.  While multiple imputation is becoming 
increasingly popular in criminology, widely available imputation programs to not 
explicitly address the nested structure of data and I found little discussion of this issue in 
prior applications of MI using the SCPS (Demuth, 2003; Demuth and Steffensmeier, 
2004; Pardoe and Weidner, 2006) or other widely used datasets where the data are nested 
and researchers have relied on MI procedures (e.g., ADD Health).  Ideally, one could 
perform multiple imputation within HLM in a way that exploits the hierarchical structure 
of the data and its variance.  Unfortunately, this is not yet possible.  To date, HLM 
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merely analyzes imputed data, and has not yet integrated algorithms to impute clustered 
data.36  To help alleviate any sensitivity to unobservable jurisdictional factors, I specified 
MI equations that included dummy indicators for county jurisdiction.  That is, the 
estimate for an imputed value is determined in part by where the case was adjudicated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5.  Predicting the Likelihood of Incarceration With and Without Imputed Data 
     
                                                
36 Recently, scholars have integrated a multilevel imputation algorithim into MLwin statistical package.  
While its use is documented in simulation studies involving large (40%) amounts of missing data, I 
uncovered no published research that actually implemented this technique to impute hierarchical data.  
Hopefully, as this application moves from its infancy there will be more opportunities to evaluate its use in 
common sources of social science data. 
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 183 
  Listwise Deletion  MI 
Predictors   β   β 
     
Race/Ethnicity Missing  --  .173* 
(Reference= White, non-Hispanic)  --  (.086) 
Black, non-Hispanic  .184*  .235* 
  (.051)  (.044) 
Hispanic, any race  .301*  .355* 
  (.059)  (.051) 
 'Other', non-Hispanic  .032  .122 
  (.161)  (.124) 
Age   -.007*  -.003* 
  (.002)  (.002) 
Age (squared)  -.0003  -.0004 
  (.0001)  (.0001) 
Male  .369*  .368* 
  (.050)  (.042) 
Prior Felony Arrest  .214*  .197* 
  (.058)  (.045) 
Prior Felony Conviction  .287*  .263* 
(Reference=No Prior Convictions)  (.068)  (.052) 
Prior Misd. Conviction  .168*  .089 
  (.061)  (.050) 
Served Prior Prison Term  .921*  .773* 
  (.067)  (.055) 
Active CJ Status at Arrest  .176*  .191* 
  (.048)  (.039) 
Pretrial Detention  1.18*  1.18* 
  (.043)  (.036) 
Private Attorney  -.086  -.036 
  (.051)  (.043) 
Guilty Plea  -.117  -.149* 
  (.082)  (.072) 
Constant  .384  .559 
  (.268)  (.227) 
     
N  20,309  26,354 
Log pseudolikelihood   -8067.01  -11268.33 
 Wald χ2    3568.01*  4461.95* 
McFadden's R2         .26   .23 
Note: Both models include controls for jurisdiction and year of adjudication.   
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.   
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
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 To summarize, the data used in this study to understand jurisdictional variation in 
sentencing severity come from the State Court Processing Statistics.  These data were 
used to construct a three-level hierarchical database that nests 26,354 criminal cases 
within 91 level-two county-years, which are in turn nested within 19 states.  Data 
describing the legal, organizational, and social climate in which defendants were 
sentenced were obtained from a variety of secondary and original sources.  In particular, 
this study extends prior research by including measures of legal context contained in the 
Vera Institute Fragment and Ferment sentencing policy database and aggregated GSS 
survey responses that more directly capture areal variation in punitive public sentiments 
and levels of mutual trust.  Using these data, hierarchical multinomial regression models 
are estimated to examine 1) The extent to which the probability of three different 
sentencing outcomes varies across county and state court jurisdictions, 2) whether 
compositional differences in caseloads explain this variability, and 3) the role that court, 
community-level, and state context play in explaining jurisdictional variation in 
sentencing outcomes.  In addition to exploring the main effects of jurisdictional context 
on sentencing outcomes, a series of cross-level interaction models are also estimated to 
explore whether presumptive guidelines and the presence of three-strikes laws 
significantly impact sentencing outcomes indirectly by strengthening the relationship 
between prior criminal history and sentence type.  The results of these analyses are 
presented in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 concludes the study by briefly reviewing the 
contributions of the study, summarizing support for the various hypotheses examined, 
and discussing the study’s limitations. 
CHAPTER 4 
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RESULTS 
INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter reports results of descriptive analyses, unconditional hierarchical 
multinomial regression models, and fully-specified random intercept and random 
coefficient models predicting the log-odds of receiving three possible outcomes: 1) a 
prison versus a jail sentence, 2) a prison versus a probation sentence, and 3) a jail 
sentence versus probation.   The discussion of the findings proceeds in four steps.  First, 
the results of descriptive analyses are presented and briefly discussed.  Second, I present 
findings from the unconditional model predicting the overall probability of receiving 
each sentence type.  The chapter then proceeds with models aimed at explaining the 
observed jurisdictional variability in the outcome.  I begin with discussing a random 
intercept model including only fixed level-one effects.  I then present the findings from 
fully specified random intercept models that estimate the main and conditioning effects of 
level-two variables while adjusting for all level-one characteristics.  Legal context models 
are presented first since legal factors should, in theory, exert the most powerful and 
proximate influences on sentencing outcomes.  The results for models examining the 
effects of organizational context are shown next.  The analyses then shift to examining 
the effects of community social context, beginning with the social conflict model of 
sentencing, followed by models estimating the effects of public sentiment and ideology 
on sentencing.  The chapter concludes with a summary of support for the hypotheses and 
a final trimmed model is estimated that contains only those level-two variables found to 
be significant in earlier models. 
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
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Table 4.1 displays descriptive statistics for variables included in the models 
predicting the odds of prison, jail, and probation.  Thirty-eight percent of defendants are 
sentenced to prison upon conviction, a figure equal to that for jail.  Though not reflected 
in the figures in the table, it is important to point out that the majority of these jail 
sentences (76%) were combined with a probation sentence to be served upon release 
from jail.  For approximately one quarter of defendants (24%), probation and fines are the 
most severe sentence imposed.  When combining prison and jail, clearly the modal 
sentence type for convicted felons is incarceration.  However, as illustrated in Figure 4.1 
below, the proportion of defendants that are incarcerated varies substantially, ranging 
from less than a third in some counties to as many nearly all convicted felons (i.e., over 
90%) in other jurisdictions.  
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Figure 4.1.  Percent of Defendants Incarcerated Across Counties 
in the SCPS, 1998-2004 (n = 91) 
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Table 4.1 also displays descriptive statistics for each of the level-one and level-
two variables included in the analyses.  The results show that the sample is quite diverse.  
Forty percent of the cases involve a black defendant, while Hispanics make up 23% of 
the sample, and whites make up just over a quarter of defendants (28%).  The average age 
in the sample is 31 years old, and the sample is primarily male (83%).  The sample 
consists primarily of offenders who have a criminal record.  For example, 70% of the 
defendants have a prior felony arrest, and half of the sample has a prior felony conviction 
and has served jail time.  Twenty-five percent of the cases involve offenders who have 
already served a prison sentence, and nearly half of the offenders (42%) were arrested 
while on “active” criminal justice status such as probation or parole.  Over a third of all 
of the cases involved drug charges.  The most common offenses for which defendants 
were convicted were drug possession (22%) and drug sales (16%), followed by theft 
(10%), driving-related offenses (8%), burglary (8%), and assault (8%).  The majority of 
offenders were arrested on multiple charges (60%) and a high percentage of these 
defendants were detained prior to conviction (54%). Ninety-five percent of all cases were 
disposed via a guilty plea. 
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Table 4.1.  Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in Analysis of Sentencing Outcomes in Felony Cases (N = 26,354)     
       
Dependent Variable Mean SD  Explanatory Variables (Cont.) Mean SD 
   Sentence Type     Organizational Climate Predictors   
      Prison Most Serious Sanction Received  .38 .48       Jail Capacity Constraints (Operating Capacity) 98.19 17.86 
      Jail Most Serious Sanction Received .38 .48       Prison Capacity Constraints (Operating Capacity) 110.98 25.76 
      Probation/Fines Most Serious Sanction Received .24 .43       Per Capita Correctional Expenditures ($) 18884.54 3482.35 
         Average Monthly Probation Supervision Fee ($) 34.62 23.80 
Jurisdictional Attributes (N=91)         Prosecutor Caseload Pressure 3.82 2.80 
Control Variables     Social Conflict/Threat Predictors   
     County Index Crime Rate 5745.73 2285.22        Percent Population Black 17.86 13.88 
Explanatory Variables         Percent Population Hispanic 18.94 14.82 
Legal Climate Predictors         Percent Population Unemployed 6.87 2.38 
     Determinant Sentencing .52 .50       Income Inequality (Gini) .44 .03 
     Truth in Sentencing (% Sentence Must Serve) 61.40 26.74       Fear of Crime 47.02 10.37 
     Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines .14 .35  Punitive Public Sentiment and Social Cohesion   
     Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines .11 .31       Southern Jurisdiction .35 .48 
     Mandatory Enhancements for Violent/Property Crimes 9.77 6.26       Percent Support Capital Punishment for Murderers 64.03 9.03 
     Three Strikes and You're Out Policy .44 .50       Mean Level of Social Trust and Cohesiveness  -.09 1.87 
     Min Sentence (months) for 1 oz. Cocaine Possession 21.63 22.08       Mean Level of Religious Fundamentalism .06 1.93 
     Min Sentence (months) for 1 oz. Cocaine Sale 35.80 25.04       Mean Level of Political Conservatism (Scale of 1-7) 4.02 .24 
     Mandatory Enhancements for Drug Crimes 18.50 25.04       Mean Level of Whites' Anti-Black Racial Animus  .00 5.14 
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Case-Level Control Variables Mean SD  Control Variables (Cont.) Mean SD 
  Defendant Characteristics       
     Non-Hispanic Black .40 .49       Guilty Plea Entered .95 .22 
     Hispanic, any race .25 .44       Convicted of Murder .01 .07 
     Non-Hispanic White .28 .45       Convicted of Rape .01 .09 
     'Other' Race/Ethnicity .02 .14       Convicted of Robbery .04 .20 
     Male Defendant .83 .38       Convicted of Assault  .08 .27 
     Age (in years) 31.21 10.25       Convicted of 'Other' Violent Offense .04 .19 
     Active Criminal Justice Status .42 .49       Convicted of Burglary .08 .27 
     Prior Felony Arrest(s) .70 .46       Convicted of Larceny/Theft .10 .30 
     Prior Misdemeanor Arrest(s) .70 .46       Convicted of Motor Vehicle Theft .04 .20 
     Prior Felony Conviction(s) .50 .50       Convicted of Fraud/Forgery .06 .24 
     Prior Misdemeanor Conviction(s) .55 .50       Convicted of Other Property Offense .05 .21 
     Served Time in Jail .50 .50       Convicted of Drug Sale(s) .16 .37 
     Served Time in Prison .25 .43       Convicted of Drug Possession .22 .41 
         Convicted of Weapons Offense .03 .18 
  Case Characteristics         Convicted of Driving/Other Public Order/Other .08 .27 
     Multiple Arrest Charges .60 .49       Felony Offense   
     Pretrial Detention Prior to Conviction .54 .50     
     Public Defender Legal Representation .62 .48         
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 The results in Table 4.1 also reveal a good deal of variation in the types of 
communities in which these defendants were processed.  Turning first to legal context, 
just over half of the counties operated in states with determinate sentencing.  The reason 
this figure is somewhat high is that many of the counties in the data set (40% of all 
county-years) come from California (one of the first states to enact determinate 
sentencing in the 1970s) owing to its large size and certainty of being selected into the 
SCPS sample.  A quarter of the counties are in guideline states: 14% are located in 
jurisdictions with presumptive guidelines, while just over 10% of the counties operate 
under advisory guidelines.  Jurisdictions also vary widely in the degree to which they 
function in states that have embraced more punitive legislative policies. For instance, 
44% of the counties (many of which are located in California) are located in states where 
any current felony conviction potentially qualifies under a “three-strikes and you’re out” 
policy.  The average percentage of sentences offenders must serve varies substantially.  
While the average is 66%, this ranges from zero in some counties to as high as 100% of 
the sentence imposed in Michigan and Ohio (see Appendix A).   Jurisdictions vary 
considerably in the extent the availability of mandatory enhancements that may be 
applied at sentencing.  States average approximately ten mandatory enhancements that 
are triggered by aggravating factors commonly targeted by state penal codes (i.e., 
weapons use, bodily harm, protected victims, and crimes committed while under state 
supervision).  Arizona leads the sample in the number of mandatory enhancements with 
26, while New Jersey has the fewest number of enhancements (2).  More striking 
variation is observed in the minimum sentences state statutes impose for the possession 
and sale of the minimum felony amount (28g) of cocaine.  The average sentence in 
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months for the sale of 1 oz of cocaine is 35 months, but this ranges from counties with no 
statutory minimum term of incarceration to a minimum as high as 120 months (10 years) 
in Georgia.  The average statutory minimum is somewhat lower for possession of 1 oz. of 
cocaine (21 months), but yet again this ranges from a low of no minimum in some states 
up to 10 years in Georgia, and over five years in Tennessee (figures not shown).  
 Table 4.1 also indicates that defendants are processed in courts that vary 
considerably in their levels of jail and prison crowding, correctional spending, and 
prosecutor caseload pressure.  Overall, the level of prison crowding is substantial.  The 
typical county is located in a state that is over capacity by 10%.  The monthly fees states 
and counties charge probationers exhibits substantial variation as well.  Most states 
charge probationers supervision fees at an average of $34 per month.  However, several 
counties do not charge probationers for their supervision and Florida leads the sample 
with a base supervision fee of $76 per month.   Variables tapping social context of the 
communities demonstrate that most of the jurisdictions, on average, have diverse 
populations (18% black, 19% Hispanic).  The average level of income inequality 
(measured by the Gini coefficient) was .44, which is slightly lower than the national 
average Gini coefficient of .46 in 2000.  The aggregated GSS measures tapping public 
sentiment and interpersonal trust indicate that counties exhibit relatively high average 
levels of fear (47%) and support for capital punishment (64%), and are, on average, only 
moderately conservative (4.02 on a scale from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely 
conservative)).  Unfortunately, the index scores for social trust, fundamentalism and 
cohesion do not provide an indicator of the overall levels of these measures since the 
transformation of the raw metric to z-scores changes the metric of each variable (i.e., a 
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mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1).  However, these standardized scales are 
useful at providing a ‘rank ordering’ of each county relative to the sample distribution 
overall.   That data (not shown) show that Christian fundamentalism is highest in 
Alabama, parts of Florida, and Missouri counties, and lowest in Seattle, Phoenix, San 
Diego, and Palm Beach County, Florida. The GSS data also indicate that racial 
resentment is highest in Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee counties, and below average 
in Seattle and San Francisco.   Social trust varies substantially as well.  Miami, St. Louis 
and Baltimore exhibit below average levels of interpersonal trust, while Michigan 
counties tend to exhibit average levels of social trust.  Social trust is highest (by more 
than two standard deviations) in Palm Beach County in Florida, Seattle, Washington, and 
Rochester, New York. 
 
RESULTS OF HIERARCHICAL MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION MODELS 
UNCONDITIONAL MODEL 
 Table 4.2 displays the results of an intercepts-only model estimating the overall 
average probability of prison, jail, and probation, as well as the degree to which these 
mean estimates vary across counties and states. The model, which contains no level-one 
or level-two predictors, is a useful first step toward gauging the extent to which the 
probability of each outcome varies among county and state jurisdictions.  The intercept 
(γ000) in the unconditional model for the first outcome shown (prison vs. jail) is a point 
estimate of the average log-odds of receiving a prison vs. a jail sentence across 
jurisdictions.  When converted to a conditional probability, the average odds of receiving 
a prison versus a jail sentence is (exp{.642}/(1+exp{.642} + exp{.431}) = .42 (or 42%), 
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which closely approximates the observed prevalence of prison sentences in the sample 
(38%).37  However, counties vary significantly around this overall mean probability of 
prison.  Table 4.2 displays the conditional probabilities at 1 standard deviation above and 
below the overall mean probability.  Going back to prison vs. jail, the results in Table 4.2 
show that while the overall conditional probability of receiving a prison sentence is .42, 
this probability fluctuates between an average of .28 (a probability of 28%) in some 
counties up to .58 (i.e., a 58% probability of prison) for counties 1 standard deviation 
above the overall grand mean.  The results are similar when comparing the conditional 
probability of prison versus probation. The intercept indicates that the overall expected 
log-odds of receiving prison versus probation is .210, or in terms of a conditional 
probability can be computed as (exp{0.21}/(1+exp{0.21} + exp{-0.431}) = .42, or 42%.  
                                                
37 Conditional probabilities for the reference category (Jail in Model 1, Probation in Models 2 and 3) are 
calculated using the following equation:  
 
Conditional probabilities for prison in Models 1 and 2 are calculated using the following equation: 
 
 
The conditional probability for jail in Model 3 is calculated using: 
 
Estimation of the variance of the conditional probabilities for the non-reference categories in the models 
above are calculated by adding and subtracting 1 standard deviation of level 2 to the average effect (e.g. 
.642 ± .638 in Model 1) and repeating the above calculations.  For Prison: 
 
 
For Jail: 
 
Examples of these formulas are provided in Holleran and Spohn (2002) and Raudenbush et al. (2004). 
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While the overall probability of prison should not change between these two outcomes 
(i.e., it should remain .42 in both outcomes), the degree to which counties vary around 
this estimate does.  Thus, while the overall probability of prison versus probation is .42, 
this probability fluctuates between .27 and .601 for the counties in the sample.  The 
unconditional mean probability of receiving jail versus probation is   
(exp{-0.431}/(1+exp{0.21} +exp{-0.431}) = .22 (approximately 22%), but this too 
fluctuates between .116 in some jurisdictions and .393 in others.  
 The variance components displayed at the bottom of Table 4.1 indicate that the 
average log-odds of each of the outcomes varies significantly across counties and states, 
with jail versus probation exhibiting the largest degree of variation across counties (s2 = 
.636*) and states (s2 =1.31*).  One noteworthy finding revealed in this table is that the 
state-level variance in the probability of prison versus jail (.733*) is nearly double the 
size of the variance in the odds of prison vs. jail at the county-level (.407*).  The results 
are similar for jail versus probation, where the amount of variance at the state level 
(1.31*) is more than double the size of county-level variance component (.636*).  This 
suggests, at least initially, that state legal and organizational context may play an 
important role in explaining jurisdictional variation in sentencing. While intriguing, the 
results pertaining to the degree of state-level variance should be interpreted with caution 
due to the small sample size of states at level-three.  Small group-level sample sizes 
challenge the ability of the models to generate reliable variance components (Raudenbush 
and Bryk, 2002).  In linear hierarchical linear models, a level-one variance component is 
provided which allows for the calculation of an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC).  
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The ICC decomposes the amount of variance within versus between counties and states.  
This output is not available for nonlinear models. 
 
LEVEL-ONE FIXED EFFECTS 
 Table 4.3 presents the results of a hierarchical multinomial regression model in 
which the effects of level-one case characteristics are estimated.  Given the consistent 
finding that most variability in sentencing can be attributed to legally-relevant 
characteristics such as prior criminal history and offense severity, as well as process 
factors associated with mode of adjudication and pretrial detention, fitting a model that 
controls for these fixed effects is critical to isolating the effects of hypothesized level-two 
variables.  Because level-one effects are not the primary focus of this research (they are 
treated merely as controls), my discussion of these findings is brief.   
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Table 4.2.  Results for Unconditional HGLM Analyses Predicting the Average Log Odds of Prison, Jail or Noncustodial Sanction     
  Full Sample of Felony Cases (N = 26,354)  
  Prison vs. Jail   Prison vs. Probation   Jail vs. Probation  
Fixed Effects  b  SE   b  SE   b  SE   	  
   Intercept g000  .642*  .219   .210  .175   -.431  .287   	  
                 	  
County Variation in Estimated 
Probability                 	  
   -1 SD  .283     .270     .116     	  
   Overall Mean Conditional Probability   .428     .428     .225     	  
   +1 SD  .586     .601     .393     	  
                 	  
Random Effects  s2  SD   s2   SD   s2  SD   	  
   Defendants (Level 1)  --  --   --  --   --  --   	  
   Counties (Level 2)  .407*  .638   .493*  .702   .636*  .798   	  
   States (Level 3)  .733*  .856   .402*  .634   1.31*  1.14   	  
                                 	  
Note: n = 91 at level 2; n = 19 at level 3;  *p < .05.                 	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Turning first to defendant characteristics, the findings are consistent with much of the 
prior research on sentencing.  On average, male defendants face significantly higher odds 
of being incarcerated in prison or jail compared with females.  When compared with 
whites, black and Latino defendants are significantly more likely to receive a prison 
sentence versus probation, and significantly more likely to go to jail versus probation.  
The effects of race and ethnicity are null for the model contrasting the odds of receiving 
prison versus jail.  As expected, having a prior criminal record (i.e., having an active 
status, a prior felony arrest or conviction, prior incarceration) is generally associated with 
significantly higher odds of receiving a prison sentence versus jail or probation.  One of 
the strongest predictors of receiving a prison sentence versus jail is pretrial detention (b = 
.836*).  The odds of prison versus jail is [exp(.836*)]  2.3 times higher for those who do 
not secure their release before conviction.  Consistent with expectations, the severity of 
the conviction charge is the strongest predictor of sentence type in the model.  For 
instance, the odds of prison versus jail is [exp(4.83*)] 125 times higher for defendants 
convicted of murder and [exp(1.29*)]  3.5 times higher for defendants convicted of rape. 
 One of the primary purposes of estimating a random-intercept model controlling 
for level-one covariates is to obtain the overall log-odds of each outcome that is adjusted 
for variance in the types of cases courts process. In all but one exception (jail versus 
prison), introducing level-one covariates into the model does not reduce any of the 
significant residual variation initially reported in the unconditional model.  Rather, taking 
into account cross-jurisdictional compositional differences marginally increases the 
amount of county and state variance in the overall log-odds of each outcome.  The 
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remainder of the analyses in this chapter examines the effects of county-level variables 
that are hypothesized to explain this residual variation.
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Table 4.3.  Hierarchical Multinomial Regressions of Incarceration vs. Probation:  The Effects of 
Case-Level Characteristics 
 Prison  Prison  Jail  
 vs.  vs.   vs.  
Fixed Effects           Jail   Probation   Probation   
            
  Defendant Characteristics       
     Male .326*  .485*  .159*  
 (.049)  (.056)  .049  
     Non-Latino Black (Reference = White) -.003  .249*  .252*  
 (.047)  (.054)  (.050)  
     Hispanic (any race) -.015  .312*  .327*  
 (.049)  (.062)  (.057)  
     Other Race -.083  -.033  .050  
 (.126)  (.158)  (.137)  
     Race/Ethnicity Missing .197*  .264*  .068  
 (.087)  (.109)  (.104)  
     Age .004  .004  .0003  
 (.002)  (.002)  (.002)  
     Age (squared) -.001*  -.001  -.0004*  
 (.0001)  (.0002)  (.0001)  
    Active Criminal Justice Status .354*  .387*  .033  
 (.038)  (.047)  (.046)  
     Prior Misd. Arrest(s) -.071  -.042  .029  
 (.052)  (.059)  (.055)  
     Prior Felony Arrest(s) .149*  .271*  .123*  
 (.052)  (.060)  (.054)  
     Prior Misd. Conviction(s) -.147*  -.095  .052  
 (.051)  (.059)  (.056)  
     Prior Felony Convictions(s) .779*  -701*  -.078  
 (.049)  (.059)  (.056)  
     Served Prior Jail Term(s) -.052  .302*  .354*  
 (.049)  (.057)  (.055)  
     Served Prior Prison Term(s) 1.110*  1.180*  .069  
 (.046)  (.061)  (.063)  
  Case Characteristics       
     Multiple Arrest Charges .269*  .397*  .128*  
 (.038)  (.047)  (.043)  
     Pretrial Detention .836*  1.670*  .834*  
 (.039)  (.046)  (.044)  
     Public Defender -.239*  -.125*  .115*  
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 (.042)  (.050)  (.046)  
     Entered Guilty Plea -.741*  -.352*  .390*  
 (.089)  (.090)  (.096)  
     Murder Conviction (Reference =  
     Assault) 4.827*  3.176*  -1.651  
 (1.014)  (.557)  (1.139)  
     Rape Conviction 1.292*  1.530*  .238  
 (.203)  (.255)  (.271)  
     Robbery Conviction 1.296*  1.093*  -.203  
 (.106)  (.134)  (.142)  
     Other Violent Crime Conviction .016  -.010  -.026  
 (.098)  (.128)  (.120)  
     Burglary Conviction .134  .175  .041  
 (.080)  (.108)  (.104)  
     Larceny/Theft Conviction -.430*  -.642*  -.213*  
 (.080)  (.100)  (.093)  
     Motor Vehicle Theft Conviction -.233*  .011  .244  
 (.095)  (.140)  (.132)  
     Fraud/Forgery Conviction -.401*  .887*  -.487*  
 (.094)  (.112)  (.101)  
     Other Property Crime Conviction -.290*  -.497*  -.207  
 (.097)  (.120)  (.113)  
     Drug Sale Conviction .084  -.038  -.122  
 (.070)  (.090)  (.086)  
     Drug Possession Conviction -.553*  -1.250*  -.697*  
 (.070)  (.088)  (.082)  
     Weapons Offense Conviction -.045  -.081  -.036  
 (.104)  (.130)  (.126)  
     Driving/Other Public Order/Other 
Felony -.252*  -.117  .134  
         Conviction (.083)  (.106)  (.099)  
       
Random Effects       
Level 2 Intercept .429*  .647*  .665*  
Chi-Square 1043.703  1071.996  1370.692  
Level 3 Intercept .969*  .584*  1.258*  
Chi-Square 222.248   95.254   230.356   
Note: Level 2 n = 91 counties; Level 3 n = 19 states; *p < .05, two-tailed test; standard errors in 
parentheses.   
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THE EFFECS OF LEGAL CONTEXT 
 One of the primary questions guiding this research is whether state sentencing 
policy choices significantly impact the severity of sentencing above and beyond the 
effects of legally-relevant factors such as offense severity and prior criminal history.  
Sentencing policies are frequently invoked as the primary reasons why many states in the 
U.S. experienced growth in their incarceration rates after 1980 (Engen, 2009).  Two 
recent studies investigating the factors associated with changes in incarceration rates over 
time have found evidence consistent with this argument (Spelman, 2009; Stemen et al., 
2005).  In a recent and exhaustive study, Spelman (2009) finds that public sentiment, 
social conditions, and political climate explain little of the escalation in prison use over 
the past 30 years.  Rather, a central factor contributing to the expanded use of 
incarceration during a period of falling crime rates is changing penal policy.  In 
particular, three of the findings from Spelman’s study inform the current analysis: that 
presumptive guidelines tend to slow prison growth, while truth-in-sentencing laws and 
the war on drugs appear to fuel the growth of incarcerated populations (see also Sorenson 
and Stemen, 2003; Zhang et al., 2009).  These findings join a number of earlier macro 
level studies of incarceration that suggest that sentencing policies (more so than social 
conditions and crime rates) exert significant influences on the likelihood that judges 
impose incarceration.  The purpose of this analysis is to examine these possibilities using 
sentencing data, which are uniquely positioned to examine the impacts of policies on a 
specific stage of the legal process, thereby avoiding the confounding of arrests, 
convictions, incarceration, and release decisions (as stock incarceration rates do).  
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Several regression models were estimated that examine the effects of legal 
context on sentencing outcomes.  Because scholars have placed significant emphasis on 
the war on drugs as a key factor responsible for the more punitive social control in the 
past 30 years (Beckett and Sasson, 2000; Spelman, 2009), I estimated the effects of legal 
context on both the full felony sample and then estimated a set of separate models 
examining the effects of legal context on the sentencing of drug offenders specifically.  
For these latter models, I broadened the specification to include laws specific to drug 
crimes.  Having estimated the main effects of legal policies on sentencing, additional 
models were estimated that examined whether two policies that base sentencing on a 
defendant’s prior record (three-strikes laws and presumptive sentencing guidelines) 
indirectly increase the severity of sentencing by increasing the impact of having a prior 
criminal history on sentencing.  
I turn first to the results in Table 4.4 showing the effects of legal variables on the 
processing of all felony defendants.  The results for models predicting sentencing 
outcomes for drug offenders are presented in Table 4.5, and the results for models that 
estimate cross-level interactions are displayed in Table 4.6.  These models, and every 
other presented for the remainder of the chapter, control for each of the level-one 
predictors included in the Level-one model displayed in Table 4.3.  The level-one 
estimates are not shown because they remained virtually identical in each of the models 
presented throughout the remainder of the chapter. 
Model 1 of Table 4.4 presents the results of a baseline model that estimates 
changes in the average log-odds of prison, jail, and probation when accounting for 
variation in the structure and severity of state legal policies.  Six variables are entered 
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into the equation predicting sentence type for the full sample of SCPS cases:  
presumptive and voluntary guidelines, determinate sentencing, the percentage of 
sentences most offenders must serve (i.e. truth in sentencing), the presence of a three-
strikes law, and the mandatory minimum score.  This baseline model reveals that, 
controlling for the effects of the level 1 covariates, the odds of prison versus probation 
doubles for defendants convicted in counties operating under determinate sentencing 
[(exp=(.798*)] = 2.22.   Three-strikes laws and a higher mandatory minimum score are 
associated with a significant decrease in the odds of prison versus jail.  Specifically, for 
every 1-unit increase above the average number of mandatory minimum enhancements in 
a jurisdiction, the odds [exp(-.069)=.93] of prison versus jail declines by 7%  
([1-.93]*100).  Similarly, the odds of prison versus jail (exp[-.804] = .44) is significantly 
lower in for defendants processed in counties with three-strikes laws.   
The effect of three-strikes law is not consistent across outcomes.  While three-
strikes is associated with lower odds of prison, the results for models estimating the odds 
of jail versus probation reveal that defendants face significantly higher odds of jail versus 
probation in jurisdictions located within states with three-strikes laws.  The odds of jail 
more than double  (exp[1.05*]=2.85) when defendants are processed in three-strikes 
jurisdictions.  The presence of voluntary and presumptive guidelines and the severity of a 
state’s time-served requirements are not significantly related to any of the sentencing 
outcomes.  Thus, contrary to expectations, it does not appear that a more punitive legal 
culture independently increases the severity of sentencing.  Somewhat unexpected, three-
strikes laws are associated with a higher probability of jail versus probation, an outcome 
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that when compared to prison, should be less sensitive to the effects of three-strikes laws 
which mandate long periods of incarceration.   
An additional model was fitted that includes controls for prison and jail capacities 
and county index crime rates because prior research has shown that these types of local 
concerns may mediate the potential impact of state-level regulations guiding sentencing 
(e.g., Engen and Steen, 2000; Merrit et al., 2006; Ulmer, 1997).  These controls were 
entered into the equation because low crime rates may reduce the willingness of some 
jurisdictions to act upon more punitive laws that were passed in the wake of a peak in 
U.S. crime rates, and because the severity of state legal policies (or the willingness to 
comply with them) may be highly correlated with the severity of a jurisdiction’s crime 
problem.  Second, any influence of punitive sentencing laws that are believed to have 
contributed to a growth in incarceration may be highly correlated with jail and prison 
crowding that may flow from the passage of such laws.   
Model 2 in Table 4.4 displays the results from this full specification.  The results 
reveal that once controlling for crime rates and correctional capacities, only determinate 
sentencing retains its significant influence on sentencing, and for only the model 
predicting the log-odds of prison versus probation.  The coefficient for determinate 
sentencing (b = .759*) indicates that the average odds of prison versus probation double 
(exp[.759*] = 2.14) when sentenced in a jurisdiction operating under determinate 
sentencing.  This finding is consistent with literature that casts the adoption of 
determinate sentencing as a move towards a philosophy of deterrence and incapacitation, 
but it contradicts findings from macro level studies that incarceration rates are 
significantly lower in states with determinate sentencing.  Though only speculative, one 
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interpretation of the positive effect reported here might be that judges in determinate 
sentencing states may be reluctant to sentence offenders to prison if they know that 
prisoners have no prospect of parole release.  
Consistent with macro level research on incarceration, the presence of 
presumptive guidelines is associated with less severe sentencing in general, but the effect 
does not achieve statistical significance. In addition, truth in sentencing provisions and 
the mandatory minimum score exert no significant influence over sentencing outcomes. 
The variance components for the full model (Model 2) indicate that although few 
of the variables were significant, controlling for these legal factors explained a substantial 
portion of the between-county and state residual variance.  For instance, entering these 
legal variables into the model reduced the state-level variance component for prison 
versus probation from .647* in the level-one fixed effects model to .233* (a 64% 
reduction).  The largest amount of variance left unexplained by the level-one fixed effects 
model was for the log-odds of jail versus probation (1.258*).  Table 4.4 reveals that after 
adjusting for legal context, the amount of between-state variation in the odds of jail is 
reduced by half (from 1.258 to .600*).  While significant variation remains, this is a 
substantial drop in the residual variation and calls attention to a need for future studies 
that analyze SCPS data to model variability both across counties and states. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from these results. There is widespread belief 
that certain sentencing policies have widened the net of offenders sent to prisons and 
jails.  It is not evident from the case-level data used in the current study that more 
punitive sentencing policies necessarily disadvantage defendants. While the present study 
represents only a modest attempt at examining the effects of policies on sentencing, the 
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results reported here do not provide evidence to suggest that the risks of incarceration are 
lower on average in states with more structured sentencing (as found in macro level 
incarceration research), nor is the severity of sentencing significantly higher in 
jurisdictions with more punitive legal climates (measured by the presence of mandatory 
penalties and three-strikes laws).  The next set of models examine whether these 
conclusions hold when examining legal outcomes in drug cases. 
Table 4.5 presents results from a baseline and fully specified model examining the 
effects of legal context on the sentencing of drug offenders.  Each model includes a 
control variable at level 1 which indicates whether the defendant was convicted of drug 
sales or manufacturing versus felony drug possession.  Because the results do not change 
substantially across the two models, I discuss only the results of the fully specified model 
(Model 2).  Turning first to the effects of non-drug related laws the results for Model 2 
indicate that the odds of prison (versus jail or versus probation) are significantly lower for 
drug offenders convicted in counties that require offenders to serve a longer portion of 
their minimum sentence.  The parameter estimate (b= -.027*) for the model predicting 
the odds of prison versus jail indicates that a 1-standard deviation (26.74) increase in the 
percentage of sentences offenders must serve is associated with a .49 change in the odds 
of receiving a prison sentence [exp(.-.027*26.74)= .485].  Expressed another way, a 1-
standard deviation increase in the time-served requirement (26.74) corresponds to a 51% 
decrease [(exp(-.027*26.74)-1)*100] in the odds of prison versus jail.  The graph in 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the magnitude of the association in terms of changes in the 
conditional probability of prison.  The graph shows that the estimated probability of 
prison versus jail is approximately .65 (or, a 65% probability of prison) in jurisdictions 
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that require offenders to serve only 15% of their incarceration terms.  This probability of 
prison drops by over half (i.e., below .30) in counties that require most offenders to serve 
over 75% of their fixed or minimum sentence.  This significant effect of TIS 
requirements is not observed for the felony sample over all and it persists independent of 
any influence that minimum statutory penalties for cocaine exert on sentencing. This 
finding may signal a reluctance among prosecutors and judges to sentence drug offenders 
to prison in jurisdictions where these offenders are certain to serve a higher proportion of 
their sentence before being eligible for parole. This might indicate that judges and 
prosecutors in these jurisdictions wish to reserve imprisonment for serious property and 
violent offenders.  
The results in Model 2 also indicate that drug offenders are significantly less 
likely to be sentenced to prison versus probation in three-strikes jurisdictions.  The slope 
coefficient (b = -1.39) indicates a -75% change in the odds of prison versus jail  
(exp[-1.39]= .249) for drug offenders convicted in a three-strikes jurisdiction. Contrary to 
expectations, the mandatory minimum score for drug crimes was unrelated to the severity 
of sentencing for drug offenders.  Supplementary models (not shown) were estimated to 
explore whether the number of drug-crime mandatory enhancements significantly 
influenced sentencing in the absence of controls for drug sale and possession statutory 
minimums.  The results did not change.  Though the implications of mandatory minimum 
enhancements are the subject of considerable debate, the results reported here suggest 
that sentencing is not significantly more punitive in states with more enhancements.  
Though the data cannot address the issue, one possible interpretation is that judges and 
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 208 
prosecutors in urban courts choose not to evoke mandatory enhancements for most drug 
offenders. 
The findings in Model 2 (Table 4.5) also reveal that drug offenders face a 
significantly higher probability of going to prison versus probation in jurisdictions with 
higher minimum sentences for the sale of 1 oz. of cocaine.  The effect is fairly substantial 
in magnitude and maintains significance after controlling for crime rates and prison and 
jail capacity constraints.  Holding constant all other level-one and level-two predictors, a 
one standard deviation increase in the minimum sentence (25 months) for the sale of one 
ounce of cocaine corresponds to a 1.77 increase  (exp[.023*25]) (or 77%) increase in the 
odds of being sentenced to prison versus probation.  The graph in Figure 4.3 illustrates 
more precisely the impact of more punitive drug statutes on the probability that drug 
offenders are sentenced to prison versus probation.  Several states in the sample have no 
minimum sentence for the sale of 1 ounce of cocaine.  In these jurisdictions, the 
probability of prison is estimated to be around 38% (.38).  However, as you move along 
to the right of the graph, the probability of prison versus probation is estimated to be as 
high as 78% in jurisdictions that mandate a minimum sentence of at least 100 months (8 
years).   These findings suggest that state legal context exerts a significant influence on 
the outcomes of drug cases and helps to account for why drug offenders face substantially 
higher risks of incarceration in certain jurisdictions. Differences in state penal statutes are 
not often discussed in the extant contextual sentencing research, where researchers place 
a heavier focus on socioeconomic explanations for understanding community differences 
in sentencing severity.  However, these findings suggest that states vary substantially in 
their legal approach to the sentencing of drug offenders in ways that generate significant 
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variability in the risks of incarceration when convicted of a drug offense. This finding 
provides support for legal models in the Weberian tradition, which view legal decision 
making as a highly rationalized process driven by rules and the law, rather than crime 
rates or organizational constraints.  At the same time, the results as a whole also seem to 
suggest that policies labeled as inherently punitive appear to wield little influence on the 
severity of sentences above and beyond any impact of case-level factors.  Another 
unexpected finding is that more punitive policies are associated with more lenient 
sanctions in certain cases.  For instance, sentencing tends to be significantly more lenient 
for drug offenders convicted in jurisdictions with more punitive legal statutes.  This may 
signal resistance among courtroom personnel in some jurisdictions to state-level attempts 
to institute harsher sanctions in ways that supplant judicial discretion by either mandating 
incarceration and/or a longer duration sentence.
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Table 4.4. Hierarchical Multinomial Regressions of Incarceration vs. Probation in Felony Cases: The Main Effects of Legal Context 
   (1)      (2)   
 (Full Sample of Felony Cases; N = 26,354)  (Full Sample of Felony Cases; N = 26,354) 
 Prison  Prison  Jail  Prison  Prison  Jail 
 vs.  vs.   vs.  vs.  vs.   vs. 
Fixed Effects           Jail   Probation   Probation  Jail   Probation   Probation 
Intercept  (γ000) .785*  .207  -.531  .705*  .252  -.454 
 (.326)  (.327)  (.414)  (.340)  (.293)  (.380) 
     Presumptive Guidelines -.263  -.700  -.478  -.287  -.461  -.174 
 (.327)  (.362)  (.389)  (.334)  (.355)  (.378) 
     Voluntary Guidelines .098  -.578  -.894  .239  -.411  -.650 
 (.478)  (.469)  (.565)  (.475  (.437)  (.529) 
     Determinate Sentencing -.203  .798*  .892  -.067  .759*  .826 
 (.405)  (.393)  (.513)  (.416)  (.247)  (.467) 
     % Sentence Imposed Offenders Required to Serve -.008  -.007  .004  -.011  -.010  .001 
 (.008)  (.007)  (.010)  (.008)  (.007)  (.009) 
     Three Strikes Law  -.804*  .196  1.05*  -.821  .093  .913 
 (.403)  (.398)  (.522)  (.423)  (.350)  (.474) 
     Mandatory Enhancement Score -.069*  -.012  .035  .047  -.013  .034 
 (.035)  (.028)  (.037)  (.030)  (.025)  (.033) 
Control Variables            
     Prison Capacity Constraints       -.005  .008  .013* 
       (.005)  (.005)  (.006) 
     Jail Capacity Constraints       -.002  -.001  .001 
       (.005)  (.005)  (.005) 
     County Index Crime Rate       .00003  -.0001  .0001 
       (.00005)  (.0001)  (.00005) 
Random Effects            
Level 2 Intercept .428  .593  .611  .414  .591  .565 
Chi-Square            
Level 3 Intercept .418*  .374*  .766*  .489*  .233*  .600* 
Chi-Square 99.68  62.4  101.9  112.07  46.12  87.18 
Note:  † < .056; *p < .05, two-tailed test.  Level 2 n = 91 counties; Level 2 n = 19 states; standard errors in parentheses.     
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Table 4.5.  Hierarchical Multinomial Regressions of Incarceration vs. Probation:  The Main Effects of Legal Context 
   (1)      (2)   
 (Drug Cases; N = 10,167)  (Drug Cases; N = 10,167) 
 Prison  Prison  Jail  Prison  Prison  Jail 
 vs.  vs.   vs.  vs.  vs.   vs. 
Fixed Effects           Jail   Probation   Probation  Jail   Probation   Probation 
Intercept  (γ000) 1.11*  .533  -.581  1.099*  .539  -.560 
 (.515)  (.304)  (.469)  (.541)  (.364)  (.595) 
Sentencing Structure            
     Presumptive Guidelines -.393  -.594  -.201  -.353  -.562  -.209 
 (.432)  (.395)  (.455)  (.449)  (.409)  (.477) 
     Voluntary Guidelines -.065  -1.29*  -1.23  -.126  -932  -.807 
 (.687)  (.487)  (.645)  (.703)  (.537)  (.740) 
     Determinate Sentencing -.214  .296  .510  -.219  .389  .607 
 (.538)  (.334)  (.495)  (.565)  (.393)  (.625) 
Indicators of Punitive Legal Culture            
     % Sentence Imposed Offenders Required to    
     Serve -.026*  -.023*  .002  -.027*  -.020*  .006 
 (.011)  (.007)  (.010)  (.011)  (.008)  (.012) 
     Three Strikes Law  -1.45*  -.616  .835  -1.393*  -.809  .583 
 (.611)  (.372)  (.551)  (.643)  (.435)  (.702) 
     Mandatory Enhancement Score --  --  --  --  --  -- 
 --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Punitive Legal Culture for Drug Offenses and Offenders           
     Mandatory Enhancements for Drug Offenses -.004  -.025  -.020  -.017  .002  .019 
 (.034)  (.020)  (.031)  (.037)  (.026)  (.040) 
     Min Sentence (months) 1 oz Sale of Cocaine .007  .017*  .010  .005  .023*  .018 
 (.013)  (.009)  (.012)  (.014)  (.010)  (.015) 
     Min Sentence (months) 1 oz. Possession of  
     Cocaine -.014  -.030*  -.016  -.013  -.010  -.019 
 (.015)  (.010)  (.014)  (.016)  (.011)  (.017) 
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Control Variables 
     Prison Capacity Constraints       -.007  .021*  .028* 
       (.006)  (.006)  (.006) 
     Jail Capacity Constraints       -.007  -.005  .001 
       (.006)  (.006)  (.006) 
     County Index Crime Rate       .00001  -.00005  -.00006 
       (.00006)  (.00006)  (.00006) 
Random Effects            
Level 2 Intercept .522  .872  .946  .493  .647  .578 
Chi-Square            
Level 3 Intercept .735*  .101*  .495*  .834*  .252*  1.041* 
Chi-Square 121.5  30.3  60.04  134.51  47.47  131.55 
N = 23,356                       
Note:  *p < .05, two-tailed test.  Level 2 n = 91 counties; Level 2 n = 19 states; standard errors in 
parentheses.       
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THE CONDITIONING EFFECTS OF LEGAL POLICIES 
Another possibility not considered in prior multilevel sentencing research (and which 
cannot be examined with purely macro level data) is whether sentencing reforms indirectly 
contribute to jurisdictional variation in punishment by modifying the effect of criminal history on 
the sentencing process.  As a case in point, macro level research, which finds that presumptive 
guidelines are associated with lower incarceration rates and slower growth in those rates may be 
picking up on more nuanced indirect ways that policies have impacted the behavior of judges 
(see e.g., Marvell and Moody, 1996; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Sorenson and Stemen, 2003; 
Zhang et al., 2009).  A series of random-slope and cross-level interaction models tested this 
hypothesis.  The expectation is that although several multilevel and macro level studies report a 
significant negative relationship between guidelines and imprisonment, another possibility not 
considered in prior research is that sentencing in many jurisdictions in the U.S. has become more 
punitive because certain policies have elevated the importance judges give to prior criminal 
history.   
There is good reason to expect that the meaning of having a prior record has changed in 
recent years.  Sentencing guidelines were promulgated at the Federal level and in several states 
dating back to the 1980s as a way to formally rationalize the sentencing process (Ulmer and 
Kramer, 1996).  Presumptive guidelines in states like Washington, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota 
expressly consider an offender’s prior criminal history (in conjunction with offense severity) 
when deciding sentencing.  This raises the possibility that the meaning of having a prior criminal 
record is different in these jurisdictions, where judges are not permitted (except in exceptional 
cases) to overlook prior record when sentencing.  This suggests that presumptive guidelines may 
indirectly increase the probability of incarceration because it gives explicit, mathematical weight 
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to criminal history at sentencing.  I tested this hypothesis in two models that interacted 
presumptive guidelines with having a prior felony conviction and having served a prior prison 
term.38  The results shown in Model 1 (Panel A) of Table 4.6 indicate that for the outcome 
comparing the odds of jail versus probation, the odds of jail are significantly higher for 
defendants with a prior felony conviction who are convicted in presumptive guideline 
jurisdictions (b = .509*).  It should be noted that the effect should be interpreted with caution 
though since neither of the main effects of felony conviction or guidelines is significant.  
Nevertheless, the bar chart displayed in Figure 4.4 does suggest meaningful differences in the 
effects of prior felony conviction for defendants convicted in guideline versus non-guideline 
states.  For instance, the far right bar of the graph represents the probability (.40, or 40%) of jail 
for prior felons convicted in a guideline state.  This effect is noticeably larger than the effect of a 
prior felony conviction in non-guideline states. The conditional probability of jail nearly doubles 
for ex-cons who are convicted in guideline states.  As you can see by looking at the second bar 
from the left, the predicted probability of jail for prior felons convicted is non-guideline states is 
approximately .25 (or 25%), compared with .40 for prior felons convicted in guideline states. 
These results suggest that all else being equal, a defendant with a prior felony conviction is 
expected to face a significantly higher probability of going to jail compared with defendants with 
prior felonies who are convicted in non-guideline states.  These findings support the hypothesis 
that presumptive guidelines may indirectly increase the severity of sentencing by amplifying the 
effect of having a prior criminal record. 
Contradicting this pattern, the results for Model 2 (Panel A of Table 4.6) contrasting the 
odds of prison versus jail indicate that offenders who have ever served a prior prison term are 
                                                
38 Initial estimates (not shown) revealed that both slopes (prior felony conviction and prior prison stay) varied 
significantly across county jurisdictions, and that the magnitude of the variance was surprisingly large, with the 
variance component exceeding .500 for prior felony conviction. 
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treated more leniently in guideline jurisdictions (b = -.930*) than they are in non-guideline 
jurisdictions. The overall main effect of having a prior felony conviction is positive and 
significant (b = .585*) which corresponds to (1-exp(.585)*100) an 80% increase in the odds of 
prison versus jail if a defendant ever served a prior prison term.  However, the magnitude of this 
positive effect is reduced substantially in guideline states.  Figure 4.5 best illustrates the 
magnitude of the difference.  The bars to the far right of the graph illustrate that guidelines 
appear to have an “equalizing” effect on the odds of prison versus jail for those who have served 
a prior prison term.  That is, all else being equal, the predicted probability of going back to 
prison for these individuals is roughly equivalent (and actually marginally lower) to the 
probability of prison for defendants who have not served a prior prison term.   However, the 
effect of having served a prior prison term results in substantially higher odds of going back to 
prison for defendants convicted in non-guidelines states.  As shown in Figure 4.5, in non-
guideline states the probability of prison for defendants with a prior prison term is over 50% 
(.53), compared with a conditional probability of 33% (.33) for prior prison inmates convicted in 
guideline states.  The results from these models suggest that while guideline systems may 
increase the odds of some type of incarceration time (i.e., jail versus probation), that the 
guideline recommendations might actually constrain more punitive sanctions against ex-cons 
compared with states who may be permitted by law (i.e., have greater discretionary authority) to 
send a much more harsh message to repeat offenders.  It is noteworthy that the ability of 
presumptive guidelines to reduce the punitive impact of being an ex-con is consistent with the 
theme from macro level incarceration research which finds presumptive guidelines to be 
significantly associated with a lower rate of prison admissions (Sorenson and Stemen, 2003).  
However, it is difficult to reconcile why guidelines might reduce prison for those who have 
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served a prior prison term but increase the odds of jail for defendants with a prior felony 
conviction.  One reason for this may be that many states instituted guidelines that were tied into 
correctional resources or allow (as in PA) judges to depart from the guidelines if crowding is a 
problem (Stemen et al., 2005).  Another logical possibility is that the guideline states included in 
this study (WA, PA, etc) have adopted guideline grids that either contain less punitive 
presumptive sentences compared with statutes in non-guideline states or that may give special 
consideration to the use of alternative sanctions, as Washington state does (Gainey et al., 2005). 
Models 1 and 2 in Panel B (Table 4.6) display the results of the cross-level interaction 
models for prior criminal history and three-strikes laws.  Arguably the most politicized effort to 
institute harsher sanctions during the 1990s came in the form of habitual offender laws, several 
of which were adopted by a direct ballot initiative and approved by voters in California, 
Washington, and Oregon (LaFree, 2002; Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin, 2001).  Many 
hypothesized that the passage of three-strikes might signal a general “wave” of more punitive 
sentencing (Stemen et al., 2005), but for the most part, the express purpose of three-strikes was 
to issue more punitive sanctions to repeat offenders more so than to increase the severity of 
sentencing generally (Spelman, 2009; Sutton, 2010; Zimring et al., 2001).   
Similar to the interaction models for presumptive guidelines, I estimated two models that 
included cross-level interactions between three-strikes laws and having a prior felony conviction 
and having served a prior prison term.  The results of these models are shown in Table 4.7.  The 
first model interacts three-strikes with having a prior felony record.  The results for the outcome 
contrasting the odds of prison versus jail indicate that the product term (Prior Felony Conviction 
* Three-Strikes) is positive and significant.  While this is consistent with the hypothesis that 
three-strikes magnifies the punitive impact of having a criminal record, a closer inspection of the 
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results reveals that the interaction is substantively meaningless since the main effect of prior 
felony record is not significant at level 1 (b =.251), and because the overall effect of three-strikes 
is negative (b = -.622).  The bar chart illustration in Figure 4.6 best illustrates this.  The bars on 
the right hand side of each level-two group (i.e., three-strikes group vs. no three-strikes) 
represent the predicted probability of prison versus jail for felons with a prior felony conviction.  
If the interaction is meaningful, we would expect that bar on the far right hand side of the graph 
would be taller (with a correspondingly higher predicted probability) if the effect of having a 
prior felony conviction was magnified in three-strikes jurisdictions.  Instead, because the overall 
effect of three-strikes is negative and non-significant (b = -.622) any additional effect of having a 
prior felony in a three-strikes state is effectively washed out.  The results for Model 2 in Panel B 
in Table 4.6 display the results of cross-level interactions between having served a prior prison 
term and being sentenced in a three-strikes jurisdiction.  The results reveal that three-strikes laws 
do not strengthen the positive effects of having a prior prison term.  This finding contradicts the 
hypothesis that three-strikes laws significantly increase the severity of sentencing either directly 
or in an indirect manner.  These findings are consistent with case studies that suggest that the 
adoption of three-strikes were primarily symbolic in states outside of California, and lend 
additional support to empirical research showing that new court commitment rates are 
significantly lower in states with three-strikes laws (Zhang et al., 2009).  What is unclear from 
these findings, however, is precisely why, holding constant crime rates and prison capacity 
constraints, three-strikes laws would be associated with significantly more lenient sentencing 
outcomes.    
As a whole, the findings suggest that presumptive guidelines exert an influence over 
sentencing primarily by conditioning the relationship between defendant criminal history and 
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sentence type.  The results for the main effects models, however, do not support the hypotheses 
predicting the more punitive legal cultures where habitual offender laws and mandatory penalties 
are more widespread translate into significantly more punitive sentencing.  Drug cases are an 
exception however; controlling for level-one characteristics (including a dummy variable of if 
the drug conviction was for sales versus possession), drug offenders sentenced in jurisdictions 
with more punitive minimum statutory penalties for drug sales face significantly higher odds 
(and increase of 26%) of going to prison compared with similar drug offenders convicted 
elsewhere. 
 
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 221 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6.  Hierarchical Multinomial Regression Models Including Cross-Level Interaction Terms Between Prior Criminal History and Sentencing Policy (N = 26,354) 
              
 (1)   (2)  
Panel A.  Interactions with Presumptive 
Guidelines Prison  Prison  Jail   Prison  Prison  Jail  
 vs.  vs.   vs.   vs.  vs.   vs.  
( x Prior Felony Conviction) Jail   Probation   Probation  ( x Prior Prison Term) Jail   Probation   Probation  
Fixed Effects       Fixed Effects       
Intercept  (γ000) .857*  .328  -.528  Intercept  (γ000) .696*  .258  -.438  
 (.341)  (.290)  (.382)   (.342)  (.322)  (.430)  
Prior Felony Conviction(s) .585*  .601*  .015  Prior Prison Term(s) .840*  1.08*  .241*  
 (.104)  (.095)  (.092)   (.106)  (.095)  (.112)  
Presumptive Guidelines -.413  -.458  -.044  Presumptive Guidelines -.083  -.701*  -.618  
 (.326)  (.349)  (.384)   (.324)  (.356)  (.394)  
     Prior Felony Conviction(s) * -.930*  -.420  .509*       Prior Prison Term(s) * -.143  -.003  .140  
     Presumptive Guidelines (.259)  (.225)  (.205)       Presumptive Guidelines (.271)  (.231)  (.265)  
              
Random Effects       Random Effects       
   Level 2 Intercept  .424  .562  .628     Level 2 Intercept  .430  .587  .667  
     Chi-Square            Chi-Square       
   Prior Felony Conviction(s) Slope .525*  .321*  .283*  
   Prior Prison Term(s)  
   Slope .537*  .258*  .433*  
     Chi-Square 518.7  243.1  290.1       Chi-Square 462.9  177.5  230.0  
   Level 3 Intercept .525*  .236*  .597*     Level 3 Intercept .521*  .362*  .867*  
     Chi-Square 160.2  48.7  89.6       Chi-Square 132.9  61.3  126.8  
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 (1)   (2)  
Panel B. Interactions with Three Strikes 
Law  Prison  Prison  Jail   Prison  Prison  Jail  
 vs.  vs.   vs.   vs.  vs.   vs.  
( x Prior Felony Conviction) Jail   Probation   Probation  ( x Prior Prison Term) Jail   Probation   Probation  
Fixed Effects       Fixed Effects       
Intercept  (γ000) .750*  .303  -.496  Intercept  (γ000) .703*  .289  -.414  
 (.344)  (.293)  (.425)   (.342)  (.276)  (.378)  
Prior Felony Conviction(s) .251  .537*  .294*  Prior Prison Term(s) .583*  .910*  .327*  
 (.136)  (.116)  (.111)   (.134)  (.115)  (.142)  
Three Strikes Law -.622  .157  .959  Three Strikes Law -.769  .025  .794  
 (.434)  (.351)  (.537)   (.429)  (.327)  (.475)  
     Prior Felony Conviction(s) * .395*  .003  -.388       Prior Prison Term(s) * .474  .356  -.116  
     Three Strikes Law (.189)  (.161)  (.150)       Three Strikes Law (.183)  (.167)  (.201)  
              
Random Effects       Random Effects       
   Level 2 Intercept  .415  .560  .614     Level 2 Intercept  .419  .590  .665  
     Chi-Square            Chi-Square       
   Prior Felony Conviction(s) Slope .587*  .335*  .276*  
   Prior Prison Term(s) 
Slope .472*  .252*  .431*  
     Chi-Square 539.6  255.5  282.4       Chi-Square 400.4  184.8  229.1  
   Level 3 Intercept .528*  .245*  .609*     Level 3 Intercept .509*  .363*  .882*  
     Chi-Square 153.7  49.9  88.6       Chi-Square 129.9  61.3  128.2  
                            
Note: Each cross-level interaction was estimated in a separate regression model while controlling for all individual-level and contextual effects shown in the models in Table 4.4. 
*p < .05, two-tailed test.  Level 2 n = 91 counties; Level 2 n = 19 states; standard errors in parentheses.         
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THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 
 Table 4.7 presents findings for models examining the effects of several indicators 
of organizational context.  With the exception of caseload pressure, each of these 
variables is predicted to significantly reduce the probability of incarceration.  In keeping 
with the models presented for legal context, I estimated equations for the full sample as 
well as for the sub-sample of drug offenders, reasoning that concerns over prison 
crowding may dissuade judges from sending drug offenders to prison, but may not impact 
decision making in cases involving serious violent offenders.  I turn first to the findings 
for the full SCPS sample of convicted felons. 
 The results in Model 1 in Table 4.7 reveal that three of the organizational 
variables I consider exert significant effects on sentence type.  The negative and 
significant coefficient for average monthly probation cost (b= -.012*) indicates that all 
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else being equal, the odds of being sentenced to prison versus jail are significantly lower 
in jurisdictions that charge higher monthly probation supervision fees.  Every one-dollar 
increase in probation fees reduces the odds of prison by approximately 1% 
 [(1-(exp(-.012)))=.011].  Expressed another way, a 1-standard deviation increase in 
monthly probation fees ($23.80) is associated with a 24% percent change in the odds of 
prison [(1-(exp(-.012*23.80))= .24].  The chart in Figure 4.7 better illustrates how the 
probability of prison changes across varying probation fee contexts, controlling for all 
other level 1 and organizational characteristics included in the model.  The far left side of 
the chart displays the estimated probability of prison for defendants convicted in counties 
that do not charge probationers supervision fees.  The average probability of prison in 
this context is approximately fifty-fifty (i.e., .45, or 45%).  As the amount of monthly 
supervision fees increase toward the mean for the counties in the sample ($34.00), the 
probability of prison drops to less than 40%, and for defendants processed in jurisdictions 
that charge the highest supervision fees ($76.00), the average probability of being 
sentenced to prison drops to under 30%. 
At first glance this may not appear to support the hypothesis that courts better 
equipped to offset the costs of probation are more likely to steer convicted felons away 
from prison since this outcome contrasts prison with jail (as opposed to prison versus 
probation).  However, the vast majority of jail sentences in the SCPS (76%) involve an 
additional period of probation.  Thus, this may represent a preference among courts to 
issue a combination of jail and probation sentences in lieu of more costly prison 
sentences.  This finding lends support to the hypothesis that in jurisdictions that can 
charge for probation supervision will adjust the severity of punishment to (i.e., use jail 
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and probation more often than prison) in an effort at shift the costs of punishment to 
offenders.  Moreover, this effect persists amid controls for how much states spend on 
corrections (i.e., the severity of the fiscal burden for prisons that they currently bear) and 
crowding (which may further urge states to steer offenders away from prison). 
 As expected, the results for Model 1 also indicate that higher per capita correction 
spending (per 100,000 residents) is associated with significantly lower odds of prison 
versus jail (b = -.0002*).   A 1-standard deviation increase ($3,482.34) in corrections 
spending per 100,000 state residents is associated with a 53% change in the odds of 
prison versus jail ((1-(exp(-0.00022*3482.35))).  This finding is consistent with the logic 
outlined in Chapter 2, which suggests that the burdens associated with high corrections 
spending will be met with efforts to “rethink” the severity of punishment (Wilhelm and 
Turner, 2002).  There are multiple ways states can do this.  They may alter penal codes in 
a more permanent attempt to manage correctional resources, but local jurisdictions may 
also react to these fiscal burdens (which usually means less state budget assistance for 
local government functions, and for state education, health care, and the like) by 
adjusting their overall propensity to incarcerate offenders in prisons versus jails or 
through more intensive probation supervision. 
Contrary to expectations, prison crowding (not jail crowding) was associated with 
higher probability of being sentenced to jail versus probation.  Also, the degree of 
prosecutor caseload pressure and county crime rates were unrelated to sentencing 
outcomes.  Thus, contrary to the tenets of instrumentalist/functionalist perspectives, 
differences in the “inputs” to each court system do not substantively alter the severity of 
local jurisdictions’ crime control response (e.g., Liska, 1992:9).  
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 Model 2 in Table 4.7 presents the results of regression models estimating the 
influence of organizational context on the sentencing of drug offenders.  With one 
exception, the results mirror those for the full sample.  The results in Table 4.7 show that 
the negative and significant influence of probation fees does not extend to the sentencing 
of drug offenders.  Though probation fees are negatively associated with the probability 
of prison versus jail (b = -.010), the relationship is not statistically significant.  This is 
somewhat surprising and contrary to expectations, since many states have sought to 
reduce the costs of imprisonment by developing alternative means of sanctioning non-
violent drug offenders (i.e., drug monitoring, treatment).  Thus, one would expect that 
higher probation fees would primarily motivate states to increase the use of probation for 
drug offenders since many of these individuals presumably pose less of a threat to 
society.   Supplementary models not shown estimated whether the effect of probation fees 
depended on the severity of drug laws (specifically, the minimum sentence for the sale of 
1 ounce of cocaine), reasoning that some jurisdictions’ drug laws may be sufficiently 
harsh so as to remove any opportunity for judges to rely on a less costly sanction 
(probation and/or jail). In other words, it is reasonable to assume that we might observe a 
very different relationship between probation fees and the odds of prison if only 
analyzing a sample of drug offenders from courts in states with much less punitive drug 
laws.  The results of this model including an interaction between minimum cocaine sale 
sentence lengths and probation supervision fees revealed no significant interactions 
(results not shown).  Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that probation supervision fees 
might exert more powerful negative influences on the odds of prison in jurisdictions that 
have less punitive drug laws. 
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Looking at the column showing the results predicting the odds of jail versus 
probation the findings reveal that, contrary to expectations, higher probation fees are 
associated with a significantly higher probability of jail versus probation.  It is not 
entirely clear why this is the case since most defendants who receive jail also receive a 
period of probation in conjunction with a jail sentence.  Thus, jurisdictions receive no 
financial benefit either way- in theory, they will collect probation supervision revenue in 
either of these outcomes.  One possibility (which cannot be observed with these data) 
relates to plea bargains and the ability of defendants to actually afford the costs of 
probation supervision.  If the costs of probation supervision are high for drug offenders 
(owing to special costs of drug monitoring that go above and beyond regular supervision 
fees captured here), these defendants may request as part of their plea bargain to do a 
short stint in jail, rather than a longer, and potentially costly probation term. 
As is the case in the full sample, correctional spending is also associated with a 
significantly lower probability of being sentenced to prison, giving further support to the 
interpretation that higher correctional spending may signal a desire among states to 
reduce the costs associated with prisons by reducing the overall severity of the sentences 
they mete out.  Finally, and contrary to expectations, states with more crowded prisons 
appear be more likely to mete out prison and jail sentences to drug offenders.  Additional 
models were estimated to explore if this effect remained after controlling for punitive 
laws (results not shown) and the effect remained significant in both the full sample of 
cases and for drug offenders.  This positive and significant relationship between the odds 
of prison and state prison capacity constraints is unexpected.  The expectation is that 
crowded conditions will provoke courts to ease their reliance on prison sentences than 
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otherwise would be the case.  However, judicial “adjustments” to ease prison crowding 
may take years for states and local governments to effectively address (Spelman, 2009).  
In addition, it may not be reasonable to expect the courts to adjust for prison crowding.  
States may control crowding more easily, and with fewer disruptions to the legal system, 
by regulating releases from prison, which would remove any need for courts to adjust the 
severity of sentencing. 
Prosecutor caseload pressure, crime rates, and jail capacities did not emerge as 
significant predictors of either prison or jail.  After controlling for these variables, along 
with level-one fixed effects, a significant amount of county and state-level residual 
variation remained to be explained.  On the whole, these models suggest that that 
organizational constraints and burdens exert important influences on sentencing, and 
appear to account for a larger portion of the between–county variation in sentencing 
outcomes than do legal policy variables. 
Although organizational perspectives serve as the backbone of early contextual 
sentencing research, recent work (outside of Pennsylvania) has largely neglected to 
examine the costs of punishment, capacities to imprison, and the ability in theory to offset 
some of these burdens through fee revenue from probationers.  The findings here suggest 
that may be a significant oversight.  Controlling for level-one case characteristics and 
crime rates, the extent of prison crowding, per capita corrections expenditures, and the 
amount of monthly supervision fees jurisdictions may charge probationers exert 
significant impacts on the severity of sentences courts impose.  For the model predicting 
sentencing outcomes for the full SCPS sample, these characteristics help to account for a 
substantial portion of the residual variance not explained in the initial level-one model 
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(see Table 4.3.).  The model does a much better job explaining portions of the mean-
adjusted state-level residual variation reported in the level-one model.  For instance, the 
organizational characteristics shown in Table 4.6 explain 11% of the county-level and 
48% of the state-level residual variance in the odds of prison vs. jail that remained after 
controlling for the level-one covariates in the earlier model shown in Table 4.3.  At the 
county-level, this reduction in the variance components after controlling for 
organizational context was greater than that accounted for by sentencing policy variables 
for both the full and drug offender samples (see Table 4.4).  In sum, these findings 
suggest that organizational factors should merit more attention in future studies 
comparing sentencing outcomes across multiple states. 
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Table 4.7.  Hierarchical Multinomial Regressions of Incarceration vs. Probation in Felony Cases:  The Effects of Organizational Context 
    
   (1)       (2)    
 (Full Sample of Felony Cases; N = 26,354)   (Drug Cases; N = 10,167)  
 Prison  Prison  Jail   Prison  Prison  Jail  
 vs.  vs.   vs.   vs.  vs.   vs.  
Fixed Effects           Jail   Probation   Probation    Jail   Probation   Probation   
  State and County Organizational Context              
     Prosecutor Caseload Pressure .021  .004  -.0168   .019  -.002  -.021  
 (.037)  (.044)  (.045)   (.450)  (.050)  (.049)  
     Monthly Probation Supervision Fee (in $) -.012*  -.002  .010   -.010  .005  .015*  
 (.005)  (.006)  (.006)   (.006)  (.007)  (.007)  
     Jail Capacity Constraints -.0005  -.001  -.001   -.004  -.005  -.001  
 (.004)  (.005)  (.005)   (.005)  (.006)  (.006)  
     Prison Capacity Constraints -.007  .011  .017*   -.009  .021*  .030*  
 (.005)  (.006)  (.006)   (.006)  (.006)  (.006)  
     Per Capita Correctional Expenditures -.0002*  -.0001  .0001   -.0001*  -.0001  .0001  
 (.00005)  (.0001)  (.0001)   (.00007)  (.0001)  (.000)  
Control Variables              
     County Index Crime Rate .00002  -.0001  .0001   -.000  -.0001  -.0001  
 (.00004)  (.0001)  (.0001)   (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  
Random Effects              
Level 2 Intercept .379  .606  .575   .459  .659  .589  
Chi-Square              
Level 3 Intercept .501*  .445*  .776*   .988*  .648*  1.177*  
Chi-Square 123.263   72.389  126.353     150.277   80.708   115.737   
Note: Level 2 n = 91 counties; Level 2 n = 19 states; standard errors in parentheses. 
*p < .05, two-tailed test               
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Figure 4.7.  Predicted probability of prison vs. jail across levels of   
monthly probation supervision fees; Full sample (N = 26,354). 
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THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 
 The models estimating the effects of variables emphasized in conflict-based 
theories are presented in Table 4.8.  Given the emphasis some researchers have 
placed on the role that the war on drugs plays in generating “symbolic” threats to the 
middle class (Sampson and Laub, 1993), both drug-specific and full sample models 
were estimated to separately examine the effects that racial and ethnic composition 
and threatening economic conditions might exert on sentencing.  The results in Table 
4.8 reveal that for both samples of offenders, none of the variables capturing 
community variation in social conflict exert any discernable influence on sentencing.  
Although the effects for racial composition are somewhat surprising given significant 
effects of percent black reported in several studies (see Table 2.1), the effects for 
economic threat mirror that of prior research and play no significant role in 
sentencing outcomes.  Contrary to expectations, levels of fear yield no significant 
influence on the outcomes of cases in either the full sample or for drug cases.  
Moreover, the relationship is not in the theoretically expected direction. The most 
striking feature of the results reported in Panels A and B in Table 4.8 is the relative 
lack of any influence of social conflict measures on criminal case outcomes.  This is 
surprising given the abundance of attention that most prior research affords to 
conflict-based explanations of formal social control (and sentencing especially).  The 
findings here, though not definitive by any means, indicate that the importance of 
social conflict explanations of sentencing may be somewhat overstated and that the 
literature would benefit from expanding model specifications to include 
organizational and legal variables. 
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Table 4.8.  Hierarchical Multinomial Regressions of Incarceration vs. Probation in Felony Cases: The Effects of Social Conflict 
   
            
Panel A.  All Felony Cases (N = 26,354) (1)  (2) 
 Prison  Prison  Jail  Prison  Prison  Jail 
 vs.  vs.   vs.  vs.  vs.   vs. 
Fixed Effects           Jail   Probation   Probation  Jail   Probation   Probation 
                      
  Indicators of Social Conflict/Threat            
     % Non-Hispanic Black  .007  .018  .011  .003  .018  .015 
 (.015)  (.016)  (.017)  (.013)  (.016)  (.017) 
     % Hispanic  -.003  -.0001  .003  .011  .006  -.005 
 (.009)  (.010)  (.011)  (.009)  (.011)  (.011) 
     Unemployment Rate .033  -.018  -.051  .025  -.024  -.049 
 (.070)  (.082)  (.084)  (.064)  (.081)  (.081) 
     Economic Inequality (Gini coefficient) 4.23  -3.06  -7.29  1.55  -4.52  -6.08 
 (4.80)  (5.46)  (5.74)  (4.46)  (5.50)  (5.60) 
     Levels of Public Fear --  --  --  -.022  -.013  .018 
       (.031)  (.011)  (.011) 
  Control Variables            
     County Index Crime Rate -.00005  -.0001  -.0001  .00001  -.0001  -.0001 
 (.00006)  (.0007)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001) 
Random Effects            
Level 2 Intercept .398  .616  .602  .321  .613  .556 
Chi-Square            
Level 3 Intercept .965*  .555*  1.268*  1.012*  .492*  1.406* 
Chi-Square 217.526   96.035   244.342   282.413   87.534   286.179 
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Panel B.  Drug Cases (N = 10,167) (1)  (2) 
 Prison  Prison  Jail  Prison  Prison  Jail 
 vs.  vs.   vs.  vs.  vs.   vs. 
Fixed Effects           Jail   Probation   Probation  Jail   Probation   Probation 
                      
  Indicators of Social Conflict/Threat            
     % Non-Hispanic Black  .012  .024  .012  .010  .024  .015 
 (.018)  (.019)  (.021)  (.017)  (.019)  (.020) 
     % Hispanic  -.008  .002  .011  .005  .006  .001 
 (.010)  (.012)  (.013)  (.011)  (.014)  (.014) 
     Unemployment Rate .054  -.053  -.107  .045  -.060  -.105 
 (.083)  (.096)  (.101)  (.079)  (.096)  (.099) 
     Economic Inequality (Gini) 3.19  -2.59  -5.78  .462  -3.44  -3.90 
 (5.81)  (6.49)  (7.03)  (5.59)  (6.59)  (6.95) 
     Levels of Public Fear --  --  --  -.029  -.009  .020 
       (.030)  (.013)  (.013) 
  Control Variables            
     County Index Crime Rate -.0001  -.0001  -.00005  -.00003  -.001  -.0001 
 (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001) 
Random Effects            
Level 2 Intercept .495  .813  .865  .432  .812  .805 
Chi-Square            
Level 3 Intercept 1.397*  .658*  1.355*  1.439*  .614*  1.523* 
Chi-Square 213.935   70.255   150.666   250.882   66.504   177.858 
Note: Level 2 n = 91 counties; Level 3 n = 19 states; standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, two-tailed 
test.      
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THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SENTIMENT  
 One of the primary goals of the current study was to examine the effects of 
variables that are emphasized in classic statements on the sociology of punishment, but 
have yet to be empirically tested due to a lack of community data that capture public 
sentiment.  Without access to data like the GSS, researchers have been limited to 
estimating the influence of official crime data and Census-derived characteristics.  As 
explained in the review of the literature in Chapter 2, when using these data researchers 
often come up short in their efforts to uncover which aspects of the local social climate 
matter most for understanding community variation in sentencing. 
 The variables considered in the models tested here stem from neo-Durkheimian 
perspectives on punishment, which emphasize the moral and cultural sensibilities that 
guide attitudes on crime and punishment.  An implicit assumption of these models is that 
public opinion influences the decision making of prosecutors and judges.  Multi-method 
contextual research documents that judges and prosecutors are in fact sensitive to public 
opinions (Myers and Talarico, 1987:31).  Using theory as a guide, variables were chosen 
that tap the type of conservative values and ideologies that have been emphasized in 
Durkheim’s work (e.g., religion) as well as contemporary survey literature as strong 
predictors of more punitive norms.  The effects of these variables are assessed net of 
controls for the crime rate and all level-one case characteristics. 
 Turning first to the results for the full sample of defendants, Model 1 in Table 4.9 
indicates that three of the variables measuring local normative climate exert significant 
influences on sentencing.  Turning first to the odds of jail versus probation, the 
coefficient for % favor capital punishment (b = .046*) indicates that defendants 
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experience a significantly higher probability of being sentenced to jail versus probation in 
jurisdictions where a higher proportion of GSS respondents support the death penalty.  
The odds ratio (exp[.046] = 1.05), better illustrates the size of the effect.  Every 1-percent 
increase in the percentage of respondents that support the death penalty corresponds to a 
5-percent increase in the expected odds of jail versus probation. A 1-standard deviation 
increase (9%) in the percentage of respondents who support the death penalty is 
associated with a 9.5-percent increase in the log-odds of jail.  These results are in line 
with theories that highlight the expressive aspects of punishment, and as such, that 
punishment will be more severe in jurisdictions with higher levels of support for more 
repressive sanctions.  However, the effect is not highly consistent across the other two 
outcomes.  For instance, the beta coefficients for prison vs. probation (b = .031) and 
prison vs. jail (b = -.015) are not significant, and in the latter case, not in the expected 
direction.   
Contrary to a sizeable body of research to suggest otherwise, the findings indicate 
that religious fundamentalism is associated with more lenient sanctioning.  The results for 
the model contrasting the odds of prison versus probation reveals that higher levels of 
Christian fundamentalism is associated with a significantly lower odds of being 
sentenced to prison (b = -.167*).  The odds of prison versus probation change by 27% for 
every 1-standard deviation (1.93) change in the fundamentalism index.  Though 
numerous studies have shown that fundamentalists exhibit more punitive orientations, 
other studies have shown that Christians are also more likely to believe in forgiveness 
and redemption, a finding consistent with the pattern of effects displayed in Table 4.9.   
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One other variable entered into Model 1 equation is significant- all else equal, the 
odds of prison versus jail are significantly higher for defendants processed in jurisdictions 
characterized by higher levels of anti-black resentment among whites.  This is also the 
case for the sample of drug offenders (b = .084*).  The graph in Figure 4.8 more clearly 
illustrates the effect of racial resentment on the sentences applied to the full sample.  
Recall that the racial resentment index is composed of a series of standardized GSS 
items.  Thus, the mean of the overall summed index approximates zero and scores above 
zero represent counties with higher average racial resentment.  Scores below zero 
represent counties with lower levels of racial resentment.  The graph in Figure 4.8 charts 
changes in the probability of prison versus jail across counties with varying levels of 
racial resentment.  In counties with below average prejudice, the probability of prison 
falls at or below about 30%.  At average levels of prejudice, the probability of prison 
increases to around 40% and then, and then at relatively high levels of prejudice, the 
probability of prison approaches 60%- nearly doubling that of defendants convicted in the 
lowest-prejudice counties.  Though no prior multilevel sentencing research has examined 
the effects of levels of racial prejudice within communities on sentencing outcomes, this 
finding conforms with a number of surveys which find that a key factor explaining 
whites’ desire for more punitive crime control is racial stereotypes and prejudice (Barkan 
and Cohn, 1994; Unnever et al., 2006).  Consistent with the Durkheimian tradition of 
punishment, these findings suggest that more punitive legal sanctions are a reflection of a 
punitive community social climate (measured here as prejudice).  
Though it is not clear why racial attitudes are associated with more punitive 
sanctions toward all offenders (i.e., rather than just toward black defendants), this finding 
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is intriguing and suggests a need for future research to better understand the mechanisms 
responsible for linking racial prejudice and resentment to more punitive attitudes 
generally.   
 Turning next to the results for drug offenders displayed in Model 2, the findings 
exhibit some interesting patterns not observed for the full sample of offenders. 
First, the results for racial resentment and religious fundamentalism mirror those for the 
sample as a whole.  The effects of Christian fundamentalism are significant and negative, 
again suggesting that sentencing is less punitive in jurisdictions containing where 
Christian fundamentalism is more prevalent.  The sizes of the fundamentalism 
coefficients are not only slightly larger in the drug sample, but fundamentalism has a 
more sweeping effect on sentencing by impacting not only the odds of prison versus 
probation (b = -.207), but now also influencing the probability of being sentenced to jail 
versus probation (b = -.213*) (an effect that is not significant for the full sample).  
Together, these two patterns suggest that fundamentalist religious beliefs may be 
especially relevant in the sentencing of drug offenders, and is consistent with research 
highlighting the compassionate and forgiving aspects of the Christian faith (Applegate et 
al., 2000). The magnitude of each of these effects is illustrated in Figure 4.9 for both 
prison and jail.  The graph shows the range of estimated probabilities at varying levels of 
fundamentalism.  Controlling for levels of crime and level-one case characteristics, the 
line depicting the relationship for jail shows that in counties where fundamentalism is 
highest, the probability of jail is as low as 10%.  However, at the lowest levels of 
fundamentalism (between -1 and -3), the probability of jail doubles to .30 (or 30%).  The 
line depicting the relationship for prison versus probation similarly demonstrates that the 
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odds of prison approach 50% in jurisdictions where fundamentalism is exceptionally low, 
and below 20% (.20) in jurisdictions where fundamentalism is the most widespread.    
 The findings in Model 2 also indicate that although support for capital punishment 
exerted significant influences on the odds of jail versus probation in the full sample, 
levels of capital punishment are not related to sentencing in drug cases.  This makes 
intuitive sense, since this measure of punitive attitudes is related to support for a sanction 
that only applies to serious violent crime.   
Finally, the results also reveal a negative and significant effect of social trust (b = 
-.185*) on the odds of jail versus probation.  Specifically, the beta coefficient suggests 
that a 1-unit increase in the social trust index is associated with a .83 decline in the 
average odds of jail [exp(-.185)=.83], which corresponds to a 17-percent change in the 
odds.  This is consistent with hypotheses grounded in Braithwaite’s theory of 
reintegrative shaming, which argues that social trust and mutual interdependence are 
aspects of community social structure that promote informal forms of social control and 
forgiveness, and that discourage more repressive forms of control such as prison.  The 
magnitude of the effect of social trust, expressed in conditional probabilities, is depicted 
in Figure 4.10.  The graph shows that in communities where social trust is lowest  
(i.e., -5.9) the probability of jail versus probation is approximately 40% (.40).  The 
probability declines substantially however as levels of social trust approach average 
levels (i.e., a score of ‘0’).  At the mean level of trust, drug offenders have on average 
about a 25% probability of going to jail (compared to 40% for offenders in counties with 
very low levels of trust).  As you can see though, this probability drops considerably and 
in counties that that have the highest levels of social trust (i.e., scores of 4.6), the 
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 241 
probability of jail is only 13% (.13)- a 67% difference from the estimated probability 
(.40) of jail in counties with the lowest levels of social trust.   It is noteworthy that levels 
of social trust within the community only impact the sentencing of drug offenders, rather 
than serious property or violent offenders.  This suggests that the effects of social trust 
may hinge on the seriousness of the crime, as the public may consider certain violent 
offenders to have less rehabilitation potential.  For example, an abundance of research 
suggests that over the past thirty years the public has grown more punitive in the sense 
they are likely to report supporting the death penalty, three-strikes policies, and 
incapacitation.  However, these same studies also reveal that at the same time the public 
embraces punitive measures, they still cling to the belief that treatment is a necessary 
component of corrections (Cullen, Cullen, and Wozniak, 1988; Sundt, Cullen, Applegate, 
and Turner, 1998).  In particular, this line of research has shown that when survey 
respondents are asked about non-violent offenders, that the American public is especially 
supportive of intermediate sanctions and restorative justice measures (Cullen, Fisher, and 
Applegate, 2000).   
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 Table 4.10 provides a summary of the results of each of the models presented thus 
far.  Turning first to the results for the full sample, overall the analyses indicate that the 
strongest and most consistent contextual predictors of sentencing are the organizational 
aspects of the court and state correctional environment, along with measures of public 
sentiment.  The findings that organizational context are highly relevant for understanding 
sentencing is consistent with organizational efficiency models which stress the 
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importance of considering cost and efficiency.  Specifically, the hypotheses predicted that 
courts located in states burdened with higher costs of punishment would impose on 
average more lenient sentencing, and that the differential opportunity for jurisdictions to 
offset the high costs of prison through charging for probation would explain why some 
courts exhibit a lower average probability of imposing prison terms.  Both hypotheses 
received support in the current study. 
 The analyses also revealed that public sentiment is highly relevant for 
understanding why certain jurisdictions impose more punitive sentences.  Specifically, 
defendants face a significantly higher probability of being incarcerated in jail versus 
probation when sentenced in communities where support for the death penalty is more 
widespread, and that the probability of prison (versus jail) is significantly higher in 
communities where more whites express feelings of anti-black racial prejudice.  It is 
important to point out however, that the effects of these variables (as well as others 
examined throughout the study) are not constant across outcome types.  For example, the 
effect of capital punishment only impacts the probability of jail, but exerts no significant 
impact on prison.  In a similar pattern, racial prejudice increases the probability of prison 
versus jail, but bears no influence on the odds of prison versus probation or jail versus 
probation.  Though the importance of a few of these variables for understanding 
sentencing have been established in one other study (Baumer and Martin, 2011), these 
findings suggest a need for future research that replicates these types of models on 
different samples of cases, and with outcomes other than incarceration to explore whether 
the effects of these measures of sentiment are sensitive to the coding of the outcome or 
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stage of the criminal justice system (i.e. pretrial detention, sentence length, and 
conviction). 
Contrary to expectations, legal policies do not figure prominently in sentencing 
outcomes.  Determinate sentencing is one exception, though the positive direction of the 
relationship reported in this study is contrary to the findings from macro level studies that 
show that incarceration rates are lower, and their grow much slower, in the context of 
determinate sentencing (Greenberg and West, 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael, 2001; Smith, 
2004; Zhang et al., 2009).  The finding reported here does not necessarily contradict 
aggregate level incarceration research since those studies do not examine the cross-
sectional influence of policy on actual sentencing decisions.  The meaning of the 
relationship reported here is difficult to interpret with the data at hand, but two 
interpretations are possible.  The first is that determinate sentencing may have been 
implemented in these jurisdictions as part of a broader package of reforms aimed at 
increasing the overall severity of punishment.  For example, when California and a 
handful of other states adopted determinate sentencing in the 1970s and 1980s, these 
legislatures also amended their state penal codes to increase penalties for many felony 
offenses and to state that the express purposes of punishment would become deterrence.  
Second, and equally plausible, is that judges in determinate states may be more likely to 
impose incarceration than judges elsewhere because their decisions control both the 
sentence and time each offender will serve (Sabol et al., 2002). 
 Table 4.10 also illustrates the relative lack of support for the hypotheses derived 
from the social conflict perspective.  The social threat perspective features prominently in 
the broader literature on social control, and it is particularly influential in sentencing 
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research (see e.g., Myers, 1987; Wang and Mears, 2010).  However, the results reported 
here find that racial and ethnic composition, levels of fear, and the economic well being 
of communities have little relevance for predicting the outcomes of felony cases. 
The results of the analyses for drug offenders are similar, although a few 
exceptions bear mentioning.  First, higher probation fees do not appear to decrease the 
odds of prison for drug offenders. Second, support for capital punishment is not relevant 
for the sentencing of drug offenders, while social trust appears to uniquely impact the 
legal sanctioning of drug offenders. Third, legal statutes appear to be more relevant for 
understanding variation in penalties applied to drug offenders.  The probability of 
incarceration for drug offenders is significantly higher in jurisdictions that require longer 
minimum sentence lengths for the sale of 1 ounce of cocaine.  However, drug offenders 
receive significantly more lenient sentences in three-strikes states and in states that 
require offenders to serve a higher percentage of their minimum or fixed incarceration 
term.  The nature of these findings are not altogether different from the effects of policy 
variables for the full sample, where both three-strikes and TIS are both negative (though 
not significant). The findings are a bit of a paradox; these two variables are typically 
interpreted as evidence of a more punitive legal culture.  Yet, at least in urban court 
settings during this time period (1998-2004), the presence of these more punitive laws 
appear to be met with more lenient sentencing for drug offenders, even after adjusting for 
crime rates, crowding, and the severity of state drug laws.
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Table 4.9.  Hierarchical Multinomial Regressions of Incarceration vs. Probation: The Effects of Public Sentiment and Social Cohesion  
   (1)      (2)   
 (All Felony Cases; N = 26,354)  (Drug Cases; N = 10,167) 
 Prison  Prison  Jail  Prison  Prison  Jail 
 vs.  vs.   vs.  vs.  vs.   vs. 
Fixed Effects           Jail   Probation   Probation  Jail   Probation   Probation 
  Public Sentiment and Cohesion            
     Southern Jurisdiction .288  .446  .157  .010  .524  .514 
 (.521)  (.481)  (.488)  (.640)  (.569)  (.574) 
     % Favor Capital Punishment  -.015  .031  .046*  -.031  .021  .052 
 (.023)  (.023)  (.023)  (.027)  (.027)  (.028) 
     Religious Fundamentalism Scale -.004  -.167*  -.163  .006  -.207*  -.213* 
 (.076)  .083  (.085)  (.091)  (.099)  (.102) 
     Social Trust Scale .034  -.060  -.094  .072  -.113  -.185* 
 (.057)  (.064)  (.066)  (.069)  (.008)  (.079) 
     Conservative Political Ideology -.404  -.876  -.472  .118  -.231  -.349 
 (.818)  (.914)  (.934)  (.941)  (1.07)  (1.09) 
     Racial Animus .075*  .023  -.052  .084*  .024  -.061 
 (.032)  (.035)  (.036)  .037  (.041)  (.042) 
  Control Variables            
     County Index Crime Rate .00005  -.00005  -.0001  .00003  -.0001  -.0001 
 (.00005)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001) 
Random Effects            
Level 2 Intercept .391  .566  .605  .464  .746  .792 
Chi-Square            
Level 3 Intercept .791*  .568*  .567*  1.179*  .764*  .739 
Chi-Square 192.891   94.713   131.150   196.072   78.589   103.525 
Note: Level 2 n = 91 counties; Level 3 n = 19 states; standard errors in parentheses.  *p < .05, two-tailed test.      
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Figure 4.8.  Predictied probability of prison vs. jail at varying levels 
of White's racial resentment; Full sample (N = 26,354)  
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Figure 4.9.  Predicted probabilities of prison and jail vs probation at 
varying levels of fundamentalism; Drug offenders (N = 10,167) 
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Figure 4.10.  Predicted probability of jail vs probation at varying 
levels of social trust; Drug offenders (N = 10, 167) 
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Table 4.10. Summary of Findings and Support for Hypotheses Predicting Jurisdictional Influences on Felony Sentencing Outcomes 
 (All Felony Cases; N = 26,354)  (Drug Cases; N = 10,167) 
 Prison  Prison  Jail  Prison  Prison  Jail 
 vs.  vs.   vs.  vs.  vs.   vs. 
Fixed Effects           Jail   Probation   Probation  Jail   Probation   Probation 
Legal Context             
     Presumptive Guidelines n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s 
     Voluntary Guidelines n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s 
     Determinate Sentencing n.s.  +  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s 
     % Sentence Offenders Required to Serve n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  ─  ─  n.s 
     Three Strikes Law  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  ─  n.s.  n.s 
     Mandatory Enhancement Score  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.       
     # Mandatory Enhancements for Drug Offenses       n.s.  n.s.  n.s 
     Min Sentence 1 oz Sale of Cocaine       n.s.  +  n.s 
Organizational Context             
     Prosecutor Caseload Pressure n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
     Monthly Probation Supervision Fee (in $s) ─  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  + 
     Jail Capacity Constraints n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
     Prison Capacity Constraints n.s.  n.s.  +  n.s.  +  + 
     Per Capita Correctional Expenditures ─  n.s.  n.s.  ─   n.s.  n.s. 
Social Threat/Conflict             
     % Non-Hispanic Black n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
     % Hispanic n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
     Unemployment Rate n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
     Economic Inequality (Gini) n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
     Levels of Public Fear n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
Public Sentiment/Cohesion             
     Southern Jurisdiction n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
     % Favor Capital Punishment for Murderers n.s.  n.s.  +  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
     Religious Fundamentalism Scale n.s.  ─  n.s.  n.s.  ─  ─ 
     Social Trust Scale n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  ─ 
     Conservative Political Ideology n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
     Whites' Anti-Black Racial Animus +  n.s.  n.s.  +  n.s.  n.s. 
Control Variables            
     County Index Crime Rate n.s.   n.s.   n.s.   n.s.   n.s.   n.s. 
Note: N.S. denotes null findings.        
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A final model that combines each of the variables found to be significant is 
provided in Table 4.11 for both the full sample and the subsample of drug offenders.  The 
results in Panel A indicate that with the exception of the coefficient for determinate 
sentencing and support for capital punishment, all of the effects reported in previous 
models remain significant and in their original direction.  The most consistent predictors 
of sentencing are organizational context and measures that tap punitive social climates- 
racial prejudice and religious fundamentalism. The results for drug offenders reported in 
Panel B indicate that the results are fairly robust.  With the exception of the variable 
measuring time-served requirements, the effects reported in previous models remain 
statistically significant after controlling for other theoretically relevant predictors.  The 
implications of these findings for theory and for advancing contextual sentencing 
research are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Table 4.11. Full Regression Analyses of Competing Models Predicting Jurisdictional Influences on Felony 
Sentencing Outcomes 
Panel A. (All Felony Cases; N = 26,354)  
 Prison  Prison  Jail  
 vs.  vs.   vs.  
Fixed Effects           Jail   Probation   Probation  
Legal Context        
     Determinate Sentencing .193  .582  .389  
 (.395)  (.443)  (.444)  
Organizational Context        
     Monthly Probation Supervision Fee (in $s) -.012*  -.004  .008  
 (.005)  (.006)  (.006)  
     Prison Capacity Constraints -.007  .008  .016*  
 (.004)  (.005)  (.005)  
     Per Capita Correctional Expenditures -.0001*  -.0001  .0001  
 (.00004)  (.00005)  (.0001)  
Public Sentiment/Cohesion        
     % Favor Capital Punishment for Murderers -.013  .007  .020  
 (.018)  (.020)  (.021)  
     Religious Fundamentalism Scale -.031  -.154*  -.122  
 (.058)  (.069)  (.070)  
     Whites' Anti-Black Racial Animus .060*  .017  -.042  
 (.025)  (.030)  (.031)  
Random Effects       
Level 2 Intercept .364  .535  .575  
Chi-Square       
Level 3 Intercept .409*  .482*  .460*  
Chi-Square 110.7   90.4   81.6   
Panel B. (Drug Cases; N = 10,167)  
 Prison  Prison  Jail  
 vs.  vs.   vs.  
Fixed Effects           Jail   Probation   Probation  
Legal Context        
     % Sentence Imposed Offenders Required to Serve -.018  -.015  .003  
 (.009)  (.008)  (.010)  
     Three Strikes Law (all current offenses qualify) -1.20*  -.657  .547  
 (.574)  (.480)  (.608)  
     Min Sentence (months) 1 oz Sale of Cocaine .011  .031*  .020  
 (.012)  (.010)  (.013)  
Organizational Context        
     Monthly Probation Supervision Fee (in $s) -.009  .009  .018*  
 (.005)  (.006)  (.006)  
     Prison Capacity Constraints -.006  .023*  .029*  
 (.005)  (.006)  (.006)  
     Per Capita Correctional Expenditures -.0001*  -.0001*  .00003  
 (.00006)  (.00006)  (.00007)  
Public Sentiment/Cohesion        
     Religious Fundamentalism Scale .005  -.245*  -.249*  
 (.077)  (.083)  (.068)  
     Social Trust Scale .079  -.103  -.182*  
 (.063)  (.069)  (.068)  
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     White Racial Animus .063*  .047  -.017  
 (.028)  (.031)  (.031)  
Random Effects       
Level 2 Intercept .408  .575  .506  
Chi-Square       
Level 3 Intercept .674*  .381*  .767*  
Chi-Square 108.8   59.1   101.6  
Note: Level 2 n = 91 counties; Level 2 n = 19 states; standard errors in parentheses.  *p < .05, two-tailed test.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
SUMMARY OF GOALS 
Prior research has shown that when controlling for legally relevant factors, the 
outcomes of criminal cases depend to a significant degree on the jurisdiction in which 
defendants are processed.  Coining this pattern “justice by geography,” Feld (1991) 
observed over 20 years ago that both the functioning styles and punishment preferences 
of courts are sensitive to the differences in bureaucratic functioning and the diversity of 
the populations that courts serve.  This further confirmed existing research showing that 
the courts draw upon their broader social environment to define acceptable going rates of 
punishment (Eisenstein et al., 1988; Myers and Talarico, 1987; Ulmer, 1997).    
In the years since this groundbreaking research, the methodological sophistication 
and geographic scope of contextual sentencing research has grown exponentially.  Aided 
by the availability of new and more diverse sentencing data, a number of studies 
document that the certainty and severity of punishment varies significantly across 
communities.  These studies also indicate that the degree of jurisdictional variation tends 
to be smaller in studies analyzing data from guidelines states such as Pennsylvania and 
greater in studies using data collected from jurisdictions located across multiple states 
and diverse sentencing structures.  This research has greatly advanced our understanding 
of the ways in which community context influences both state and federal court 
sentencing. As a whole though, the research examining the community contexts of 
sentencing has yielded few answers to the basic question of what social contexts appear 
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to make for more punitive legal sanctioning.  Though many studies report that judge-level 
characteristics, the courtroom environment, and the broader social climate influence the 
severity of sentencing, the inconsistency of findings for any given variable across these 
studies makes it difficult to formulate a consistent narrative about which aspects of social 
context matter and precisely how they impact the severity of sentencing.  Thus, despite a 
rich theoretical background encouraging contextual approaches to understanding legal 
decision-making, the sources responsible for jurisdictional variation in sentencing remain 
elusive (Myers and Talarico, 1987). 
This ambiguity about which contextual factors are most relevant reflects three 
tendencies in the literature: a) this area of research is primarily informed by studies that 
analyze cases within only a handful of states (most of which operate under policies 
designed to limit the potential for community variation in sentencing); b) an over-
emphasis on social structural characteristics at the expense of other theoretically-relevant 
variables; and c) a lack of serious consideration among multi-state contextual studies for 
the ways in which legal and organizational contexts contribute to geographic differences 
in the severity of sentencing within the U.S.  Accordingly, a major goal of this study was 
to broaden contextual sentencing research in three ways:  by employing a more 
comprehensive theoretical framework, by exploring policy questions surrounding the 
adoption of various sentencing reforms, and by bringing new (and more direct) measures 
to bear on the question of whether community sentiments impact the sentencing process 
in any significant way.  The remainder of this chapter discusses the findings and their 
implications as they pertain to the above-mentioned goals. 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Legal Context  
 One of the questions that motivated the current study was whether sentencing 
policies that have been singled out as key causes for the growth in mass incarceration 
increase the probability of imprisonment net of legally relevant case characteristics.  
Specifically, the analyses sought to determine if offenders sentenced in jurisdictions with 
more punitive laws faced significant disadvantages compared with offenders sentenced in 
less punitive legal contexts.  The findings provide little evidence that structured 
sentencing reforms significantly influence the severity of punishment.   The findings also 
do not suggest that sentencing is more punitive in jurisdictions that have more mandatory 
minimum enhancements, three-strikes laws, or more punitive time-served requirements.  
These policies were intended to capture variation in the relative harshness of each 
jurisdiction’s legal culture. If policies like these do drive incarceration growth, it does not 
appear to be doing so by increasing the probability of going to prison, at least during this 
time period of study (1998-2002) and in these urban counties.  Perhaps this is an artifact 
of the sample being from urban courts, which may be more lenient than rural courts and 
resistant to state efforts to make sentencing more punitive.  But there are reasons to doubt 
that this is true.  In Pennsylvania, Ulmer (1997) found that urban court judges relied 
much more heavily on guidelines and rules because it helped large courts to process cases 
more efficiently. Also, if policies that aim to increase the severity of punishment are 
increasing incarceration rates, you would expect to observe the effects of policy in 
precisely these kinds of courts; when weighted, these data from the SCPS represent over 
half of all defendants sentenced in the U.S. each year.   
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 Cross-level interaction models were used to test hypotheses predicting that 
presumptive guidelines and three-strikes laws indirectly impact the severity of sentencing 
by increasing the role that prior criminal history plays in sentencing decisions. Contrary 
to expectations, the findings do not indicate that offenders with a prior criminal history 
face a greater odds of prison in three-strikes states compared with repeat offenders 
sentenced elsewhere.  Cross-level interaction models exploring the potential conditioning 
effects of presumptive guidelines reveal significant interactions between guidelines and 
having a prior felony conviction.  The nature of the interaction is not uniform across 
different outcome categories, however.  The findings show that offenders with a prior 
felony conviction face a significantly higher probability of jail versus probation than 
repeat offenders in non-presumptive guideline states.  Thus, consistent with expectations, 
presumptive guidelines do appear to indirectly increase the severity of punishment by 
placing greater weight on prior criminal history.  However, in guideline states the odds of 
prison versus jail is less impacted by a prior felony conviction compared to non-guideline 
states.  In other words, having a prior felony conviction will generally increase the odds 
of prison versus jail for all offenders, but the effect of a prior record is actually larger in 
non-guideline states that do not direct judges to specifically consider prior offending 
history.  This may reflect the inability of judges in guideline states to impose more severe 
sanctions than the guidelines dictate, whereas judges in states without guidelines typically 
sentence from broad penalty ranges and if they choose, may consider additional factors 
besides offense severity and criminal history at sentencing.  This broad discretion may 
mean that sentencing is more severe for repeat offenders convicted in states that do not 
control judicial discretion in the way that presumptive guidelines do. 
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 A substantial portion of the growth in incarceration rates can be attributed to the 
increase incarceration for drug crimes (Blumstein and Beck, 2000).  States have 
experimented greatly with the severity of their drug laws over the past thirty years, with 
some having a completely separate set of sentencing guidelines for drug offenders (e.g., 
Washington and Minnesota) (Stemen et al., 2005). Given the diversity of ways states 
have approached the punishment of drug offenders, the analyses also explored the effects 
of structured sentencing, mandatory minimums, three-strikes laws, time-served 
requirements and specific drug policies on the sentencing of drug offenders.  The results 
reveal that policy differences bear a greater influence on the sentences applied to drug 
offenders, although not necessarily in the expected way.  The findings show, for example, 
that the odds of prison are significantly lower in three-strikes states and lower in states 
that require offenders to serve a longer portion of their sentence before becoming eligible 
for parole.  To the extent that the presence of three-strikes laws and more stringent truth 
in sentencing requirements indicate a punitive legal culture, these findings are 
unexpected.  One could speculate that these negative effects indicate reluctance on the 
part of prosecutors and judges to using three-strikes on drug offenders, as well as a 
reluctance in TIS states to send drug offenders to prison where those will serve most of 
the duration of their sentence.  Related to this point, one possibility is that three-strikes 
and TIS requirements may be correlated with the amount of money each state devotes to 
drug treatment for prisoners.  For instance, some states offer comprehensive drug 
treatment in their prisons (Carmichael, 2010).  If this is the case, then judges may be 
more likely to send drug offenders to prison in those states in hopes that the offender 
receives drug and alcohol treatment.  Future research should explore if variation in the 
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resources devoted to drug treatment in prisons helps to explain why more punitive laws 
appear to reduce the chances that drug offenders will go to prison.  If states with punitive 
laws spend more money on locking offenders up and keeping them there longer, and then 
devote little resources to rehabilitating them in prison, then this may reduce the 
propensity of prosecutors and judges to seek prison terms for drug offenders.  
The findings regarding the effects of more punitive drug laws were mixed.  
Contrary to expectations, drug offenders sentenced in states with more mandatory 
enhancements for drug-related crimes do not face a significantly higher odds of being 
incarcerated compared to drug offenders convicted in states with fewer or no drug 
enhancements.  However, the minimum penalties for the sale of cocaine exert a strong 
influence on the odds of going to prison versus probation.  Compared with offenders 
sentenced in states with no minimum incarceration for the sale of 1 ounce of cocaine, the 
probability of prison versus probation doubles for drug offenders convicted in the most 
punitive states, where the minimum penalty for selling 1 ounce of cocaine is 10 years in 
prison (see Figure 4.3).  Prior contextual sentencing studies have not examined the effects 
of drug policy on the specific sentences applied to these defendants, but the results 
reported here suggest that one way forward in understanding the impact of differences in 
the severity of laws may be to examine the effects of specific statutes on specific types of 
samples (e.g., the effects of mandatory enhancements on the sentencing of violent 
offenders, or comparing the effects of sex offender laws on the sentencing of sex 
offenders).  More broadly, these findings suggest that differences in state legal codes are 
an important part of the story on why sentencing varies significantly across jurisdictions 
in the U.S.  Future research that pools defendants from courts in multiple states should 
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explore more thoroughly the implications of this for both multilevel sentencing research 
and aggregate level research on incarceration rates.  As one study’s authors recently 
observed, the bulk of aggregate level research on incarceration rates is consumed with 
estimating the effects of socioeconomic structural factors and that this “traditional 
approach dismisses the variation in state-level sentencing and corrections policies and 
confounds the impact of ideological and political covariates of imprisonment with state-
centered interventions.” (Stemen and Rengifo, 2011: 175).  To the extent that this is true, 
this raises doubts about the findings from previous studies that have used the SCPS to 
explain variation in sentencing.  Without controls for differences in statutory penalties, 
the significant results reported in these studies for racial composition, crime rates, and 
religious fundamentalism may be misleading.  It could be the case that these types of 
community attributes are more influential in shaping the severity of state law than the 
severity of judicial behavior at sentencing, and that social structural variables hold little 
relevance once controlling for variation in the content of the law.  This study provided 
only a modest step towards examining the impact that penal codes have on generating 
variation in the sentencing of drug offenders within the U.S.  Nevertheless, the findings 
are similar in spirit to those reported by Baumer and Martin (2011), who find that 
variation in the severity of state penalties for murder explain a substantial portion of 
inter-county variability in the sentencing of convicted murderers.  Thus, future research 
should attempt to make strides toward better accounting for differences across states in 
the severity of penal codes. 
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Organizational Context 
Another shortcoming of the literature this study attempted to address was the 
absence of variables measuring jurisdictional differences in the organizational constraints 
and opportunities to punish more harshly.  The models presented here tested the 
hypotheses that as the costs of prison are higher, and the physical capability to imprison 
lower, that courts will be less likely to mete out prison terms.  The analyses also tested 
whether fiscal offsets in the form of charging probationers supervision fees help to 
account for why some jurisdictions, on average, are significantly less likely to imprison 
offenders.  On the whole, the results for both the full sample and drug cases support these 
hypotheses. Even after adjusting for level-one characteristics and other level-two 
variables, the final model (Table 4.11) shows that the amount of monthly probation fees 
courts charge probationers remains a significant negative influence on the odds of prison 
versus jail.  As expected, correctional spending is also associated with less punitive 
sanctions for both the full sample as well as drug offenders, even after controlling for 
prison crowding (which could be expected to explain away the effect of high correctional 
costs) and levels of crime.  The results for probation fees do not extend to the sentencing 
of drug offenders, however.  Additional research is needed to explore whether drug 
offenders are a more costly probation burden for states (hence, removing any fiscal 
benefit of placing them on probation in lieu of incarceration), or if drug offenders are on 
average less likely to pay their probation supervision fees.  Overall, the findings reported 
here suggest that these organizational attributes play an important, and frankly 
underappreciated, role in explaining why sentencing behavior varies across jurisdictions.  
Though state fiscal “crises” are gaining more attention in today’s economic context, the 
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burden of corrections costs on states has been an issue for over 10 years.  In 2002, 
twenty-five states were forced to reduce their corrections budgets because state revenue 
could not meet the demands of correctional budgets.  That same year, the Vera Institute 
conducted a study on the budgetary consequences of “get tough” sentencing policies and 
found that many states slowed corrections spending by repealing mandatory minimums 
and reclassifying certain offenses in such a way that they no longer automatically result 
in prison sentences (Wilhelm and Turner, 2002).  These types of developments, coupled 
with the findings reported here, suggest that the costs of punishment are important to 
consider.  These issues have been overlooked in the broader sentencing literature.  As 
Engen recently observed, “The preoccupation with detecting and explaining unwarranted 
disparity in sentencing research has been accompanied by a near-exclusive emphasis on 
individual-level social psychological theories of decision-making and, to a lesser extent, 
on contextual theories (e.g., racial threat) that still emphasize subjective decision-making 
as the central causal mechanism.  Theories must devote equal attention to understanding 
the institutional features such as sentencing laws, that provide the context in which these 
decision-making processes take place.” (2009: 333).  The findings presented here echo 
Engen’s call that greater attention be given to institutional factors. 
 
Social Threat 
A particularly noteworthy finding is that measures of social conflict and fear of 
crime are unrelated to sentencing outcomes.  With the exception of racial composition, 
this continues a trend observed in the literature of weak and inconsistent effects of 
economic conditions on sentencing severity.  Conflict theories will undoubtedly retain 
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their importance in the macro and multilevel research on crime control, but the collective 
weight of the evidence shown in Table 2.2 and reported in the current study suggest that 
researchers seek out new variables and measures of social context to interpret community 
variation in sentencing.  Though nearly every study reviewed in Chapter 2 considers the 
effects of economic conditions on sentencing, conflict models of sentencing might be 
better geared towards understanding the sentencing of disadvantaged and minority 
defendants instead of felons generally. 
 
Public Sentiment 
 Finally, a major aim of this study was to expand on prior research by examining 
the effects of social attributes emphasized in theories that draw heavily from Durkheim’s 
conceptualization of punishment as rooted in moral and cultural sensibilities.  The 
findings from models that include measures of public sentiment suggest that the 
relationship between socio-cultural context and sentencing is complex.  For the full 
sample, the final model (Table 4. 11) indicates that the probability of incarceration is 
lower in more fundamentalist communities, and greater in jurisdictions with higher levels 
of racial prejudice.  For the drug sample, the results are similar with one exception- the 
sentencing of drug offenders appears to be sensitive to levels of social trust.  Braithwaite 
stresses that more therapeutic forms of punishment will flourish in more 
“communitarian” social environments, where interpersonal trust and mutual 
interdependence thrive (1989).  These findings bolster the arguments that public attitudes 
are an important part of understanding reactions to crime.  Garland in particular has 
emphasized that while punishment has many purposes, one that has grown increasingly 
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important is conveying public sentiment.  Evidence of this can be seen in political efforts 
to adopt crime control policies that sought to alleviate public fear and to articulate public 
sentiments about how best to control crime.  What is intriguing about much of the 
theoretical work on the politics of crime control is that the effects of public sentiment are 
often assumed to be in the direction of stricter punishment.  For instance, Garland 
observes that “punishment- in the sense of expressive punishment, conveying public 
sentiment- is once again a respectable, openly embraced, penal purpose and has come to 
affect not just high-end sentences for the most heinous offenses but even juvenile justice 
and community penalties” (2001: 9).  While this is certainly true to some extent, the 
findings from this study also highlight those aspects of local culture that help reduce the 
severity of punishment for offenders.  In sum, the results reported here suggest that 
variables tapping the normative environment in which sentencing occurs can help us 
understand why some communities are more punitive than others.  Because the effects of 
these variables have not been examined in much previous research, future work should 
replicate these analyses with data from different jurisdictions, different time periods and 
for a broader range of court outcomes such as pretrial arraignment, charging, conviction, 
and sentence length decisions. 
 
STUDY WEAKNESSES AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The weaknesses of this study are plentiful, but perhaps the most critical are the 
lack of more detailed information on the circumstances of each offense and the lack of a 
control for the “presumptive sentence” for each individual case.  More detailed 
information on the specific circumstances and severity of each conviction charge would 
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permit a more comprehensive analysis of the extent to which sentencing variation is 
explained by jurisdictional differences in legal codes.  For instance, if we know what 
felony class each offense in the SCPS fell into, whether it was “aggravated”, and perhaps 
victim and location attributes, it would be possible to search each state’s penal code for 
specific sentence ranges and then model variation in sentencing as a function of 
variability in the severity of statutes.  As it stands, the current study is unable to control 
for presumptive sentences.  While I attempt to partition any variance that might be due to 
state legal codes with a three-level model, this is insufficient.  At the same time, the lack 
of a control for presumptive sentence may be less consequential when analyzing variation 
in the decision of whether to incarcerate.  In an effort to gauge the extent to which states 
vary in the presumption of incarceration for each of the felony crime types included in 
the SCPS, I reviewed the state penal codes for each of the nineteen states included in the 
sample.  Most of these states typically allow incarceration for any felony, and all states 
loosely define felonies as any crime punishable by incarceration.  However, in guideline 
states the penalties become much more specific and for a number of felony offenses 
incarceration is not the presumptive sentence if an offender has no prior record.  Thus, 
the current study likely does a poor job of accurately modeling variation in sentencing for 
defendants convicted in guideline states.   
Other limitations of the study, and ones that pervade sentencing research 
generally, include the lack of information on victim attributes and defendant 
socioeconomic status, potential selection bias problems, and especially, more detailed 
information on prosecutorial decisions regarding initial charging and charge reductions.  
This latter point is particularly important for modeling sentencing outcomes in states that 
 Martin, Kimberly, 2011, p. 264 
have adopted determinate sentencing, mandatory minimums, and guidelines.  As several 
studies have found, these reforms have displaced much of the discretion traditionally 
afforded to judges and placed it in the hands of prosecutors.  Because these reforms make 
sentencing more predictable and certain, prosecutors are able to control the sentencing 
process through charging decisions.  This unintended effect of reform has been observed 
in states such as Washington, Minnesota, Ohio, and in the case of mandatory minimums, 
Oregon (Engen, 2009; Merrit et al., 2006; Wooldredge, 2009). Thus, the current study 
may in fact not be modeling judicial behavior at all in jurisdictions that operate under 
determinate and/or presumptive guideline schemes.  This raises a larger concern about 
the ability of this study to draw any conclusions about the effects of policies on 
sentencing.  With the exception of the estimates pertaining to the effects of drug statutes, 
it is difficult to discern from this type of analysis exactly whether or how policy shapes 
sentencing.  A more thorough analysis devoted strictly to policy questions would need to 
examine how various court outcomes (not just the in/out decision) are influenced by 
policy.  For instance, the current study finds that for drug offenders TIS time-served 
requirements and three-strikes are significantly and negatively related to the risk of 
prison.  If court personnel simply ignore those laws (perhaps they disagree with how 
punitive the statutes are), we would expect to observe a null effect of these punitive 
policies on sentencing.  However, it is a challenge to explain why, controlling for crime 
rates and prison capacities, sentencing for drug offenders would be significantly more 
lenient in jurisdictions with these laws.  There are several possibilities.  One is that the 
effects of policy may be conditioned by community social context, or by a court’s 
caseload pressure- suggesting that courts will blunt the effects of more punitive laws if 
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the laws interfere with case processing efficiency or if local prosecutors do not feel the 
public desires such punitive laws.  There is evidence to suggest this is true in the case of 
three-strikes in California, where the law was passed as part of a voter ballot initiative.  In 
their ethnographic study of chief prosecutors’ implementation of three-strikes in 
California counties, Harris and Jesilow (2000) found that though many prosecutors were 
uncomfortable with the severity of the law, they fully implemented three-strikes 
provisions because it was popular among voters.  Another possibility is that more 
punitive sentencing policies change how courts “do business” (Tonry, 2006).  For 
instance, there is good reason to suspect that in states with some of the more punitive 
laws, plea bargains and charging “behave” differently, and not merely because 
prosecutors may disagree with the severity of the laws legislatures pass (e.g., see Merritt 
et al., 2006; Tonry, 2006).  For example, one of the concerns about the effects of 
mandatory minimums and 3-strikes was that these laws would clog the courts with trials 
by reducing the incentive for a defendant to plea.  Thus, the laws would increase the 
number of defendants who would rather take their chances at trial in order to avoid 
pleading guilty and being sentenced under such harsh terms (Clark, Austin, and Henry, 
1997; Olsen, 2000).  If this is true, then prosecutors and defense attorneys in these 
jurisdictions must “hustle” to secure plea bargains, and in order to secure them, might 
have to offer much more beneficial bargain terms than prosecutors in jurisdictions 
without such harsh policies (presumably, pleading is a less frightening proposition in a 
jurisdiction with less punitive statutes).  If this is in fact happening, then plea bargain 
deals may offer more lenient sentencing options in these states compared with plea deals 
elsewhere. Consistent with a deterrence/economic perspective, this would increase 
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convictions (the certainty of punishment), and drive down the overall severity of 
punishment.  Because a dummy indicator for plea bargain would not be able to capture 
these nuances, we could conceivably observe that sentencing is more lenient in three-
strikes jurisdictions because most of the SCPS sample (95%) pleads guilty.  An 
interesting question thus arises: are the benefits of plea bargains greater in jurisdictions 
with more punitive legal policies in ways that explain why in the current study nearly 
every indicator of punitive legal policy tends to be negatively associated with the 
probability of imprisonment (though not significantly).  
There is some evidence from California that supports the argument that policy 
may actually lower the severity of punishment by altering plea bargaining practices.  In 
the aforementioned study on the implementation of three-strikes in California, Harris and 
Jesilow (2000) document that judges were resistant to the passage of the law because it 
disrupted the ability of prosecutors to secure pleas, which in turn increased the caseload 
pressure on judges.  The authors explain that before the passage of three-strikes plea 
bargains were easily accomplished because the court workgroup knew what the informal 
going rates were for most crimes.  However, after the adoption of three-strikes, 
defendants became reluctant to plead guilty, which disrupted the efficient processing of 
cases.  In response, judges in one county began circumventing the authority of 
prosecutors who were consistently charging defendants under the provisions of the law 
(at least initially).  Judges frequently made promises to delete any prior strikes on a 
defendant’s record in exchange for a plea bargain.  By striking prior felonies to avoid 
sentencing under the three-strikes law, the authors of the study found that 80% of the 
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time judges did this, the plea deals offered the lowest possible minimum sentence in 
exchange for the defendant’s plea (Harris and Jesilow, 2000: 197-198).   
Future research on the effects of policy could explore these types of issues and 
form a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of policy on sentencing, if 
widely used databases like the SCPS and the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 
included more detailed data on prosecutorial decision making.  This is especially 
important in the present day context of sentencing in large urban courts where plea 
bargaining is almost always the mode of conviction, and where presumably the 
importance of the prosecutor and defense attorneys is more important than ever for 
understanding the disposition of felony cases.  Finally, and building off of this theme of 
examining the process of punishment, future research should explore whether some of 
the relationships observed here between social context and sentencing might be mediated 
by earlier decisions such as the granting of bail and the ability to secure pretrial release. 
For example, a good deal of sentencing research uses data sets from Washington and 
Pennsylvania that do not contain information on pre-conviction decisions such as 
charging and pretrial detention (Bushway and Piehl, 2007).  This is not a trivial 
limitation; pretrial detention in the current study is among the strongest predictors 
(second only to offense severity) of incarceration.  It would be useful to know if the 
relationships between social context and sentencing that are reported in studies that rely 
on post-conviction data sets are mediated by earlier decisions, especially pretrial 
detention. Such research could greatly advance the broader literature on court processing 
by clarifying more precisely the stages and decision-makers that are most sensitive to the 
effects of social context. 
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APPENDIX A.  SENTENCING STRUCTURES AND LAWS REGULATING HABITUAL      
OFFENDING AND PROBATION SUPERVISION IN STATES USED IN ANALYSES, 1998-2004†     
State 3 Strikes Law 1    Structured 
Sentencing 
  Determinancy and Type of Structured Sentencing   Adoption 
Date 
  Truth in 
Sentencing 2  
           
Alabama No  Yes  Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines  2000  33% 
           
Arizona  No  Yes  Determinate Sentencing with Presumptive Terms  1978  85% 
      (Single term for each offense class)     
           
California  Yes  Yes  
Determinate Sentencing with Presumptive Terms; Parole 
Retained  
1976 
 50% 
      (Presumptive single term for each specific offense)     
           
Connecticut  No  No  No Structured Sentencing System in Place    50% 
           
Florida 3 No  Yes  
Determinate Sentencing with Presumptive Minimum 
Terms  
1994 
 85% 
           
Georgia No  No  No Structured Sentencing System in Place    33% 
           
Illinois  No  No  Determinate Sentencing    50% 
           
Indiana Yes  Yes  Determinate Sentencing with Presumptive Terms  1977   
      (Single term for each offense class)    50% 
           
Maryland No  Yes  Voluntary Guidelines  1983  25% 
           
Michigan  Yes  Yes  Voluntary Guidelines  1985-1998  100% 
      Presumptive Guidelines  1999-Present   
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Missouri  Yes  Yes  Voluntary Guidelines  1997  15% 
           
New Jersey Yes  Yes  Presumptive Sentencing  1977  33% 
      (Single term for each offense class)     
           
New York No  No  No Structured Sentencing System in Place    83% 
           
Ohio  No  Yes  Determinate Sentencing with Presumptive Terms  1996  100% 
      (Single term for each offense class)     
           
Pennsylvania No  Yes  Presumptive Guidelines  1982  100% 
           
Tennessee  No  Yes  Presumptive Guidelines  1989  30% 
           
Texas  Yes  No  No Structured Sentencing System in Place    25% 
           
Virginia  No  Yes  Determinate Sentencing with Voluntary Guidelines  1995  85% 
           
Washington No  Yes  Determinate Sentencing with Presumptive Guidelines  1984  66% 
                      
†: Information on each state's sentencing criteria up to 2002 was adapted from Stemen, Rengifo and Wilson (2005). Information for 2004 collected by study author.  
1: State has a 3 Strikes Law where any current felony conviction qualifies as a strikable offense.      
2: Percentage of the minimum or fixed sentence that felony offenders will serve.      
3: As explained in Stemen et al. (2005, p. 66) Florida repealed its presumptive guidelines in 1994 and replaced them with the "Criminal Punishment Code" which determines the lowest 
possible sentence that judges must impose without a departure.  Judges may then sentence offenders up to the statutory maximum for the offense in question.  As Stemen et al. (2005) 
explain, "Thus, the Code is not really a set of sentencing guidelines used to determine a specific sentence, but functions simply to determine the minimum sentence that a judge must 
impose without a departure."  
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Appendix B.  Zero-Order Correlations among Jurisdictional Variables included in Analysis of Legal Sanctions Applied in Felony Cases (N=91 county-years).  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
               
(1)      Index Crime Rate -- .024 .234* -.037 -.024 .226* -.011 .425* .340* .078 .263* -.012 .074 
               
(2)      Determinate Sentencing  -- -.171 -.223* .186 .104 .250* -.465* -.069 -.114 .420* .034 .134 
               
(3)      Presumptive Guidelines   -- -.143 .334* -.172 .292 .206* -.076 -.284* .010 -.114 -.051 
                
(4)      Voluntary Guidelines    -- -.250* -.099 -.089 .004 -.212* -.150 -.284* .383* .233* 
                
(5) 
     (TIS) % Sentence Offenders Must  
     Serve     -- -.424* .269* .040 -.314* -.416* .167 -.257* -.043 
               
(6)      Three Strikes Policy      -- .157 -.284* -.110 .220* -.006 .059 -.030 
               
(7) 
     Mandatory Sentencing  
     Enhancement Score       -- .016 -.333 .153 .271* .252* .012 
               
(8) 
     Mandatory Enhancements for Drug  
     Offenses        -- .285 .171 .049 .190 -.189 
               
(9) 
     Severity of Cocaine Possession  
     Sanctions         -- .720* -.005 -.083 -.095 
               
(10)      Severity of Cocaine Sale Sanctions          -- -.125 .071 -.119 
               
(11)      Monthly Probation Supervision Fee           -- -.029 .010 
                
(12)      Prosecutor Caseload Pressure            -- .074 
               
(13)      Jail Capacity Constraints             -- 
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Appendix B, continued.  Correlations among Jurisdictional Variables included in Analysis of Legal Sanctions Applied in Felony Cases (N=91 county-years).  
    (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
               
(1)      Index Crime Rate -.216* -209* .510* -.007 257* .497* .016 .381* -.126 .418* .507* .332* .383* 
               
(2)      Determinate Sentencing .331* -.024 -.518* .305* -.255* -.212* .080 -.162 .101 -.199 -.029 .434* -.272* 
               
(3)      Presumptive Guidelines -.162 -.105 .267* -.239* .192 .067 .001 .028 .017 .080 -.026 .125 .197 
               
(4)      Voluntary Guidelines -.195 -.189 .144 -.299 -.216* -.287* .078 .256* -.167 .129 -.043 -.228* -.120 
               
(5) 
     (TIS) % Sentence Offenders 
Must Serve -.099 .370* -.083 -.057 .086 .014 .241* -.297* -.128 -.231* -.248* -.124 -.079 
               
(6)      Three Strikes Policy .340* -.061 -.254* .214* .005 -.221* .023 -.281* .284* -.156 -.266* -.008 -.374* 
               
(7) 
     Mandatory Sentencing 
Enhancement Score .026 .049 -.373* .169 -.089 -.194 .314* -.128 .186 -.237* -.041 .375* -.146 
               
(8) 
     Mandatory Enhancements for 
Drug Offenses -.624* -.287* .350* -.273* .100 .179 -.103 .397* -.079 .368* .392* -.057 .414* 
               
(9) 
     Severity of Cocaine 
Possession Sanctions -.114 -.381* .374* -.105 .144 .333* -.377* .331* .140 .352* .511* .400* .539* 
               
(10) 
     Severity of Cocaine Sale 
Sanctions -.126 -.178 .148 .091 .066 .202 -.296* .228* .169 .203 .331* .289* .225* 
               
(11) 
     Monthly Probation 
Supervision Fee -.121 .178 -.295* .196 -.229 -.015 .104 .278* .005 .114 .410* .448* .155 
                
(12)      Prosecutor Caseload Pressure -.277* -.364 -.067 -.081 -.114 -.255* .071 .224* -.099 .196 .074 .050 -.012 
               
(13)      Jail Capacity Constraints .114 -.063 -.020 -.117 -.107 -.192 -.089 .038 .049 -.068 -.106 -.015 -.106 
               
(14)      Prison Capacity Constraints -- .005 -.237* .106 -.114 -.097 .047 -.524* .171 -.308* -.327* .058 -.290* 
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    (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
(15) 
     Per Capita Corrections   
     Expenditures   -- -.280* .425* .080 .113 .202 -.098 -.041 -.451* -.230* -.230* -.364* 
    (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25)  
(16)      % Population Black   -- -.301* .605* .597* -.200 .238* -.219* .366* -.227* -.127 .478* 
               
(17)      % Population Hispanic    -- .284* .253* .374* -.017 -.230* -.069 -.058 .043 -.267* 
               
(18)      Unemployment Rate     -- .633* .049 -.109 -.169 .045 -.041 -.163 .135 
               
(19)      Income Inequality (Gini)      -- -.085 .144 -.224* .212* .327* .068 .360* 
               
(20)      Fear of Crime       -- -.099 -.384* .129 -.194 -.229* -.286* 
               
(21)      Southern Jurisdiction        -- -.106 .507* .631* .234* .471* 
               
(22)      Levels of Social Trust         -- -.412* -.008 .293* -.031 
               
(23)      Religious Fundamentalism          -- .460* .005 .509* 
               
(24) 
     Politically Conservative      
     Ideology           -- .602* .737* 
               
(25)      % Favor Capital Punishment            -- .383* 
               
(26)      Anti-Black Racial Animus             -- 
                              
* p < .05              
 
 
 
 
 
